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If You Want Peace, Prepare for War, and Diplomacy

A combination of deterrence and diplomacy is key to avoiding war and pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula.

By: Robert Einhorn

Publication Type: Analysis

This essay is part of a series, Pursuing Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea , that explores how the United States and South Korea can peacefully coexist with a nuclear North Korea. 

At this Kim Dae-jung Peace Forum, it’s useful to recall seemingly paradoxical advice offered by a fourth-century Roman general: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you want peace, prepare for war.”

This Roman-era aphorism has come to mean that if you face an aggressive adversary, build your military strength so that the adversary knows that, if it launches an attack, it will receive a punishing response — and will therefore be discouraged from pursuing such an attack. The idea of achieving peace by preparing for war has been a critical foundation of security strategies for many centuries. Today we call it “deterrence.”

Of course, not all countries prepare for war in order to have peace. Some have prepared for war as a prelude to waging war. Hitler built the Nazi war machine to conquer Europe and beyond. But for countries genuinely seeking peace and facing significant security threats from well-armed adversaries, building countervailing military strength has usually been the chosen strategy. They feared that failure to build and maintain adequate deterrent capabilities would signal weakness and might only invite aggression.

The Limits of Deterrence

Deterrence — or peace through strength, as it is sometimes called — has stood the test of time because it is widely believed to have worked. Deterrence of the Soviet Union by the United States and its NATO allies during the Cold War is credited with avoiding a major East-West conflict.

But a strategy of deterrence is not without risks. Strengthening defenses to deter an adversary may be interpreted by that adversary as an indication of aggressive intent and a serious threat to its own security. It may respond by further building up its own capabilities. The result may be an expensive and destabilizing arms race — one that reinforces mutual antagonisms, perpetuates a state of confrontation and makes resolution of the underlying conflict even more difficult.

In addition, as both sides build up their military capabilities, they may declare policies, test weapon systems or engage in exercises or deployments that the other side views as preparations for the use of force, even preemptive use of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, the risk of armed conflict breaking out as a result of accidents, misperceptions or miscalculations would grow.

Moreover, even if a mutual military buildup does not result in large-scale armed hostilities, it would not necessarily prevent lower-level provocations. Indeed, an aggressor’s belief that it could deter large-scale retaliation could increase its confidence that it could engage in lower-level provocations with impunity.

To avoid war and ultimately achieve peace, deterrence should be accompanied by diplomacy.

During the Cold War, while amassing huge nuclear arsenals to deter each other, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in diplomacy to moderate and stabilize their competition, limit and reduce their nuclear forces, adopt transparency and confidence-building measures to avoid dangerous miscalculations, and in general prevent their competition from getting out of control.

Yes, if you want peace, prepare for war. But also pursue diplomacy.

So, how do these considerations apply to matters of war and peace on the contemporary Korean Peninsula?

North Korea’s Growing Capabilities

Seventy years after the Korean Armistice Agreement, hope for genuine peace on the peninsula continues to fade. In recent years, the security environment has dramatically deteriorated. The primary cause of increased tension and instability has been North Korea’s relentless efforts to expand and diversify its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Under Kim Jong Un, this rapidly growing nuclear arsenal has been accompanied by inflammatory rhetoric toward Seoul and Washington, including the North’s often-declared willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively .

What is Kim’s motivation for his aggressive nuclear posture? Is it essentially defensive — to ensure the survival of his regime from foreign interference or attack? Or is it essentially offensive — to intimidate and coerce South Korea and reunify the peninsula under Pyongyang’s control? Of course, we don’t know. We can only speculate.

North Korea’s initial motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons may well have been defensive — to deter what it perceived as foreign, mainly U.S., efforts to undermine or eliminate its regime. But whatever its initial motivation, Kim may now feel emboldened by his increased capabilities to pursue more offensive objectives.

Many observers doubt that Kim sees reunification of the peninsula by force as a realistic possibility. But he may now feel he can dominate inter-Korean relations, drive wedges in the U.S.-South Korean alliance and engage in increasingly aggressive provocations. And he may become dangerously overconfident in his ability to control the risks of escalation.

South Korea and the United States have become increasingly alarmed by the growing threat from North Korea. South Korean concerns have been magnified by uncertainty about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees.

U.S.-South Korea Response: Prioritizing Deterrence

The main allied response to the North Korean threat has been to boost their collective deterrent capabilities.

At the highest political levels, the administrations of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden have worked together closely to demonstrate strong alliance solidarity and resolve. Seoul has augmented its own conventional capabilities, including its  three-axis strategy . South Korea and the United States have taken significant steps to reinforce the credibility of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent and to give South Korea a more prominent role in the planning and execution of that deterrent — most notably in the  Washington Declaration adopted during Yoon’s state visit to Washington in April. And together with Japan, the allies have boosted trilateral defense cooperation in unprecedented ways, as agreed at the Camp David summit in August 2023.

While prioritizing deterrence, the allies have also sought diplomatic engagement — reaching out repeatedly to Pyongyang to begin talks . But all those initiatives were rebuffed by the North.

In the absence of diplomacy, the situation is becoming more dangerous. North Korea continues to advance its threatening capabilities. The allies continue to strengthen their deterrent — with large-scale, live-fire joint defense drills and high-profile visits of U.S. strategic assets, including a port visit by a U.S. ballistic missile submarine. Pyongyang, in turn, condemns those allied efforts, which it claims are preparations for attacking the North. It says those efforts justify the further acceleration of its own programs and even its preemptive nuclear doctrine.

Risk Reduction: The Most Immediate Objective

What can be done to break this downward spiral? It may be time for a renewed push for diplomacy. But to get talks underway, a somewhat different approach may be required.

I believe the major reason Kim has so far rejected engagement has been his desire to avoid talks that might interfere with the completion of his ambitious five-year plan to develop and test key nuclear and missile capabilities.

But another reason may be what Washington and Seoul declare must be the focus of any negotiation — namely, the North’s complete denuclearization. Kim has made it clear that he has no intention of eliminating what he regards as essential to the survival of his regime. He says repeatedly that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is irreversible and nonnegotiable .

If Pyongyang eventually gets rid of its nuclear weapons, it will be the result of either a fundamental transformation of the current regime’s policies and values or its collapse.

Neither outcome can be dismissed altogether, especially the regime’s eventual collapse. But we can’t count on either one, at least not in the near term. Realistically, we will have to live with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

The United States and its allies can’t accept the North as a legitimate nuclear-armed country. It acquired nuclear weapons illegally and deceitfully. Accepting its nuclear capability would set a dangerous precedent that is damaging to the global nonproliferation regime.

The United States and its allies should continue to adhere to the ultimate goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But for now, they should focus on the most immediate threat — the risk of intentional or inadvertent armed conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.

The United States and South Korea should therefore approach North Korea and propose setting aside denuclearization for the time being and focusing instead on a risk reduction agenda — primarily confidence-building, transparency and communications measures that can enhance predictability and reduce the risks of armed conflict resulting from accident, misperception or miscalculation. Negotiations could take place bilaterally, trilaterally or in a multilateral regional format, perhaps involving the countries that participated in the Six-Party Talks.

Participants might be required to reaffirm the goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — a goal Kim supported in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement  — although participants would presumably continue to differ on the conditions that would make the attainment of that goal possible.

The risk-reduction measures that might be considered in such talks could include:

• prenotification of flight tests of several categories of missiles
• prenotification of land, sea and air military exercises meeting certain agreed-upon criteria
• avoidance of military activities in specified geographic areas (for example, no-fly zones or maritime buffer zones)
• the establishment of routine and crisis communications channels
• the resurrection of several confidence-building steps contained in the moribund North-South Comprehensive Military Agreement
• the adoption of so-called rules of the road to prevent provocative cyber activities
• the toning down of inflammatory rhetoric (including threats to use nuclear weapons preemptively or to launch decapitation strikes against an adversary’s leadership)
• the creation of what might be called “risk-reduction dialogues” where civilian and military officials would meet regularly to raise concerns about another country’s military activities and seek measures to address those concerns

Such risk reduction measures would not bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. Neither would they ensure progress toward denuclearization or remove the need for current U.S. and South Korean efforts to strengthen deterrence and maintain allied military readiness.

Moreover, North Korea’s willingness to engage on risk-reduction measures is far from certain. It may believe that maintaining risks at a high level serves its interests by discouraging the United States and its allies from conducting military activities that could increase the likelihood of conflict. Or it may decide to engage but condition its support for risk-reduction measures on unacceptable concessions from the allies.

Still, in light of the huge stakes, it is worth a try. Risk-reduction measures along these lines — together with a determined allied effort to reinforce deterrence — could help arrest or even reverse the current downward spiral on the peninsula. They could reduce each side’s incentives for pursuing an open-ended arms competition. Perhaps most importantly, they could help alleviate one of the most acute threats on the peninsula today — the risk of inadvertent armed conflict that could escalate to nuclear war.

And if faithfully implemented, such measures could reduce tensions, build habits of constructive engagement, pave the way for practical steps to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat and at least keep alive the hope, however remote today, of a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula living in peace.

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” There’s much truth in that age-old advice. Deterrence may well be a necessary condition for achieving peace — or at least avoiding war.

But it’s only a partial truth. Deterrence may be necessary, but it’s not sufficient. It must be accompanied by diplomacy. And there’s an increasingly urgent need for diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula — diplomacy with realistically achievable and critically important goals.

This is a lightly edited version of Robert Einhorn’s remarks to the 2023 Kim Dae-jung Peace Forum on October 6, 2023, in Mokpo, South Korea.

Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow at the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology of the Brookings Institution.

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Who Said 'If You Want Peace, Prepare for War'?

This Roman idea is still in many minds today

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The original Latin of the expression "if you want peace, prepare for war" comes from the book " Epitoma Rei Militaris, " by the Roman general Vegetius (whose full name was Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus). The Latin is, " Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum ."

Before the fall of the Roman Empire , the quality of its army had begun to deteriorate, according to Vegetius, and the decay of the army came from within itself. His theory was that the army grew weak from being idle during a long time of peace and stopped wearing its protective armor. This made them vulnerable to enemy weapons and to the temptation to flee from battle.

Vegetius' quote has been interpreted to mean that the time to prepare for war is not when war is imminent but rather when times are peaceful. Likewise, a strong peacetime army could signal to would-be invaders or attackers that the battle may not be worth it. 

Vegetius' Role in Military Strategy

Because it was written by a Roman military expert, Vegetius' " Epitoma Rei Militaris " is considered by many to be the foremost military treatise in Western civilization. Despite having little military experience of his own, Vegetius' writings were highly influential on European military tactics, particularly after the Middle Ages.

Vegetius was what was known as a patrician in Roman society , meaning he was an aristocrat. Also known as the   " Rei Militaris Instituta ," Vegetius' book was written sometime between 384 and 389. He sought a return to the Roman military system of legion formation, which was highly organized and depended on a disciplined infantry.

His writings had little influence on the military leaders of his own day, but there was a particular interest in Vegetius' work later, in Europe. According to "Encyclopedia Britannica," because he was the first Christian Roman to write about military affairs, Vegetius' work was, for centuries, considered the "military bible of Europe." It's said that George Washington had a copy of this treatise. 

Peace Through Strength

Many military thinkers have modified Vegetius' ideas for a different time, such as to the shorter expression of "peace through strength."

Roman Emperor Hadrian (76–138) was probably the first to use that expression. He has been quoted as saying "peace through strength or, failing that, peace through threat."

In the United States, Theodore Roosevelt coined the phrase "Speak softly and carry a big stick."

Later, Bernard Baruch, who advised Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, wrote a book titled "Peace Through Strength" about a defense plan.

The phrase was publicized widely during the 1964 Republican presidential campaign and was used again during the 1970s to support the construction of the MX missile. The adage justified the Cold War buildup of nuclear missiles as a deterrent to war.

Ronald Reagan brought "peace through strength" back into the limelight in 1980, accusing President Jimmy Carter of weakness on the international stage. Said Reagan: "We know that peace is the condition under which mankind was meant to flourish. Yet peace does not exist of its own will. It depends on us, on our courage to build it and guard it and pass it on to future generations."

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ECONLOG POST

Dec 17 2008

If You Want Peace, Prepare for Peace

Bryan caplan .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-author-boxes-avatar img { width: 80px important; height: 80px important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-author-boxes-avatar img { border-radius: 50% important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-author-boxes-meta a { background-color: #655997 important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-author-boxes-meta a { color: #ffffff important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-author-boxes-meta a:hover { color: #ffffff important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_email-profile-data { background-color: #655997 important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_email-profile-data { border-radius: 100% important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_email-profile-data { color: #ffffff important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_email-profile-data:hover { color: #ffffff important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_url-profile-data { background-color: #655997 important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_url-profile-data { border-radius: 100% important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_url-profile-data { color: #ffffff important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-user_url-profile-data:hover { color: #ffffff important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-author-boxes-recent-posts-title { border-bottom-style: dotted important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-author-boxes-recent-posts-item { text-align: left important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-li { border-style: none important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-li { color: #3c434a important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-li { border-radius: px important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-category-wrap .ppma-category-group { margin-bottom: px important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-category-wrap .ppma-category-group { margin-right: px important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-category-wrap { font-size: px important; } .pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode .ppma-author-category-wrap .ppma-category-group-title { font-weight: important; } .pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline ul.pp-multiple-authors-boxes-ul { display: flex; } .pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline ul.pp-multiple-authors-boxes-ul li { margin-right: 10px }.pp-multiple-authors-boxes-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-wrapper.pp-multiple-authors-layout-inline.multiple-authors-target-shortcode.box-post-id-69046.box-instance-id-1.ppma_boxes_69046 ul li > div:nth-child(1) {flex: 1 important;}.

By Bryan Caplan, Dec 17 2008

Since 9/11, you’ve heard it a thousand times: “If you want peace, prepare for war.”  My question: What about your enemies?  If they want peace, should they prepare for war, too?

Yes, it’s a trick question.  Who’s going to say, “If Kim Jong Il wants peace, he’d better pour more money into his nuclear weapons program”?  But it’s also a serious point.  Even the hard-line American hawk thinks that if Kim Jong Il really wants peace, he should just back down and disarm. 

When you think about it, the prudential value of peace is one of the most amazing features of the modern world.  Stop scaring people in other countries, and they’ll leave you alone.  In the Middle Ages, if one princeling unilterally disarmed, he’d probably be invaded before he could say, “Doh!”  But when Russia disarmed after the Cold War ended, in contrast, not even North Korea saw a golden opportunity to attack. 

Is preparing for peace always the best path to peace?  No.  But especially in the modern work, it works more often than you’d think.  And if you retort, “Yes, but that’s only true for our enemies,” consider: How many of your enemies would admit that they would be safer if only they were weaker?  In all likelihood, they’d pant, “You’d like that, wouldn’t you?!  As soon as we lower our guard, you’ll slit our throats!” 

The lesson: “If you want peace, prepare for war,” may sound like a universal truth, but at least nowadays, it’s something we tend to believe whether or not it’s true.

READER COMMENTS

• READ COMMENT POLICY

Dec 17 2008 at 10:18am

Are you aware of the theories that posit that one of the main reasons that the world has been peaceful over the last 70 years is that the U.S. has been the dominant military and economic power, and it has generally frowned upon aggression? Because that would explain why Russia was never attacked; the only country strong enough to attack it was the U.S., and for cultural reasons, we’re not interested. If this theory is correct, then good things would not flow from a unilateral U.S. disarmament, since that would result in increased power for other countries that might not share our distaste for territorial expansion powered by military aggression. China, for example, has been using the threat of military force to try to reacquire Taiwan. If the U.S. weren’t so powerful, China would have invaded Taiwan–or, at least, made its threats much more explicit–long ago.

Additionally, if U.S. military power were weaker, we would move from a unipolar world to a multipolar one, and multipolar worlds are often much less stable and more prone to military conflict. This is one explanation for, e.g., WWI.

Dec 17 2008 at 10:26am

“Stop scaring people in other countries, and they’ll leave you alone.”

Tell that to Kuwait or Georgia.

“But when Russia disarmed after the Cold War ended, in contrast, not even North Korea saw a golden opportunity to attack. ”

They still had the most nukes in the world.

Smaller countries exist under the US’s umbrella (NATO) or through the UN.

Dec 17 2008 at 10:28am

It seems that in the modern world each country you take over is a drain rather than an asset. We got Iraq but if Iraq kept Kuwait would they be fighting an insurgency?

caveat bettor

Dec 17 2008 at 10:43am.

Didn’t Jimmy Carter’s unilateral disarmament actually encourage the Soviet Union to accelerate its arms buildup? I think you are assuming shreds of Scottish Enlightenment throughout the world, and emprically, it is better to assume the doctrine of Original Sin. I believe that the prospect of consequences being tied to decisions–which includes some Big Stick theory–is part of the path to peace.

John Thacker

Dec 17 2008 at 10:53am.

But when Russia disarmed after the Cold War ended, in contrast, not even North Korea saw a golden opportunity to attack.

Russia’s “disarming” included retaining a fair number of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan (and India and China) fought more hot wars with each other before they all had nuclear weapons. Reducing it down to “disarming” is a bit misleading.

Dec 17 2008 at 10:55am

One could more easily say, “If you want peace, stop having designs on external territory and concentrate on oppressing only your own people, and other countries will leave you alone.”

Dec 17 2008 at 10:58am

I really don’t think the issue is all that complicated: Its a continuous iterative prisoner’s dilemma. Peace requires one to prepare for war when its suspected one’s enemies may attack, and prepare for peace when they won’t. Aggression should be responded to with aggression, and peace should be responded to with peace.

In my opinion, the same things which aid prisoner’s dilemmas also aid world peace: Increases in communication and transportation technologies, interdependence (trade), as well as learning from past conflicts.

Do we prepare for war with Canada in order to insure peace with Canada?

Dec 17 2008 at 11:01am

In the past, war was cheap and its gains relatively large. “Let get some mounted men to raid the other tribe and take away their cattle” was a good business plan.

In modern times war is increasily costly, and its gain wrt trade are lower.

So the maxim could be stated as “if you want peace, prepare to be costly to be conquered (but not too much)”

Garrett Schmitt

Dec 17 2008 at 11:06am.

Beyond political commitments to be nice, I would argue that offensive armaments are destabilizing because they pose a threat, but defensive armaments raise the cost of invasion, serving as deterrents.

The live debate in my mind is not whether deterrence works, but how much some weapons (e.g. ICBMs, B-52s, carrier task forces)

a) raise the opportunity cost for foreigners to attack us (deterrence) or

b) decrease the opportunity cost for us to attack foreigners (destablization).

Because all weapon systems accomplish each to some degree, their contribution to deterrence–and thus, sustainable peace–is ambiguous.

Carl Shulman

Dec 17 2008 at 11:12am.

“But when Russia disarmed after the Cold War ended, in contrast, not even North Korea saw a golden opportunity to attack.”

Russia did retain a massive nuclear arsenal capable of incinerating any aggressor.

“Who’s going to say, “If Kim Jong Il wants peace, he’d better pour more money into his nuclear weapons program”?”

I’ll give it a shot. In what way has Kim Jong Il done badly (for himself, not his unfortunate subjects) with the nuclear program? He has had his nuclear test and has his artillery pointed at Seoul, and because of that enjoys increased security, while his leverage in getting foreign aid (without conditions that threaten his regime with the free flow of information) is improved. Iraq got attacked because it *didn’t* have nuclear weapons.

El Presidente

Dec 17 2008 at 11:31am.

Are you aware of the theories that posit that one of the main reasons that the world has been peaceful over the last 70 years is that the U.S. has been the dominant military and economic power, and it has generally frowned upon aggression?

This is an interesting point. I contend that one purpose of government, in a Hobbesian sense, is to monopolize the use of force. This works well to explain the behavior of governments with respect to their own citizens. As any amateur economist can tell you, a monopoly drives price up and output down -> less violence and a higher social, political, financial premium on its use, at least domestically.

However, it doesn’t work so well when applied to the international activities of national governments. Not even the ability to nuke the whole world serves as a credible deterrent in many cases because people are pretty sure we are rational actors and we aren’t eager to push the button. This is more like a prisoner’s dilemma game (as Grant says) because all parties have means of reprisal short of nuclear war. In most cases, we are dealing with states that have domestic control or non-state actors that don’t have a state with which to be concerned. We cannot influence them as readily as the average citizen of our own country because our power is not so great, and cannot be so great as to overwhelm all potential adversaries in perpetuity. To “prepare for war” is thus provoking it in many cases, because it betrays a hostile intent, or at least willingness to objectify others.

Machiavelli’s riff on being loved versus being feared is insightful. His reasoning leads me to believe that there is only one end of violence: destruction of one’s adversary. So, we would be wise to contemplate that end before we make preparation for it or issue implicit or explicit threats. If we are not willing to kill them all, we would do better to talk about how we can improve our mutual fate. If we are trying to kill them all, it’s not a good idea to spook them first. It’ll just make it harder to kill them. Either way, publicly preparing for war is not a deterrent. It’s either a waste of time and resources or revealing our cards too soon.

Dec 17 2008 at 3:19pm

It never ceases to amaze me: game theory experiments in which there is a patently, wildly obvious win-win for both players (this a repeated, not a one-time game)–only about 50% of pairs get to that win-win solution.

All I can say to those at the Discovery Institute, is that it obviously wasn’t a very intelligent designer.

Dec 17 2008 at 3:24pm

I think that the answer might be, “If you want peace, develop nuclear weapons, but forget about all those conventional ones.”

Dec 17 2008 at 4:00pm

“If you want peace, prepare for defense” ?

Dec 17 2008 at 4:55pm

The central premise of this post is that our enemies want peace as much as we do, and their actions are motivated as a response to a hostile US.

Why in the world do Libertarian economists think that laissez faire applies in foreign relations as it does in markets? This is why (to paraphrase Hayek) I’ll never consider myself a Libertarian.

Perhaps you’d like to extend this philosophy to medical care? Let the market take care of that infection!

Please – stick to economics.

James A. Donald

Dec 17 2008 at 6:52pm.

Disarming works for our friends, because we protect them. Disarming works for our enemies, for we would like them to be our friends.

Disarming will not work for us.

That said, government violence seems to be painfully inefficient and inordinately expensive. As piracy becomes a rapidly worsening problem, that governments are unwilling or unable to deal with, we need private groups prepared for war – merchant ships, for example, should carry some machine guns and light artillery. Aircraft captains should carry a gun, and have a reinforced cockpit door with gun ports in it. We need to arm for peace.

Dec 17 2008 at 8:27pm

A courageous post Bryan. Now I have to stop ridiculing you on my blog.

As the comments above show, it would be very hard to convince people who have the opposite world view, just like in macroeconomics. (E.g. Krugman thinks, “Yep, laissez-faire gives you a housing bubble,” while I think, “Yep, Greenspan flooding the market with unbacked credit gives you a housing bubble.”)

For those above who are arguing that the US is keeping the world safe: Look at the disparate treatment of Saddam versus Kim Jong Il. If I were a two-bit tyrant, the lesson would be clear: Acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as possible, since it’s the only sure way to keep the US out of your country.

Dec 18 2008 at 12:29am

Well, the saying goes for one’s own country, and it is rational that in a world governed by the aggressive use of force, a strong defense would create more peace.

Actually, the world *is* probably safer with more nuclear arms floating around, to act as a deterrent to war and/or as an incentive for nations that would otherwise ignore defense (and thus create the risk of invasion) to pay more attention to defense.

I think the best thing for peace is economic liberalization, though. If war as we know it is ever made obsolete, it will be thanks to every economy on Earth becoming a free one that trades freely with all other economies. NOT from bureaucrats sitting around a table, hashing out treaties and pretending they don’t all really hate eachother….. We see how well that works out in the Israeli/everybody else conflict.

Dec 18 2008 at 12:48am

The World has been peaceful over the last 70 years?

2008-70=1938

Since 1938:

WW2 Korean War Cuban Revolution Bay of Pigs Indo-China war Algerian War Suaez Crisis Six Day War Indo-Pakastani War (Twice?) Vietnam War Soviet-Afghan War Iraqi-Iranian War Kuwaiti Invasion/Gulf War X number of terrorist attacks Falklands Greneda Panama Balkans More terrorist attacks Iraqi Invasion Afghansistan Russia-Georgia Conflict

I’m sure I missed some.

What are you talking about?

thebastidge

Dec 18 2008 at 8:39am.

“If Kim Jong Il wants peace, he’d better pour more money into his nuclear weapons program”?

Overly simplistic: Preparing for war is not simply amassing weapons, it is strategic positioning and alliances. The DPRK is in a very poor strategic position.

No real allies, no leverage to get what they want except for military threats. They can only push that envelop so far before somebody gets pre-emptive on them. The nuclear option is on the table, but there are plenty of theorists who point to the limited nuclear war option, particularly with the example of Japan behind us.

The ROK doesn’t want the DPRK nuked: they still see the possibility of reunification as a national goal. China doesn’t want radioactive fallout or the precedent. Russia probably doesn’t much care except for fallout and whatever they can gain in concessions by playing a role. Japan is horrified by the thought of nukes whatsoever, but even more so by nukes in the DPRK under the control of someone so clearly unstable as Jim Jong Il. The US really doesn’t want to ever nuke anyone, ever again, not to mention the political fallout of being seen as a bully.

The DPRK’s best bet would be re-unifying with the ROK, but it would require “losing”. And yet, DRPK continues as a borderline beligerant, not integrating into a social and economic and military framework that allows other nations to relax their guard and get on with the business of improving everyone’s lives.

Indeed, prepare for war. Hopefully the preparations will have secondary and tertiary benefits to offset the (hopeful) waste of time and resources.

Dec 18 2008 at 11:44am

I understand your point and am also confused by blabla’s assertion… but here’s a question… how many of those conflicts occurred on US soil?

Oh, there were a couple of unprovoked terrorist attacks…

Is there such a thing as ‘world peace’? Are humans able to co-exist with each other without conflicts that escalate to combat? Isn’t the best we can honestly hope for is to keep combat as limited as possible and to keep ourselves and those with whom we have good relations as ‘conflict free’ as possible, and if that means intimidating a few bullies along the way then so be it?

I think Jacob has it. Aggressive force is always somewhere on the table weather we like it or not, weather we ignore it or not. Israel will *always* be in danger. It’s not rational, it just is. So, if we don’t have it on the table, and there will ever be someone who does, what will happen if we don’t respond in kind? At some point, I think we are the victims of aggression.

Dec 18 2008 at 12:13pm

Bryan, it seems many commentators are not convinced. I wonder if they’re willing to test the limits?

“If you REALLY, REALLY want peace (or if you want UNIVERSAL, EVERLASTING peace), prepare for ABSOLUTE NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST.”

I also wonder how many apply their theoretical concerns in their daily lives:

“If you want to not be mugged, prepare with concealed carry.” I am personally in favor of concealed carry, though I do not practice it. But how many who feel the only way to achieve peace is through preparing for war apply that principle at the micro level to themselves?

Dec 18 2008 at 12:42pm

WW2 is a bit of a tired example, but in the context of disarmament, peace, and war I do not think there is one more apt.

Britain relentlessly “prepared for peace” through disarmament for almost twenty years. The effect was lowering the cost of territorial expansion for any other party so interested.

I am not quite sure why Libertarians think the world is a safe place. The problem is glaringly obvious: peace requires the agreement of all parties and war only requires the disagreement of one.

What of self-interest, opportunity, and incentive which Libertarians and economists normally understand? For many years Germany managed greatly to increase its financial and strategic positions at low cost through preparing for war. It did this sagely and frugally, conquering two neighboring countries without great expenditure and without firing a shot. The return was tremendous for such a small investment.

Choosing one of those countries to continue the point, I think any reasonable person would admit that Germany made a far better investment preparing for war than Czechoslovakia did preparing for peace.

Even the fact that Germany ultimately returned its gains fails to reverse the balance for two reasons. The first, and most important, is that Germany lost its position through unrelated action. There was no imperative to attack Poland and so embroil the whole continent and ultimately world powers against them. They could have “quit while they were ahead,” as the saying goes. The other is that Germany actually recovered much more quickly. The region which was once Czechoslovakia was entirely subjugated while even at the worst at least half of Germany was free. As a related argument, Czechoslovakia’s continuing subjugation was the result of the West “preparing for peace” with Russia…

This is one of the strange cases where I think Libertarians make a blatant moral assertion–that is, that peace is good–without any scrutiny as to whether people actually act in way compatible with that assertion, and will do so even against self-interest.

Dec 18 2008 at 12:53pm

I feel that having a sufficient number of people around with concealed carry benefits me. I don’t necessarily have to carry; there simply has to be enough people carrying that any mugger is wary. I don’t carry; I have friend who do and on whom backs I free-ride.

So, yes, in analogy to international relations, having a close ally that pays for a lot of defense and pledges to defend you while you don’t pay for it and “prepare for peace” instead is even better.

Dec 18 2008 at 12:55pm

Disarming is less important than developing trade and business links. The interdependency of Venezuela and the US does decrease the chance of war, for example, even though closer ties are certainly possible.

Curt Doolittle

Dec 18 2008 at 1:56pm.

Wow, I am stunned.

You would only come to some such reasoning if you misunderstand the foundations of human interaction, and if you’re really an austrian (the psychological method), then you would only get to that conclusion by misunderstanding psychology, or applying cultural biases or cultural philosophies as universal truths, rather than biases of a group. (THe traditional humor about economists applies here.)

Debate itself is a byproduct of property. Debate assumes weakness on the part of both parties. Or at least differnces in power that are insignificantly marginal. It assumes that each must choose to debate in the first place. And that there is a reason for debating. (that you need the other person’s resources)

Debate then, comes AFTER choosing between the question: not ‘what do we do to coexist’ but ‘why don’t I just kill you and take your stuff’. And therefore, economic cooperation is a function of realative weakness in the first currency, force.

Furthermore, Peace is determined by the presence of sufficient force to enforce order such that punishment results from failing to trade. Since If I am powerful I can usurp trade (governments do this all the time, so do brigands), we know violence actually is what controls the ability to trade. The STRONG pay an opportunity cost to finance trade from which they benefit more than if interfered with trade.

The contrary belief is caused by cultural beliefs for SMALL GROUPS, not LARGE groups with different resources and social orders. In other words, it’s largely Religious. Traditional. Nietzsche started the conversation about power, and writers like Kagan are addressing it in the field of history and military strategy. But there are still people in this world who do not yet comprehend the silliness of ‘belief’ (a small group process) in that we all should get along, in contrast to getting along is determined by relative powerlessness. Not the choice to be less powerful, but the choice that both possessing power, the only profitable choice is cooperation.

Economic and political idealism are cute. But in the end, cooperation is determined by power and weakness. And massive power, overhwelming power creating order, creating certainty, are what make the economic basis of exchange possible. And this is the difference between the two cultural biases in western capitalism. The weak (jewish) who are diasporic city dwellers maximizing capital by following trade routes but who do not have to pay for social order, and the strong (christians) who are land-controlling managers of social order who create and maintain trade routes, and pay for it. Best thought of as long wave and short wave capitalism. With the masses of labor and peasantry in the middle as consumers and producers. It doesn’t matter if it’s athenian greece, rome, mongol china, or wherever, it’s the same structure in all societies that create sufficient order to maximize trade.

One should never try to make your cultural or ideological biases into utopian realities. (I”m saying that you think you made an economic comment but you really said a prayer.) These biases are just pleas to let others allow your weakness to be viewed as a strength. (ie: they’re prayers) As groups with different beliefs, different organizing strategies, different social goups operating at different capital-tempos, our biases are another division of labor, an intertemporal division of labor concentrating skills on some faster or slower moving capital, and we need each other to respect how they interact just as we need to respect individual expertise and craftsmanship. Otherwise, such silly pleas are asking the strong, who DO PAY FOR SOCIAL ORDER USUALLY WITH RISK TO LIFE, to give you permission to usurp them by other means. Or more clearly stated, to steal from them the investment that they have made in creating order by means of daily opportunity costs. Systems of ‘Belief’, utopian social orders, like you’re unintentionally advocating, are means of getting everyone to pay opportunity costs, or to forgo opportunities for their minority, so that another minority can benefit. In other words, you’re simply making a different form of the argument to egalitarian communism. It’s a plea for the weak to become the strong at the expense of the strong.

In the end, it’s just violence that our cooperative pyramid sits upon. Violence is the first currency, the capital of cooperation. It is only by the concentration of that capital, and to some degree the exhaustion created by maintaining that capital across land, that makes the less expensive and more productive trade rather than violence profitable.

Peace is not determined by equality and consent then. It is determined by the economic limits imposed by creating the power needed to make trade and peace possible. Or “prepare for war if you want peace.”

And the very idea that you could propose something so silly as mutual weakness, and can have such idle utopian thoughts without being daily confronted with their fallacies, is because empire anglo-europa, like empire Greco-Roma, creates order by the threat of violence, so that the cost of cheap territorial expansion is made so high that only trade is an affordable means of conflict. The strong compete with the strong so that they can profit from the weak competing with the weak. In historical terms, the great historians call what you’re thinking, the “skeptical” phase of civilization. It’s part of the process of decay.

Cheers Curt

(Sorry Bob Murphy, I hate to criticize a Rothbardian, and especially one I admire. I’m a Misesian in terms of understanding calculation, but pacifism is just paying with time and opportunity costs, rather than direct costs of action. It assumes I have the resources to simply pay with time – to finance my activities in the interim.

And furthermore it’s utopian: A group of people will never cooperate by ‘belief’ except AGAINST others. There isn’t any other means of holding a belief in a populace. A fact which negates the entire premise of anarchy except against some other group, failing to make it egalitarian anarchy. Any group sufficiently weaker at trading and production will resort to violence. Any group sufficiently constrained in resources will resort to violence. This is an axiom of human action. It is no good to follow an a priori method if you’re SELECTIVE in the a priori causes.

This was Mises’ error, and it is the source of Hayek’s gentle criticism him. He was selective either by intent or cultural bias. Rothbard made the same mistake. Hoppe does not. He’s actually got the answer: the corporeal state is the problem, not government, laws are the problem, not government, and only intertemporal property under monarchy solves the issue of social order necessary to create sufficient costs to conflict that trade is simply cheaper for everyone to engage in, while maintaining intertemporal calculability, creative freedom with creative destruction, hayekian knowledge, and long term capital accumulation in the population.

THe issue for Keynesians and for the rest of us is simply to determine if there is a vehicle, a set of tools, for borrowing against ourselves rather than another group, so that we can continue producing incentives, or accelerate prosperity and investment, or to provide mutual cultural insurance against variances, without falling into the moral hazard of undermining calculation, and destroying what we have built the social order specifically to maintain. The court is out but I suspect that we will find a happy medium.)

Dec 19 2008 at 11:59am

Would Ghandi, going up against any power other than Britain, have succeeded as well as he did — or would he have been executed for treason?

Dec 19 2008 at 12:12pm

C’mon guys, let’s “think like economists” here and reason on the margin. You’re saying, e.g., that Ghandi would have been slaughtered by Hitler. Yes he would have. So what that means is the way to beat Hitler is to try to kill him with a suitcase bomb placed under his table! Violence is clearly a more successful strategy.

(And yes, I understand you will say, “Huh? I’m talking about the Allies coming in with tanks and bombers.” But Ghandi didn’t have tanks and bombers at his disposal. I get exasperated when people somehow flip the example of Ghandi to show that nonviolence doesn’t really get you anywhere in the real world.)

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1 “If You Want Peace, Prepare for War”

• Published: February 2019
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The first chapter of The Politics of Peace provides an analysis of peace within the context of the diplomatic relationship between East and West. Between the late 1940s and early 1960s, both sides in the Cold War battle used the rhetoric of peace to advance their own domestic and international political agendas. By repeating the narrative of their failure to prevent World War II, US and Western European governments promoted a strategy of peace through strength and military preparedness. The United States in particular regarded peace advocates as a threat to national security and often accused them of being either communist agents or naïve idealists who had been duped into becoming puppets of international communism. While the Soviet Union and its allies followed a similar strategy of military preparedness, they linked the rhetoric of peace to internationalism, often institutionalizing peace activism within the bureaucratic machinery of the Communist Party.

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If you want peace, prepare for war — and diplomacy

Subscribe to this week in foreign policy, avoiding war and pursuing peace on the korean peninsula, robert einhorn robert einhorn senior fellow - foreign policy , strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology , arms control and non-proliferation initiative.

October 16, 2023

The following is a slightly revised presentation given remotely by Robert Einhorn on October 6, 2023, to the 2023 Kim Dae-jung Peace Forum, held October 4-6 in Mokpo, South Korea.

At this Kim Dae-jung Peace Forum, it’s useful to recall seemingly paradoxical advice offered by a fourth-century Roman general: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “ If you want peace, prepare for war.”

This Roman-era aphorism has come to mean that if you face an aggressive adversary, build your military strength so that the adversary knows that, if it launches an attack, it will receive a punishing response — and will therefore be discouraged from pursuing such an attack. The idea of achieving peace by preparing for war has been a critical foundation of security strategies for many centuries. Today we call it “deterrence.”

Of course, not all countries prepare for war in order to have peace. Some have prepared for war as a prelude to waging war. Hitler built the Nazi war machine to conquer Europe and beyond. But for countries genuinely seeking peace and facing significant security threats from well-armed adversaries, building countervailing military strength has usually been the chosen strategy. They feared that failure to build and maintain adequate deterrent capabilities would signal weakness and might only invite aggression.

Deterrence — or peace through strength, as it is sometimes called — has stood the test of time because it is widely believed to have worked. Deterrence of the Soviet Union by the United States and its NATO allies during the Cold War is credited with avoiding a major East-West conflict.

But a strategy of deterrence is not without risks. Strengthening defenses to deter an adversary may be interpreted by that adversary as an indication of aggressive intent and a serious threat to its own security. It may respond by further building up its own capabilities. The result may be an expensive and destabilizing arms race — one that reinforces mutual antagonisms, perpetuates a state of confrontation, and makes resolution of the underlying conflict even more difficult.

In addition, as both sides build up their military capabilities, they may declare policies, test weapon systems, or engage in exercises or deployments that the other side views as preparations for the use of force, even preemptive use of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, the risk of armed conflict breaking out as a result of accidents, misperceptions, or miscalculations would grow.

Moreover, even if a mutual military buildup does not result in large-scale armed hostilities, it would not necessarily prevent lower-level provocations. Indeed, an aggressor’s belief that it could deter large-scale retaliation could increase its confidence that it could engage in lower-level provocations with impunity.

To avoid war and ultimately achieve peace, deterrence should be accompanied by diplomacy.

During the Cold War, while amassing huge nuclear arsenals to deter each other, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in diplomacy to moderate and stabilize their competition, limit and reduce their nuclear forces, adopt transparency and confidence-building measures to avoid dangerous miscalculations, and in general prevent their competition from getting out of control.

Yes, if you want peace, prepare for war. But also pursue diplomacy.

So, how do these considerations apply to matters of war and peace on the contemporary Korean Peninsula?

North Korea’s growing capabilities

Seventy years after the Korean Armistice Agreement, hope for genuine peace on the peninsula continues to fade. In recent years, the security environment has dramatically deteriorated. The primary cause of increased tension and instability has been North Korea’s relentless efforts to expand and diversify its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Under Kim Jong Un, this rapidly growing nuclear arsenal has been accompanied by inflammatory rhetoric toward Seoul and Washington, including the North’s often-declared willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively.

What is Kim’s motivation for his aggressive nuclear posture? Is it essentially defensive — to ensure the survival of his regime from foreign interference or attack? Or is it essentially offensive — to intimidate and coerce South Korea and reunify the peninsula under Pyongyang’s control? Of course, we don’t know. We can only speculate.

North Korea’s initial motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons may well have been defensive — to deter what it perceived as foreign, mainly U.S., efforts to undermine or eliminate its regime. But whatever its initial motivation, Kim may now feel emboldened by his increased capabilities to pursue more offensive objectives.

Most observers doubt that Kim sees reunification of the peninsula by force as a realistic possibility. But he may now feel he can dominate inter-Korean relations, drive wedges in the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and engage in increasingly aggressive provocations. And he may become dangerously overconfident in his ability to control the risks of escalation.

South Korea and the United States have become increasingly alarmed by the growing threat from North Korea. South Korean concerns have been magnified by uncertainty about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees.

U.S.-South Korean response: Prioritizing deterrence

The main allied response to the North Korean threat has been to boost their collective deterrent capabilities.

At the highest political levels, the administrations of President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Joe Biden have worked together closely to demonstrate strong alliance solidarity and resolve. Seoul has augmented its own conventional capabilities, including its three-axis strategy . South Korea and the United States have taken significant steps to reinforce the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and to give South Korea a more prominent role in the planning and execution of that deterrent — most notably in the Washington Declaration adopted during Yoon’s state visit to Washington in April. And together with Japan, the allies have boosted trilateral defense cooperation in unprecedented ways, as agreed at the recent Camp David summit .

While prioritizing deterrence, the allies have also sought diplomatic engagement — reaching out repeatedly to Pyongyang to begin talks. But all those initiatives were rebuffed by the North.

In the absence of diplomacy, the situation is becoming more dangerous. North Korea continues to advance its threatening capabilities. The allies continue to strengthen their deterrent — with large-scale, live-fire joint defense drills and high-profile visits of U.S. strategic assets, including a port visit by a U.S. ballistic missile submarine. Pyongyang, in turn, condemns those allied efforts, which it claims are preparations for attacking the North. It says those efforts justify the further acceleration of its own programs and even its preemptive nuclear doctrine.

Risk reduction: The most immediate objective

So, what can be done to break this downward spiral? I think it may be time for a renewed push for diplomacy. But to get talks underway, a somewhat different approach may be required.

I believe the major reason Kim Jong Un has so far rejected engagement has been his desire to avoid talks that might interfere with the completion of his ambitious five-year plan to develop and test key nuclear and missile capabilities.

But another reason may be what Washington and Seoul declare must be the focus of any negotiation — namely, the North’s complete denuclearization. Kim has made it clear that he has no intention of eliminating what he regards as essential to the survival of his regime. He says repeatedly that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is irreversible and non-negotiable .

If Pyongyang eventually gets rid of its nuclear weapons, it will be the result of either a fundamental transformation of the current regime’s policies and values or its collapse.

Neither outcome can be dismissed altogether, especially the regime’s eventual collapse. But we can’t count on either one, at least not in the near term. Realistically, we will have to live with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

The United States and its allies can’t accept the North as a legitimate nuclear-armed country. It acquired nuclear weapons illegally and deceitfully. Accepting its nuclear capability would set a dangerous precedent that is damaging to the global nonproliferation regime.

So, the United States and its allies should continue to adhere to the ultimate goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But for now, they should focus on the most immediate threat — the risk of intentional or inadvertent armed conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.

The United States and the South should therefore approach the North and propose setting aside denuclearization for the time being and focusing instead on a risk reduction agenda — primarily confidence-building, transparency, and communications measures that can enhance predictability and reduce the risks of armed conflict resulting from accident, misperception, or miscalculation. Negotiations could take place bilaterally, trilaterally, or in a multilateral regional format, perhaps involving the countries that participated in the Six-Party Talks.

Participants might be required to reaffirm the goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — a goal Kim Jong Un supported in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement — although participants would presumably continue to differ on the conditions that would make the attainment of that goal possible.

The risk reduction measures that might be considered in such talks could include:

• prenotification of flight tests of several categories of missiles.
• prenotification of land, sea, and air military exercises meeting certain agreed-upon criteria.
• avoidance of military activities in specified geographic areas (for example, no-fly zones or maritime buffer zones).
• the establishment of routine and crisis communications channels.
• the resurrection of several confidence-building steps contained in the moribund North-South Comprehensive Military Agreement.
• the adoption of so-called “rules of the road” to prevent provocative cyber activities.
• the toning down of inflammatory rhetoric (including threats to use nuclear weapons preemptively or to launch decapitation strikes against an adversary’s leadership).
• the creation of what might be called “risk reduction dialogues” where civilian and military officials would meet regularly to raise concerns about another country’s military activities and seek measures to address those concerns.

Such risk reduction measures would not bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. Neither would they ensure progress toward denuclearization or remove the need for current U.S. and South Korean efforts to strengthen deterrence and maintain allied military readiness.

Moreover, North Korea’s willingness to engage on risk reduction measures is far from certain. It may believe that maintaining risks at a high level serves its interests by discouraging the United States and its allies from conducting military activities that could increase the likelihood of conflict. Or it may decide to engage but condition its support for risk reduction measures on unacceptable concessions from the allies.

Still, in light of the huge stakes, it is worth a try. Risk reduction measures along these lines — together with a determined allied effort to reinforce deterrence — could help arrest or even reverse the current downward spiral on the peninsula. They could reduce each side’s incentives for pursuing an open-ended arms competition. Perhaps most importantly, they could help alleviate one of the most acute threats on the peninsula today — the risk of inadvertent armed conflict that could escalate to nuclear war.

And if faithfully implemented, such measures could reduce tensions, build habits of constructive engagement, pave the way for practical steps to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat — and at least keep alive the hope, however remote today, of a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula living in peace.

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” There’s much truth in that age-old advice. Deterrence may well be a necessary condition for achieving peace — or at least avoiding war.

But it’s only a partial truth. Deterrence may be necessary, but it’s not sufficient. It must be accompanied by diplomacy. And there’s an increasingly urgent need for diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula — diplomacy with realistically achievable and critically important goals.

Arms Control & Nonproliferation

Diplomacy & Multilateralism U.S. Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy

North Korea Northeast Asia South Korea

Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative

Amy J. Nelson, Andrew Yeo

July 22, 2024

Robert Einhorn

April 12, 2024

Ryan Hass, Colin Kahl

April 5, 2024

Home > New World Federalist Papers > Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”)

Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”)

By Keith Best

The quotation from Roman General Vegetius’ “Epitoma Rei Militaris” on military matters is now much in the news since the British General Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff,told British soldiers that they are the generation that must prepare “to fight in Europe once again” as the  conflict in Ukraine  continues.  Vegetius wrote in the 5 th Century AD but his apothegm echoes an earlier Chinese tract and, of course, the philosophy is central to Sun Tzu’s Military Method (“the Art of War”) both of which date before the Common Era. It is tempting to conclude that Vegetius was influenced by these. The Art of War stresses ‘Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a thousand battles without disaster.” It also advocates that “The supreme art of war is to  subdue the enemy without fighting.”

Is the adage still true today or have we moved into a different age in which we see large expenditure on armaments and nuclear “deterrence” as no longer providing the security needed in the world? Can we really turn swords into ploughshares?In his  farewell address , U.S. President  Dwight Eisenhower , when speaking about the  military–industrial complex , put the dilemma: “Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.”  President Ronald Reagan in his address to the 42 nd Session of the UN General Assembly posed the question: “Cannot swords be turned to plowshares? Can we and all nations not live in peace? In our obsession with antagonisms of the moment, we often forget how much unites all the members of humanity. Perhaps we need some outside, universal threat to make us recognize this common bond. I occasionally think how quickly our differences world-wide would vanish if we were facing an alien threat from outside this world. And yet, I ask you, is not an alien force already among us? What could be more alien than war and the threat of war?”

As world federalists we believe in disputes being adjudicated at the lowest level possible and through the rule of law by an acceptable and respected judicial instrument. If such a mechanism were achieved then war would only be the last resort of a frustrated entity which refused to accept a disinterested judgement and would be condemned by all peace-loving states and peoples.  Recently, we have seen the crime of aggression added to the panoply of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Many crimes or prohibited activities enshrined in treaties and, therefore, strictly applicable only to those states that have signed and ratified them, are now becoming regarded as customary international law (such as non-refoulement, which asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom, in the Refugee Convention). In the recent issue over the treatment of the Rohingya in Myanmar not only has the ICC assumed jurisdiction (although Myanmar is not a party to the ICC, the impact has been felt in Bangladesh which is) but The Gambia has taken Myanmar to the International Court of Justice for a ruling and Argentina has initiated a claim for universal jurisdiction. It is in such ways that treaty obligations can, indeed, be elevated into norms of global society.

Yet has the march to the rules-based order to which we all subscribe and which we desire as the alternative to armed conflict been halted and even reversed in Ukraine? History will tell. The auguries, however, are good. Apart from certain states such as India, China and Saudi Arabia, which may well come to rue their position and have their own geo-political reasons and affinities to reconcile, the near universal condemnation, the swift application of devastating sanctions (put on one side the comparative ineffectiveness of those on oil and gas supplies) and the provision of aid to support the Ukrainian defence against unprovoked aggression speak loudly of the world’s wish to see the end of military adventurism. The early talk of bringing to justice the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity which, undoubtedly have been committed, up to the highest level are encouraging. No political leader, high ranking general or platoon officer can be in any doubt that they will be pursued. The alleged impunity from the defence of superior orders was dismissed as long ago as Nuremberg. Whenever the conflict ends that must be the resolve: there can be no peace without justice. Maybe, the message will spread more quickly that all individuals, however high or influential, are subject to the rule of law (echoing the famous dictum in a case in 1977 of Lord Denning, the famous British judge, “To every subject of this land, however powerful, I would use Thomas Fuller’s words over three hundred years ago, ‘Be ye never so high, the law is above you” ).

There is another factor which should not be overlooked: conventional war is becoming too expensive to wage. With smart munitions, sophisticated means of delivery of projectiles and ships and manned aircraft costing millions of dollars each the resort to war is for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)the rich nations only. Increasingly, it is the Kalashnikov and machete, aided by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) that are the tools of war. They are as available to the insurgent with limited means as they are to the superpower and in wars such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, urban and guerrilla conflict the more sophisticated weapons cannot compete with the improvised explosive device by the roadside.

Perhaps an even more important corollary is that the only business that likes war are the armaments and technology sectors – the former for obvious reasons and the latter as a way of developing at less scrutiny over cost and testing in the field new equipment such as drones (UAVs) and cyber warfare. It is arguable that we should not now have the internet or a variety of technology put to civil and domestic use had they not been developed principally for use during war. Radar, computers, penicillin, the jet engine, blood plasma transfusion and flu vaccines and more all came out of development during the Second World War – perhaps the only evidence is support of a wartime economy!

The rest of production and supply loathe war as a disruptor of business as usual, cross border commerce and uninhibited free trade without having to worry about sanctions and embargoes let alone resources diverted away from peaceful production to armaments manufacture. Ever since the First World War (and, arguably, even earlier) extended wars have been won not by military tactics or general ship but by whose economy was most efficient and durable – which could turn a myriad of small production lines of several pieces of incompatible kit into mass production on the scale of car manufacture of standardised and interchangeable weapons platforms. Despite the best efforts of Albert Speer, Hitler’s architect and munitions minister, to effect this in Germany, when it was too late, the Allies won simply because they outfaced German production and its economy.

It is small wonder, then, that economic, financial and fiscal sanctions are seen as important factors in a military conflict. The battlefield may be won by which side has the more sophisticated long-range artillery and missiles or the fastest and best-armed jets but the war will be won by which side has the most enduring economy and the ability to wreak havoc with cyber attacks and sanctions or (as Russia hopes) the provision of a major asset on which others are reliant (eg oil and gas) and prepared to pay for.

The advantages of a rules-based order which determines disputes without recourse to armed conflict rather than seeking to resolve disputes through war is axiomatic yet still seemingly elusive. Perhaps there will always be the military adventurers (emanating mostly from non-democratic regimes) who see a military solution as the first goal but every soldier will tell you that this does not provide a solution –every armed conflict has to end in a political compromise and if there is no exit strategy (arguably in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq to name but a few) then the resultant cease-fire or peace is never a final resolution. Some seventy years after the cessation of armed hostilities both the DPRK and South Korea technically remain at war with one another.

Consequently, we may hope in vain that Ukraine is the last armed conflict (when, of course, there are so many ongoing ones elsewhere partially eclipsed by the war in Europe). What can world federalists and the lovers of peace do? The answer is both simple but demanding and not of easy resolution in the near future – so we shall need patience and perseverance. The answer is to encourage an universally accepted rules-based order on common acknowledgement of international and customary law that prohibits armed aggression, provides penalties for those who venture to perpetrate it and a sense of global popular moral outrage when those rules are broken. Much of this is already in place, not least in the panoply of crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Civil society can be effective in mobilising change. Many influential lawyers have told me that without the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, assembled by the World Federalist Movement, we still today would not have the ICC. That is something of which not only to be proud but also to use as a model to emulate. Until then I fear that the words of Vegetius still ring true.

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• …the character of a man…

In times of peace, prepare for war.

In times of peace, prepare for war .   –  niccolò machiavelli.

Are you prepared? What would you do if you had to evacuate for a few days with little notice? What are you ready for, and what are you willing to do without?

What does that mean? This quote has been around since long before Machiavelli. However, it is very close to passages in The Art of War and in The Prince, and fits with his basic attitude. This quote is also commonly attributed to  Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus   but actually goes back at least as far as Horace (Satires II, 2, iii).

As stated by Machiavelli, it is (as usual) much longer : “ War should be the only study of a prince. He should consider peace only as a breathing-time, which gives him leisure to contrive, and furnishes as ability to execute, military plans. ”

This quote is often derided by those who have difficulty thinking past the present. When is the proper time to prepare for a hurricane? When it gets there is too late. You must prepare for the event before it occurs. Once it is started, you can only use what you have at hand, nothing more.

These days, we get warnings for large weather patterns, like hurricanes. But not so for sudden events, like an earthquake, or an a surprise attack from an enemy. To be prepared for either of these, you have to do so in times of calm, times of peace. Times when the terrible event is farthest from your mind.

Why is being prepared important?    Recently (relative to the writing of this post), the Eastern coast of the USA was hit by a large storm. With several day’s notice, they had plenty of time to gather what they could find, and be as prepared as one can be for a force of nature.

But what if the store ran out of batteries? What if you found out the bulb in your flashlight was broken? Now what? You’re not prepared, are you? In war, for the sake of a city state, or a modern country, being prepared to defend itself is a crucial to it’s survival.

Being prepared involves both knowing what to do (and practicing it) as well as having the necessary materials available. Knowing how to cook over an open fire is great. Practicing it is better. Having wood, matches, cooking pots, and food would be the minimum necessary to be prepared, right?

Where can I apply this in my life? Just think of all the times you’ve been caught unaware. A surprise at work, where something you thought was done was rejected for some rework, and you put everything away. Or something new was added or changed, and you don’t have a clue (or the tools, or …) what to do.

What about real life? For those with kids, how prepared were you for your first child? Did you think to practice changing diapers on a large doll? How well did that prepare you to change the diaper on an actual squirming baby?

At least for me, the first one was one lesson in preparation after another. The second was a little better, because I had practiced, and that is part of being prepared, right? How were your experiences similar, and how were they different?

When else were you caught unprepared? Perhaps while driving? Do you know how to brake properly (and skidding is not proper braking technique)? What about the proper way to swerve and retain control of the vehicle? If you aren’t prepared, if you don’t practice, how well will things go when it’s done for real, with lives on the line?

Grab some paper and write down some examples of when you were caught unprepared. Rank them with how likely they are to happen, from a low of one, which might be Earth being struck by a giant asteroid, and 10 being driving in your car, something you may do every day.

Now look at your list, and put a cost (in both time and money) next to each of these things, both for preparing, and the loss you would incur if it happened. What we’re looking for are the things that happen fairly regularly, but don’t cost much to prepare for. What falls into that category?

Look at each of the things for which it is most cost effective to prepared. What can you do to get ready? Do you have a “go” bag, with personal items and a couple days food, just in case there is an emergency evacuation for your area? It’s not too expensive, and doesn’t take much time to be ready.

When you’ve addressed the cheap and easy things, consider how much time, money, or effort you are willing to invest in being prepared, and for what you are willing to prepare. If you live in an area with earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, or snow storms, you probably have a basic idea of how to be prepared for your local phenomena. You can use that as an example or a blueprint for other things for which you might want to prepare.

But remember, after the stinky stuff hits the fan is too late to prepare. It’s on, and you’ll have to make do with what you have at hand. If life gave us better warnings, we wouldn’t need to be so prepared. But stuff happens, be ready for it, or suffer the consequences.

What are you willing to do to be prepared, and what are you willing to suffer if you are caught off guard?

From: Twitter,  @TonyGaskins confirmed at :  http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/n/niccolomac138208.html Photo by  KOMUnews

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Prepare for War in Times of Peace

• First Online: 05 January 2018

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Leaders know that change can happen at a moment’s notice. To get ahead of challenges, they prepare for them. This chapter discusses the importance of strategic preparation in times of peace to avoid reactive strategies during crises.

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Jack, D. (2014, March 8). Address: If You Want Peace, Prepare for War—U.S. Military Pre-Eminence and Why it Matters. Hudson Institute. Retrieved January 25th, 2017 from https://www.hudson.org/research/10155-address-if-you-want-peace-prepare-for-war-u-s-military-pre-eminence-and-why-it-matters .

Bandura, A. & Adams, N.E. (1977 December). Analysis of Self-efficacy Theory of Behavioral Change. Cognitive Therapy and Research 1 (4): 287. Retrieved January 16, 2017 from https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01663995 .

Simmons, E. (1998). The Marines. Triangle: The Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

Smith, L. (2007). The Few and the Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words. New York: W. W. North & Company.

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Mariama-Arthur, K. (2018). Prepare for War in Times of Peace. In: Poised for Excellence. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64574-2_14

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Is NATO Ready for War?

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Table of Contents

Report by Sean Monaghan , Eskil Jakobsen, Sissy Martinez, Mathieu Droin, Gregory Sanders , Nicholas Velazquez, Cynthia Cook , Anna Dowd , and Maeve Sockwell

Published June 11, 2024

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Executive Summary

Two years ago, NATO adopted a “back to the future” strategy of forward defense and deterrence following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To implement it, allies committed to take various measures to strengthen their deterrence and defense at the 2022 Madrid Summit. As NATO leaders gather in Washington for the alliance’s 75th anniversary summit, this paper takes stock of allied efforts to strengthen collective defense. It finds they have made substantial progress on defense spending, forward defense, high-readiness forces, command and control, collective defense exercises, and integrating Finland and Sweden—achievements which should be recognized in Washington. However, while NATO might be ready for war, the question remains whether it is ready to fight—and thereby deter—a protracted war. To meet this goal, allies still need to spend more, boost industrial capacity, address critical capability gaps, and bolster national resilience.

Introduction

Si vis pacem, para bellum. If you want peace, prepare for war. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not already have a motto — animus in consulendo liber , “in discussion a free mind”—this Latin adage would fit the alliance’s purpose quite well. The phrase conveys a piece of timeless deterrence logic: preparing for war might be the best way of averting it.

After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO adopted a new “ back to the future ” strategic concept which returned Russia to its Cold War status of adversary and put deterrence and defense back at the heart of alliance strategy. NATO revealed the concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit alongside a wide range of commitments which NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg described as amounting to a “fundamental shift to our deterrence and defence.” 

In less than a month, NATO leaders will gather in Washington for the alliance’s 75th anniversary summit. Ahead of that historic meeting, this paper takes stock of the progress NATO allies have made in implementing the commitments made two years ago in Madrid.

The paper comprises three sections. The first briefly recaps NATO’s efforts to strengthen defense and deterrence since 2014 and considers Russia’s current threat to NATO. The second assesses the progress made by NATO allies in implementing their Madrid commitments to strengthen deterrence and defense across the nine issue areas described in the Madrid Summit Declaration. The final section uses this assessment to gauge whether NATO is ready for war.

The Road to Washington

NATO’s journey toward stronger deterrence and defense began at the 2014 Wales Summit where allies responded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea by making long-term commitments to raise defense spending above 2 percent of GDP. Their near-term focus was on adapting NATO’s force posture. This started with the 2014 Readiness Action Plan , followed by establishing four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) multinational battlegroups in the east in 2016. In 2018, the NATO Readiness Initiative improved the state of NATO’s high-readiness forces.

While the 2022 Strategic Concept garnered public attention, another NATO concept agreed upon in 2020 was already quietly revolutionizing deterrence and defense: the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) concept. The DDA focuses on “force employment to deter and defend today.” Following Russia’s 2022 invasion, NATO activated its defense plans, making 40,000 troops—plus air, naval, and other assets—available to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Four new EFP missions followed, alongside a strengthened maritime posture, air policing, air defense, and multinational exercises.

NATO planning was further transformed at last year’s Vilnius summit with the unveiling of new defense plans , another product of the DDA. “The DDA family of plans,” as SACEUR, U.S. general Christopher G. Cavoli, describes them, include three regional plans (covering northern, central, and southern Europe) alongside domain-specific plans (for land, air, maritime, cyber, and space forces) as well as plans for logistics and sustainment. As one recent analysis suggests: “None of this would have been possible without the DDA.”

Ready for War?

Russia’s actions in Ukraine confirmed the fears of many that Vladimir Putin would seek to continue the Stalinist subjugation of Russia’s near abroad. The war suggests that the worst-case thinking about Russia’s “ maximum intentions ” that historically guided NATO’s planning is warranted for the foreseeable future. Putin’s apparent propensity for aggression, risk taking, and strategic miscalculation makes him a dangerous adversary—and a difficult one to deter.

Russia has seen staggering losses in Ukraine but has “almost completely reconstituted militarily” to pre-war levels thanks to national mobilization and a war economy supported by China, Iran, and North Korea. Beyond Ukraine, Russia is making nuclear threats against NATO and stepping up hybrid threats across Europe. Several European leaders have warned that Russia could attack NATO allies within three , four , five , or eight years. Not only is China helping Russia’s military reconstitute, but the prospect of coordinated aggression between Moscow and Beijing has many implications for NATO—the most serious being the implications for U.S. force posture in Europe.

To paraphrase Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, what kind of war should NATO prepare for?[1] Perhaps the most stressing scenario is a rapid territory seizure by Russian forces in the Baltic region. Variations of this scenario have been described , wargamed , and analyzed in recent years, almost becoming cliché, but it should not be dismissed.[2] In military planning jargon, it is the “most likely” and “most dangerous” course of action for Russia to take.

It is the likeliest scenario for any Russian conventional attack on NATO because the local force balance drastically favors Russia. This does not mean it is likely —a lot of things would have to go badly for Russia to consider this a good option—just that it might be the most likely NATO-Russia war scenario. Despite all the warnings from NATO leaders, the jury is still out on whether (and why) Russia would invade.

The consequences mean NATO planners must be prepared, as this kind of invasion risks nuclear escalation and is hard to reverse. Any NATO operation to regain lost ground would require establishing air superiority and control of the Baltic Sea before massing a significant local ground force. Even with NATO assurances, this situation is sufficiently threatening under Russian doctrine for Moscow to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons for coercive or military purposes—forcing NATO to threaten nuclear use to compel withdrawal and reestablish deterrence.

This is why Baltic officials describe the best strategy as “repel, don’t expel.” It is also why NATO’s new strategic concept returned deterrence by denial and forward defense to the core of alliance strategy. As with the Cold War , deterrence by punishment—which relies primarily on the “sword” of U.S., UK, and French strategic nuclear forces—will continue to do most of the heavy lifting to deter the most serious threats to NATO allies. But just like in the Cold War, NATO allies will increasingly rely on forward-based “shield” forces to strengthen conventional deterrence and defense. This paper focuses on the commitments made by NATO allies in Madrid to do just this.[3] The next section analyzes these commitments in detail.

From Madrid to Washington: Assessing Commitments by NATO Allies to Strengthen Deterrence and Defense

Defense Spending

We reaffirm our commitment to the Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety. We will build on that pledge and decide next year on subsequent commitments beyond 2024

The 2014 Defense Investment Pledge (DIP) required allies to invest at least 2 percent of GDP on defense—and at least 20 percent of that on modernization—by 2024. Last year in Vilnius, allies agreed that 2 percent would become “a minimum.” While in Wales only three allies met the target, this year 18 are projected to do so. NATO estimates that this year will be the first where European NATO allies invest 2 percent of their combined GDP. As Figure 1 shows, European allies have increased their investment by around a third since 2014, to a total of $380 billion.

Recent announcements on spending included Norway’s “ historic boost ” to its spending, which will double over the next 12 years. The UK government recently announced a “fully funded plan” to reach 2.5 percent by 2030—an extra £75 billion ($96 billion). Meanwhile, despite announcing an additional funded CAD 8.1 billion ($5.9 billion) by 2030, Canada would still fall short at 1.76 percent of GDP.

Despite solid progress on defense spending since Madrid, three important questions remain for NATO allies. The first is whether the “2 percent as a minimum” target agreed to in Vilnius is enough to maintain a positive trajectory and deliver the capabilities required for a strong forward defense. The second is what they are spending money on. European allies need to address their known capability gaps and remove their reliance on the United States to conduct high-end collective defense missions . The final question is how the money is being spent. European allies have been spending more but cooperating less , making defense more expensive and inefficient than it needs to be.

Forward Defense Forces

Allies have committed to deploy additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battle groups to brigade-size units where and when required . . . [including] establishing division-level structures.

The main component of NATO’s revitalized forward defense is the eight EFP missions, including multinational forces from several allies led by a framework nation. The status of each mission is set out below, based on the latest available data. This analysis highlights progress against the two new Madrid commitments : to scale up each mission to “brigade-size units” (up to 5,000 personnel) and to establish “division-level structures.”

NATO forward defense forces are also deployed in the air and at sea. Last year, NATO’s strengthened Air Policing mission conducted over 300 intercepts of Russian aircraft in Baltic airspace. Allied air forces also increased contributions to Air Policing and Air Shielding (air and missile defense). At sea, allied Standing Naval Forces came under SACEUR’s command for the first time in 2022, while a French navy carrier strike group operated under NATO command in the Mediterranean—another first.

Significant progress has been made to enhance NATO’s forward defense. Since Madrid, allies have proven the combat readiness of all eight EFP missions with battlegroup-level certification exercises. Four of the eight missions have been exercised at the brigade level to rehearse rapid reinforcement in a crisis. Meanwhile, all eight missions are integrated into NATO’s command structure at the division level. EFP Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have plans to integrate with new national division-level structures. Meanwhile, NATO allies have strengthened existing missions in the air and at sea. However, only two EFP missions are planning to permanently scale up to brigade size. This is because the Madrid agreement leaves the decision to scale up to the host, framework, and contributing nations. The question remains as to whether even brigade-size missions would be sufficient to deter by denial, given the local force imbalance in Russia’s favor.

NATO Force Model

We welcome the initial offers by Allies to NATO’s new force model, which will strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure and will resource our new generation of military plans.

In Madrid, allies agreed to transition to a new force model by 2023. The aim of the New NATO Force Model (NFM) is to boost deterrence and defense by providing a much larger pool of forces available to deploy quickly in a crisis. The NFM replaced the 40,000 strong NATO Response Force (NRF). As Figure 2 below shows, it contains three tiers of forces held at graduated readiness, from 10 to 180 days (the NRF’s readiness time was 15 days). The NFM presaged the regional plans agreed to a year later in Vilnius, stating forces “will be pre-assigned to specific plans.” The NFM also provides the high-readiness forces required for the new Allied Reaction Force, to which NATO will transitioned in mid-2024.

Detailed allied contributions to the NFM remain classified, but public announcements suggest progress. Germany agreed to contribute 30,000 troops and a combination of 85 ships and aircraft mobilizable in 30 days (Tier 2). The United Kingdom offered combat aircraft, ships, aircraft carriers, and “brigade-sized land forces.” The United States has also placed much of its 80,000 strong forces in Europe under NATO command, the most connected it has been to NATO structures in decades.

Challenges remain regarding force generation and sustainment. Last year, NATO Military Committee leaders acknowledged the remaining work to meet 300,000 but emphasized the importance of knowing what is missing. Additionally, experts such as John R. Deni of the U.S. Army War College have raised concerns about readiness. Recruitment and retention challenges in Europe and the United States undermine readiness, while demand for enablers and logistics personnel is going up. Deni notes that NATO has established readiness verification processes for Tier 1 and Tier 2 forces, but these have revealed shortfalls.

The authorities for SACEUR to activate and deploy NFM forces pre-crisis will be essential for delivering the DDA. As SACEUR confirmed , these authorities support “NATO’s ability to execute its plans and helps influence Allies to contribute their own forces.” Yet, allies are not always willing to grant NATO commanders the “transfer of authority” required for optimization and efficiency.[4] This also highlights the significance of aligning NFM force composition with the regional plans, potentially different from the forces allies typically provide.

Command Structure

Allies have committed to . . . enhanced command and control.

NATO has steadily adapted its command structure since Madrid, vital for the implementation and execution of the regional plans. The NFM’s scale also underscores the need for an updated and modernized structure. Figure 3 shows critical command and control (C2) nodes and how they relate to NATO’s regional plans.

New headquarters include Headquarters Multinational Division North (MND N) in Ādaži, Latvia, which became fully operational in July 2023. In March 2024, Headquarters Multinational Division Northeast (HQ MND-NE) in Elbląg, Poland, followed suit. Both have a key role in coordinating EFP missions. In September 2023, the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA) became the interim headquarters of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) .

The addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO also required new C2 arrangements. JFC Norfolk (JFCNF), NATO’s newest strategic command, which oversees the northwest Europe regional plan (see Figure 3), became fully operational in July 2021 but significantly changed following Finland and Sweden’s accession, when a political consensus formed across the Nordic nations to gather under JFCNF . To meet this reconfiguration, the JFCNF is being upscaled, with full integration planned for 2025.[6] The JFCNF demonstrated its readiness by taking command of Steadfast Defender for one month while the exercise was in its area of responsibility.[7] A new corps-level land component command has been proposed in Mikkeli, Finland (about 140 km from the Russian border), likely vital for the JFCNF’s C2 infrastructure.

If created, Mikkeli would take the number of corps-level commands to the 11 deemed necessary by NATO to deliver on regional plans. Streamlining NATO’s C2 structures is crucial for robust deterrence and defense. Agile commands such as the German DEU MARFOR , capable of rapid scalability in crises or supporting DDA activities, are essential. Prioritizing C2 adaptation and exercising should address this need.

Integrate Finland and Sweden

We reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy. Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO and agreed to sign the Accession Protocols.

The most notable NATO achievement since the Madrid Summit has been Finland and Sweden joining as full NATO members. Following their formal invitation and after nearly two years of political drama, Ankara and Budapest eventually dropped their objections after extracting concessions from various allies, including the United States. This sent a resounding political signal to Moscow and added serious deterrent power to NATO’s ranks, gaining two highly capable members with the ability to severely constrain Russia’s freedom of maneuver in the Baltic Sea.

The process of fully integrating Finland and Sweden into NATO is ongoing, but substantial progress has been made. The integration is helped by the deep military cooperation between the two countries and NATO prior to accession. Both were Enhanced Opportunities Partners (under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative ) which assessed Finland and Sweden as more interoperable with NATO than some existing allies. The integration of the “ formidable ” air power of the Nordic countries has been developing for decades , as the recent integration of Finnish and Swedish air forces into NATO illustrates.

Several challenges remain to fully integrate Finland and Sweden. These include developing adequate command structure arrangements, adjusting the regional plans and DDA, and taking account of both nations’ requirements for defense across domains, including logistics. Analysis suggests the critical role here of the United States and United Kingdom, given that the United States recently signed Nordic defense cooperation agreements and the United Kingdom leads the Joint Expeditionary Force, which has integrated Finnish and Swedish forces on operations for several years.

Collective Defense Exercises

We will enhance our collective defense exercises to be prepared for high intensity and multi-domain operations and ensure reinforcement of any ally on short notice.

NATO has significantly delivered since Madrid on its promise to refocus its exercise program on collective defense. The recent Steadfast Defender was the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War, featuring 90,000 personnel from all allies across all domains. It included maritime and amphibious drills in the High North and multi-domain exercises across Europe, with a focus on military mobility. Steadfast Defender has been an important tool to test and validate other major lines of effort such as the NFM and regional plans .

NATO’s exercise program has focused on multi-domain operations. In the air, Germany hosted and led its largest edition of Air Defender, while Vigilant Falcon tested Baltic air policing this May. At sea, Neptune Strike 2024 included five carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean, and Dynamic Mongoose focused on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. The 2023 Baltops exercise was the first with Finland participating as an ally.

The newest domains, cyber and space, were also tested. NATO held its dedicated space exercise Vulcan Guard in April. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, hosted the world’s largest cyber defense exercise, Locked Shields , last year. In June, the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise will test interoperability across all domains and NATO C2 systems.

Defense Industry

To have the necessary capabilities, the Alliance requires a strong and capable defence industry, with resilient supply chains.

Russia’s war in Ukraine revealed the critical state of NATO’s defense industrial base, as allies seek to supply Ukraine with munitions and replenish their stocks . At Vilnius, allies urged the removal of barriers to defense trade and investment among themselves to bolster resiliency. The Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP) was unveiled, “leveraging the Alliance’s role as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler.” Highlighted DPAP priority areas include aggregating demand across allies to accelerate joint procurement, increasing production capacity , and enhancing allied interoperability.

Varying progress has been evident in demand aggregation, interoperability, and procurement coordination and collaboration. Since July 2023, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) has awarded contracts for munitions , joint procurement of Patriot missiles , and artillery shells . In addition, allies have improved multinational capability cooperation, evident in NATO’s MRTT-C air fleet achieving initial operational capability . As Figure 4 shows, traditional European producers have increased trade within Europe, but Poland’s all-source importation strategy has significantly boosted arms trade for the continent.

Synchronization efforts between the European Union and NATO could enhance NATO deterrence and defense, should such efforts be pursued. The European Union has allocated over €500 million ($544 million) to ramp up ammunition production and has provided aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. Additionally, its first ever Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) was released this year, with the aim to boost capacity and intra-European collaboration. While some have seen EDIS as in competition with DPAP on standard setting, officials affirm that they are not in competition with each other. The European Union and NATO share the goal of increasing readiness, making enhanced coordination between them essential to avoid duplication.

Unsurprisingly, significant defense industrial production challenges remain. Despite clear demand signals, barriers inhibiting production acceleration and NATO-EU tensions persist. Orders form only one input in the production equation, and delivery delays fail to convert into weapons stocks in reliable timeframes. Figure 4 shows incremental progress but demonstrates that longstanding pathologies hobbling European production are not easily overcome. To ensure NATO readiness, the United States should prioritize multilateral munitions production with member states over bilateral efforts. The European Union’s anticipated increased role raises NATO concerns, but it could positively transform the transatlantic defense industrial base, contingent on EU funding capacity. To effectively leverage NATO collective investments and build production capacity, the alliance would benefit from greater defense industrial integration and consolidation.

Defense Capabilities

Investing in our defence and key capabilities is essential.

NATO’s cumulative capabilities far exceed Russia’s—even excluding the United States. This is shown below in Table 2, which uses two examples of critical capabilities to make the comparison. Two years of war in Ukraine have taken their toll on Russia’s armed forces, as its fleet of active main battle tanks has diminished by 41 percent since 2022 and active personnel have fallen by nearly 20 percent despite partial national mobilization. Moreover, non-U.S. NATO can field more modern equipment than Russia. Approximately 71 percent of non-U.S. NATO’s combat aircraft fleet was produced or modernized after 1990, compared to 53 percent of Russia’s inventory.[9]

However, this advantage does not necessarily translate to the battlefield. NATO faces significant capability gaps and readiness challenges which undermine conventional deterrence. Allies may have more advanced combat aircraft, but they have struggled with magazine depth. During NATO’s 2011 air operations in Libya, non-U.S. NATO members began running out of precision munitions within a month—and this was a comparatively minor operation compared to defending the Baltics.

NATO’s issues go beyond airpower. According to a study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of combat battalions, in-service main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored reconnaissance vehicles, and self-propelled artillery in European armies has remained static or fallen between 2014 and 2023. More broadly, European nations are carrying significant gaps in naval forces , air enablers , air defense , and “ battle-decisive ammunition ” (artillery munitions and missiles). Any major combat operation in Europe would rely on U.S. forces to make up for European shortfalls  in the land, maritime, and air forces required to deliver a range of warfighting missions. These issues have not yet been addressed by the significant increases in defense investment by NATO allies since 2014. NATO allies clearly face an important conversion challenge in translating their wealth into combat capabilities.

Resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment.

Resilience—incorporating military capacity, civil preparedness, and emergency planning—was NATO’s first line of defense against the Soviet Union. The same is true again today. Since Madrid, allies have launched several new initiatives to enhance resilience. In October 2022, NATO established a Resilience Committee which met twice prior to Vilnius. In March 2023, the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure was established to examine four key sectors: energy, transport, digital infrastructure, and space. Its final report in June 2023 recommended 14 actions to leverage NATO-EU cooperation on critical infrastructure. This was picked up at the Vilnius Summit in July, when NATO launched a new Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command. The summit communiqué also emphasized societal resilience, health systems, supply chains, and energy security . Allies also agreed to resilience objectives and a new baseline for allied resilience planning—which remains a national responsibility, guided by NATO authorities.

Resilience is a complex issue that demands persistence, investment, and cooperation, requiring a more coordinated and collective approach . Building on progress to date, NATO’s Resilience Committee should consider new ideas such as a NATO resilience fund, a resilience advisory group, and a NATO-wide Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) to identify key resilience risks. The European Union’s renewed focus on resilience and the unique levers it possesses—from financial instruments to regulatory powers—make it well placed to act boldly, in continued close cooperation with NATO. These efforts also boost allies’ responses to generational challenges in NATO’s Strategic Concept, such as green energy and the digital transition.

Enhancing military resilience through NATO is not enough; each ally must confront the societal challenge of war preparedness based on its own strategic culture. New allies Finland and Sweden offer a new wave of expertise based on their advanced approaches to whole-of-society resilience and civil preparedness. Above all, NATO allies must find the “ will to fight ,” which—as Ukraine has shown—remains the foundation of defense.

The detailed assessments above are summarized in Table 3 and discussed below. A simple rating of “on track” or “off track” is used because the commitments made by NATO allies in Madrid were not scheduled for completion in Washington. As one analysis put it: “the alliance’s journey toward stronger defense and deterrence has only just begun.”[10]

What does this assessment tell us about NATO’s readiness for war? The answer to this question depends on the kind of war that emerges from any crisis. It seems clear that NATO is ready to “fight tonight.” The transition to the DDA and the regional plans adopted in Vilnius have driven a step change in the scale of NATO’s forces which are combat ready, deployed forward, and under SACEUR’s direct command.

Expanding to eight EFP missions and reinforcing air and maritime presence has empowered NATO to swiftly assemble a significant fighting force along the eastern front in crises, fostering a cultural shift among allies.[11] Meanwhile, NATO’s C2 has evolved quickly and demonstrated readiness through large-scale exercises. The NFM has led to a revolution in apportioning high-readiness national forces to NATO at a scale 10 times greater than before . Above all, NATO has successfully integrated Finland and Sweden, adding significant air, naval, and land combat power and removing any uncertainty over their contribution to an Article 5 scenario.

However, a closer look at the longer-term measures agreed upon in Madrid reveals a slightly different question: NATO might be ready for war, but is it ready for protracted war?[12] Any permutation of a serious Russia-NATO conflict that does not end quickly will become a clash of not just armies, but societies. This becomes a competition in resilience and preparedness, industrial capacity and supply chains, magazine depth, logistics, mass, resources, and especially the “will to fight.” The halting progress and ongoing challenges to increase defense spending, transform defense industrial capacity, address critical capability gaps, and bolster national resilience—all required to strengthen deterrence and defense—must be acknowledged, addressed, and overcome. As SACEUR Cavoli recently clarified , the key question for NATO is not about Russian reconstitution per se, but relative to the alliance’s own deterrence and defense reconstitution. As Clausewitz reminds us in his “two wrestlers” metaphor, all strategy is dynamic and relative.

In reconstituting their forces, NATO allies face the perennial challenge of balancing the “ iron triangle ” of trade-offs between readiness, modernization, and force structure. For NATO, this might be adjusted as shown in Figure 5. In essence, allies must balance short-term force increases (“fight tonight”) and long-term modernization efforts (“fight tomorrow”), all while preparing for protraction. For example, compare Poland’s efforts to soon field the biggest army in Europe with the United Kingdom’s focus on becoming a “Science and Tech Superpower” by 2030. This trade-off is neither new nor binary, but the nature of the Russian threat makes it critical. The answer will depend on the judgment of NATO allies as to when Russia might be able and willing to attack. The diverse range of assessments and inherent uncertainty of this task make it challenging, but NATO’s war readiness will depend on the type of conflict that arises. It seems clear that NATO is ready to “fight tonight.”

A final question raised by this analysis is the paradigm within which NATO allies are planning to meet their Madrid commitments. The 2022 Strategic Concept put forward defense back on NATO’s agenda, but for all its qualities, allied forward presence is “ still a tripwire .”[13] Even if the Madrid commitments were fulfilled completely, NATO’s forward presence would likely still fall short of the denial standard required to make a Russian fait accompli untenable.[14] The strategy would then be “expel, not repel,” when the reverse is far preferable. The alliance would be placing all of its eggs in the basket of nuclear deterrence, with all the catastrophic associated risks.

As NATO leaders gather in Washington this summer, they should celebrate their significant progress in fulfilling the commitments made in Madrid to bolster allied deterrence and defense. They should also push for improvements in key areas underpinning NATO’s readiness for a protracted war: defense spending, industrial capacity, critical capability gaps, and national resilience. Furthermore, they should reconsider whether the level of ambition they set in Madrid is high enough. In the Cold War, NATO’s strategy rested just as much on a robust forward defense “shield” as it did on its “sword” of nuclear deterrence. Times have changed, but not that much. Si vis pacem, para bellum .

Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Eskil Jakobsen is the Stuart Center visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. Sissy Martinez is a program manager and research associate for the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. Gregory Sanders is deputy director and fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. Nicholas Velazquez is a research assistant with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. Cynthia Cook is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS. Anna Dowd is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. Maeve Sockwell is an intern with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS.

This white paper is made possible by general support to CSIS.

Please consult the PDF for references.

This report is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Sean Monaghan

Eskil Jakobsen

Sissy Martinez

Mathieu Droin

Gregory Sanders

Nicholas Velazquez

Cynthia Cook

Maeve Sockwell

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‘If you want peace, prepare for war'

Speech by admiral rob bauer, chair of the nato military committee, for the machiavelli lecture.

• 22 Feb. 2023 -
• Last updated: 30 Dec. 2023 17:15

(as delivered)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

One year and one day ago at this time I was standing in my office at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. I was looking at a map of Ukraine that we had put up a few months before.  And I knew: tonight I will receive a phone call that the invasion has begun. I sent everyone home early, because it was going to be a short night. Quarter past four, I got the call. Half past six, I was at headquarters.

Half past eight, there was a meeting of the North Atlantic Council where the first facts about the invasion were discussed. Around the table there was a sense of dismay. Not because we had not seen the invasion coming. In the months before, intelligence had been shared on an unprecedented scale and NATO's intelligence picture was better than ever. But dismay because in the course of one night, the course of world history had changed. It is a tectonic event. War is back on the European continent. Just weeks before, we had sat down with Russia in a historic NATO-Russia Council meeting.  The Russian delegation was ill prepared and uncoordinated in its expressions. The Russian statements deviated so far from reality that they were met only with surprise and calm contradiction by NATO Allies. Russia claimed, among other things, that NATO was responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia. After which countries like Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia and North-Macedonia one by one asked for the microphone to explain the real course of history....  

Ladies and Gentlemen, In the run-up to 24 February, diplomacy was conducted at all possible levels.

And while those talks were still being conducted... and all alarming intelligence reports were being denied by the Russian side…  the first tanks drove across the borders of Ukraine. The tracks of the T-72 and T-90 tanks crushed all the mechanisms of conflict resolution and international diplomacy we had built together over the past 70 years.  And soon these tanks, along with merciless shell and missile attacks, would wreak unprecedented havoc on sovereign, democratic Ukraine.  The Russian incursion ushers in a new era of collective defence. Not just for Ukraine. Not just for the entire NATO Alliance. But for all free, democracies in the world. The vibrations of the Russian tanks are felt - to this day - as far away as Japan and Australia. For 20 years after the Cold War, NATO Allies tried to establish a balanced form of cooperation with Russia. It was the first country to be designated a 'Partner for Peace' by NATO in 1994. But since the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia has embarked on an increasingly steep downhill path. And has now even reached the low level of abducting and mistreating Ukrainian children in a network of so-called 're-education camps'. NATO Military Authorities have closely followed the Russian pattern of aggression. In response, we have developed strategies for the collective defence of NATO territory. To expect the unexpected. Those strategies were sorely needed. Because the fundamental difference between crisis management and collective defence is that it is not we, but our adversary who determines the timeline. We can no longer decide for ourselves where and when we participate in a conflict... or what our 'level of ambition' is.... We have to prepare for the fact that conflict will present itself at some point. And then we will either be ready.... Or not. It requires a winner's mentality. Because in a war, there is no second place.  

Collective defence requires a shift in mind-set that goes far beyond the armed forces. Preserving peace... means: preparing for war. Niccolò Machiavelli even goes so far as to say that you have to arm yourself even more strongly in peacetime than in war. Both operationally and mentally. Because that is when you have the time and space to make yourself stronger and to learn from history. Time and space are two things Ukrainians absolutely do not have. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, they have been in the highest state of readiness. And, together with their armed forces, the Ukrainian population has developed a resilience that inspires the whole world. There is hope. David can indeed win from Goliath. Resilience in Ukraine is an old man stopping a tank with his bare hands. Is a woman smashing a drone with a jar of tomatoes. Is a group of young women using Tinder to locate young male Russian soldiers. Is a soldier who not only blows up a bridge, but also himself, to prevent Russians from entering his territory. Are journalists who risk their lives to show the world the brutal reality of war. And is now even a ballerina from the national opera who signs up to serve in the trenches.... A ballerina in the trenches... consider for a moment how far removed this is from your everyday reality. For people in the military, war is a reality that we face much more often. It is sometimes even claimed that we 'love it'. I know that even after this lecture people will write that I am a warmonger. Just as I was scolded for murderer in 1981 when I walked across the Dam Square in uniform on my way home. I can assure you: soldiers do not like war any more than doctors like illness ... or firefighters like fire. Servicemen and women know far too well the devastation of war and violence. In my 41-year career in the armed forces, I have seen it time and time again.  The grief and despair of losing a colleague. Someone's father. Someone's mother. Someone's partner. Someone's child.   The grief of a colleague who, due to a mental or physical injury, can no longer be in the military and pursue his/her life's purpose. The grief and pain of people who have killed an opponent by order of the Dutch government, and have to live with that fact forever. War equals devastation. That is why the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces are ready to do everything in their power to limit war and preferably even prevent it. Men and women in uniform are steeped in the realisation that war is very close. But the average Dutchman or woman is not. That is understandable. Come May 5 th , we will have the luxury of celebrating 78 (!) years of freedom. And then we routinely say to each other “freedom is not to be taken for granted”... which we then forget on May 6th. But in countries like Finland and Sweden... people do feel the threat of war. In a matter of months, these countries have left decades of neutrality behind. This was not an imposed decision by their governments. But a bottom up movement, spanning all parts of society. The Finns and Swedes realised that they could no longer rely on the guarantees of the international rules-based order. Neutrality was no longer an option. We too, as the Dutch, are part of that international rule rules-based order. Our entire prosperity is built on the guarantees of that system. And on the assumption that if we trade with a country (like Russia) and are mutually economically dependent, we will never go to war with that country. And the assumption that if we make a country rich (like China), the country will become democratic. Neither assumption has proven to be true. And our international rules-based order is under immense pressure. So we Dutch cannot stand idly by, hoping we will never experience war again. Machiavelli says in Dell' arte della guerra that if you observe the enemy's plans and strategic objectives well, and put a lot of effort into training your armed forces, you are in less danger and have more hope of victory. In other words, you can only win a war if you prepare properly. And to that I would add: you can even prevent war if you prepare properly. This is more difficult for democracies than for autocracies. To prevent war, you need deterrence. Deterrence consists of military capabilities plus the political willingness to deploy those capabilities. In an autocracy, deploying military capabilities requires only the decision of one leader... and an armed force or a group of mercenaries to implement that decision. In a democracy, the deployment of military capabilities requires broad societal and political support for the fact that it is necessary and legitimate. And so it should be. But that means we cannot start thinking about a conflict only when it presents itself, as with crisis management operations and missions. Collective defence requires us to think about different scenarios together in advance. It requires us to set direction and stay the course. The French political philosopher Raymond Aron warned just before the Second World War that democracies believe too much in the power of compromise and have forgotten that there are also countries and leaders who want to achieve their goals through brute force. I myself still believe in the power of compromise. But when the opponent is aiming at you with the cannon of a tank, you need more than a cup of coffee, two chairs and good intentions.

Collective defence is about thinking ahead. And that doesn't just apply to deploying military capabilities. Anyone who thinks we can get through this era with only additional investments in Defence... will unfortunately be deceived. Collective defence is about being aware of all your vulnerabilities. We have to realise that the enemy will use anything to bring us to our knees. Energy, food and migration are being weaponised by Russia. What if our wind farms are bombed? How have we set up our infrastructure in Europe? Is it not very naive to think that China will not use its influence over our infrastructure, through the purchase of ports, railways, highways and communication networks, to support Russia too? On whom have we made ourselves dependent for our raw materials? These are all uncomfortable questions that we prefer to avoid. But true resilience means that national security must be factored into every major decision in our country. Resilience is something that requires a whole society approach. This includes the business community. I have made the case several times in the past year for a fundamentally different approach to our defence industry. The shortage of production capacity creates major risks to our national security. Defence budgets within NATO have been increasing for eight years in a row. But production capacity has not grown proportionally. As a consequence, prices have gone up (sometimes by 300 per cent) and delivery times have moved considerably to the right. I understand the desire for a long-term demand signal and the importance of stakeholder value.... But if the commercial interest always wins out over the collective interest... we end up knocking away the very ground on which our economic activities are built. If production capacity does not increase dramatically in the coming year, we will not only be taking irresponsible risks with our own security, but we will also be unable to ensure that Ukraine wins this war.

I have undoubtedly said things in the last few minutes that some of you disagree with. I am not saying that I have all the answers, but I am convinced that these are issues we should debate and plan for. What I ask of you is that we dare to have the conversation about difficult topics. Discussions about security are still far too binary: you’re either crazy or you’re right. But between crazy and right lies a world of nuance. Four years ago on this very spot, then-ambassador Pete Hoekstra argued against Nordstream II. And because we are all in our own information silo and truth bubble, his cautions were not taken seriously enough. When I was Chief of Defence, I once hypothetically talked about reactivating conscription. After all, what do we do if we have too few professional soldiers to win the war? Do we then give up?  Or do we create extra tiers of people who can defend our country? How resilient is the Dutch population when it comes down to it? How much stock have we built up to absorb shocks? You don't have to agree with me. But let's exchange arguments. Think in scenarios. Weigh up risks. And then make choices. It is time that we see the world for what it is. Not for what we would like it to be. War is back, whether we like it or not. If you want effective deterrence... then you have to make decisions.

If I ask you: what does NATO stand for? Then you say: Article 5: One for all, all for one.

This is correct. And I am proud of the fact that every day at NATO headquarters we can reach agreements with 30 countries by consensus on so many issues. The solidarity in this 'Alliance against Autocracy' is unique in the world. There are soldiers from Norway willing to die for the Netherlands. Soldiers from Belgium willing to die for Bulgaria. Soldiers from Portugal willing to die for Poland. But remember: before Article 5 comes Article 3. And in that article, all Allies promised to be able to defend themselves first. We have lost sight of that article far too much. We started to think of NATO as an emergency hotline. We thought we could neglect national security and national resilience, because when it came down to it... there would always be someone else who would come to our rescue. But NATO is not a hotline, it is what we make of it. Quite literally, as the slogan goes: we are NATO.   And that means that in this new era of collective defence, every member state MUST first and foremost be able to defend itself. And any promise to NATO that we break... poses a direct risk to the security of all Allies. And for those of you who are thinking: isn't this all getting way too expensive? Then let me assure you: if we do not get our resilience and our deterrence right... If we do not pull out all the stops to ensure that Russia loses this war... Then not only Russia, but also China, and all other autocratic leaders around the world will learn a chilling lesson: that you can break international agreements with brute force. Then our international legal order will be destroyed. Then global uncertainty and instability will increase even further. And the costs to national security will be phenomenally higher. This new era of collective defence is all about the collective. To fight for the we, in a world of me.  It is a lesson much older than medieval Machiavelli: Preserving peace means... preparing for war.

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If you want peace, prepare for war… Really?

There is the well-known saying Si vis pacem, para bellum – if you want peace, prepare for war. Uttered by famous politicians since WWII to make the case for bloated military spending and questionable security and defense-oriented foreign policies, this often-cited Latin aphorism dates all the way back to Roman historian Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus in 4th century AD.

While this saying has a place in history, it is no longer relevant in 2021 or beyond. Military dominance or the perception of it will not uphold global order, nor will it solve the myriad of global challenges that people will face in the years ahead.

Global conflict trends in the last two decades clearly demonstrate that “preparing for war” has not brought peace. As military and security-focused approaches continue, conflicts have increased both in number and scale. According to the data of the latest  Global Peace Index , the world is considerably less peaceful today than it was in 2008, with peacefulness declining year-on-year for nine of the last thirteen years.

Military interventions in the last 20 years alone have come at an astounding price, while contributing insignificantly to global peace and threatening the human security of conflict-affected populations. It is estimated that the war in Afghanistan killed more than 46,000 civilians and cost the US $2.3 trillion (it cost Italy 8.9 billion). The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have cost another $2 trillion, killed thousands, displaced millions, and destroyed the livelihoods of local communities. The situation in all three countries remains unstable and undesirable with yet a new generation of young people experiencing only the realities of war.

As we painfully see, the long-term consequences of protracted conflicts and continued violence will mostly be borne by the youngest generations , who are increasingly worried about the state of the world. According to  United Nations estimates , today in the world there are 1.2 billion people aged between 15 and 24, and this number is projected to grow by 7% by 2030. In the most fragile regions – where most conflicts take place – the number of young people is projected to increase by 62% by 2050 (including +89% in Subsaharan Africa, and +28% in the Middle East and North Africa). This large number of people is growing up in a world where traditional international relations paradigms do not make sense anymore. They are confronted with global issues – from climate change to rising inequalities – that are complex and threaten public health, security and livelihoods.

To put it simply, continued ineffective management of the climate crisis and rising inequalities will lead to increased conflict that cannot be solved with weapons, troops, training or ammunition.

Peace can and has to be built and it must be built with the inclusion of young people. The centrality of young people in peace and conflicts has been acknowledged by the United Nations Security Council, which approved the resolution 2535 on youth, peace and security in July 2020. While highlighting the role of youth in preventing and resolving conflict, this resolution encourages States to include young people in decision-making processes due to their unique role and sensitivity in responding to issues and dynamics on a long-term perspective.

Building peace requires financial investment and the kind of political and public support that the antiquated 1600-year-old aphorism has received. It will require strength, courage and bravery on the part of politicians and decision makers to not oversell quick fixes and to ethically weigh state geopolitical and economic interests with the safety and well-being of populations. If we can learn one thing from those who have so effectively lobbied for and profited from the arms race over the past 20 years, it is that “Those who love peace must learn to organise as effectively as those who love war.” Martin Luther King, Jr.

Sonya Reines-Djivanides  is the Executive Director of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a position she started in April of 2015. She has more than fifteen years of experience in international conflict resolution and works, in her current role, towards peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict.

Lorenzo Conti , Policy Officer, EPLO, holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations and European Studies, from the University of Turin and Sciences Po Bordeaux

EPLO is the independent civil society platform of European NGOs, NGO networks and think tanks which are committed to peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict. It was founded in 2001 by 16 member organisations, including AP.

EPLO aims to influence the EU so that it promotes and implements measures which lead to sustainable peace between states and within states and peoples, and which transform and resolve conflicts non-violently. EPLO wants the EU to recognise the crucial connection between peacebuilding, the eradication of poverty, and sustainable development worldwide and the crucial role NGOs have to play in sustainable EU efforts for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

The original version of this article was published by HuffingtonPost Italia on September 24, 2021.

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Nadia Paleari is a Communication Strategist and Climate Policy Advisor with a background in International Relations and European Studies, as well as a Master’s degree in Public Diplomacy. Her expertise in stakeholder engagement and youth involvement in sustainable development led to her appointment by the European Commission as a European Climate Pact Ambassador. In this role, she advocates for climate action and promotes sustainable development among young people. Additionally, she serves as a recognized observer NGO by UNFCCC, actively participating in international climate negotiations, including COP conferences.

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ADVISORY COUNCIL

Daniela castagno.

Daniela Castagno is an economist by background and an intersectional feminism enthusiast, with almost 20 years of international experience in European and Middle Eastern countries, where she worked with UNDESA, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the European Commission before joining the philanthropic world. She has extensive practice in both international cooperation and philanthropy, facilitating the design and implementation of collaboration and funding schemes, and supporting social and economic transformation through civil society organisations. Currently, she works as an International Program Manager at the Kering Foundation, where she leads the Foundation’s partnerships with Italian, Mexican and Korean local organizations supporting women survivors and implementing prevention and cultural change activities. Graduated from Turin University, Ms Castagno holds a MSc in Development Studies from SOAS – University of London. She was a Senior Fellow at the Centre on Philanthropy and Civil Society at the City University of New York.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ADVISOR

Gianluca de luigi.

Gianluca has more than 20 years of experience in international cooperation. He has held roles as project manager and country representative, focusing primarily on food security, disaster prevention, and emergency response in conflict areas, especially in South America, Middle East and Africa. In recent years, he has specialized in financial management and administration, supporting different organizations in developing workflows and operational procedures aimed at enhance efficiency and transparency in resource allocation and financial management.

Shadi Shahbaz

Shadi is a peacebuilder, futurist, researcher and practitioner with a decade of multidisciplinary experience. While most of her experience comes as a result of her active role with international NGOs and youth networks, she has worked with United Nations agencies in Iran and at HQ. She has founded her own young women-led peacebuilding initiative in Iran, PeaceMentors. She was formerly the leading editor of the Journal of Youth, Peace and Security and the MENA Regional Coordinator of the United Network of Young Peacebuilders. Shadi’s research focuses on intergenerational leadership in peace and security at the nexus of the Youth, Peace and Security and Women, Peace and Security agendas. She uses foresight and futures thinking as well as immersive experiences as innovative methodologies and approaches to conducting research and change-making in international development.

Her previous roles have enhanced her expertise in monitoring and evaluation, project cycle management and capacity development. She is a skilled facilitator, an enthusiastic community builder and a qualitative researcher. Shadi holds a BA and MA in English Literature (minor in Postcolonial studies) from Allameh Tabataba’i University, a double joint MA in International Development (minor in Migration and Mediation) from the Ca Foscari University of Venice and Paul Valery Montpellier 3 University. Currently, she is an associate research fellow at Alfred Deakin Institute and a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne. Shadi is a Kroc IPJ Women PeaceMaker Fellow, a UNAOC Young Peacebuilder Fellow and a One Young World EU Commission Peace Ambassador. She speaks 5 languages and has conducted research with and on youth in Tunisia, Canada, Italy, Iran, Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Australia.

Hodan Ahmed

Hodan has over 15 years of experieence in the areas of peacebuilding, good governance, gender equality and women’s rights and empowerment in a different environment ranging from conflict, post conflict to peace and stability. Hodan worked with a number of development Institutions in East Africa countries and worked as a consultant on research and evaluation in the region. She has a wealth of experience in advocating for gender equality policies, advancing women’s interests and capacities, and is committed in connecting women leaders both at grassroot and policy levels to achieve women’s rights and enhance their involvement and meaningful participation in political and peacebuilding processes in the region. She holds Master’s Degree in Sociology and community development obtained from Agra University, India.

Kuyang Harriet Logo Mulukwat

Dr. Kuyang Harriet Logo Mulukwat taught international law, international human rights law, women and child law at the University of Juba. Kuyang works on democratic governance, access to justice and the rule of law issues, with extensive experience in evaluating UN interventions. Prior to becoming an academic and consultant, Kuyang served with the United Nations Development Programme in the capacities of rule of law analyst, programme analyst for the rule of law cluster and access to justice specialist in Sudan, South Sudan and Timor Leste. Kuyang has published 4 book chapters and peer reviewed journal articles on knowledge production and transitional justice, international humanitarian law, customary law and gender issues. Dr. Kuyang was fellow of the Data and Displacement Project, University of Warwick and was a member of the Expert Working Group of the Africa – China – Europe on promoting dialogue and cooperation to prevent the diversion of arms and ammunition in Africa. She is currently a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute and is a gender lead for the Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund2.

Bert Koenders

Bert Koenders holds the Kooijmans Chair in Peace, Security and Justice at Leiden University and is Chairman of the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs.

Mr Koenders served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands from October 2014 to October 2017. He was a member of the House of Representatives from 1997 to 2007 and served as Minister for Development Cooperation from 2007 until 2010. He was the Under Secretary General of the United Nations and served as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Operation in the Ivory Coast (2011-2013), and Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (2013-2014).

Mr Koenders has also served as President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly and was Founder of the Parliamentary Network on the WorldBank/IMF. He has been a Visiting Professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS.

Head of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

Bernardo monzani.

Bernardo has 20 years of experience in the international development sector, where he is an expert on conflict resolution, peacebuilding, governance and support to civil society in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Bernardo is also a monitoring, evaluation and learning expert, who is specialized in using theories of change (and theory-based approaches) to assess the effectiveness and impact of initiatives focused on advocacy and social change. Bernardo has designed, coordinated and led complex assignments across five continents. He is also an experienced analyst, who monitors and regularly comments on peace and conflict developments in the Middle East and North Africa. Bernardo has worked for several international NGOs—including International Alert in the UK, Search for Common Ground in Belgium and Morocco, and the European Centre for Minority Issues in Georgia—and for UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti and Liberia. He holds a BA from Tufts University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington DC. Bernardo is AP’s co-founder and Head of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning.

PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES

Peacebuilding in Italy: a sector in need of identity

Women, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa

Youth, Peace and Security: an Agenda for change

Project evaluation: Building peace in Mindanao

Project evaluation: good governance in Africa

Evaluation Inuka!

Evaluation Oxfam’s work

Intercultural action in Bologna

Winds of War in the Sahara Desert

Women’s marginalization and the failures of the Libyan Peace Process

Using peacebuilding to counter violent extremism

Getting it right: peacebuilding in Libya after Palermo

Keeping peace at the heart of the EU: a political challenge

Italy’s contribution to peacebuilding: one step forward, two steps back

The EU budget post 2020 and the future of peacebuilding

Women, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: a guide to programming

Peace in Libya is no longer a priority for Italy

Civil society as the engine for stability and growth in Africa

Peace is still possible in Libya, but only with the involvement of civil society

Italy needs to do more for Libya

Italy’s contributions in Libya and lessons from Lebanon

Women Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: between rhetoric and reality

NEWS & EVENTS

The global failure on gender equality [Huffington Post]

Media and Peacebuilding in Somalia Harder Than You Think

Evaluation Report: “Leading the way to peace” project

Evaluation Report: Tubiri Tuvurana Ubupfu

Report BPF2022

Implementing the YPS agenda at the country level

Evaluation report: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana

Evaluation report: Inuka! Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya

Partecipation and migrants

Evaluation of Oxfam’s work to increase citizen engagement and influence onagriculture policies and practices in Burkina Faso and Tanzania

Assessment summary: Women peace and security in the Horn of Africa

Head of Research and Policy

Bernardo venturi.

Bernardo Venturi has 20 years of experience in research, training, policy work and programme management mainly on peacebuilding, conflict resolution,  EU external relations, good governance   and international cooperation. He likes to blend theoretical analysis and fieldwork in order to bring practicality to the former and reflection to the latter. Bernardo is also Adjunct Professor at the University of Bologna, an Associate Researcher for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and lectures in several MA courses and training programmes in different countries. Bernardo obtained his PhD in 2009 from the University of Bologna, where he also held a post-doctoral research fellowship.

Bernardo consulted for several regional and international organizations including the European Commission, EEAS, European Parliament, IGAD, OSCE, the Italian MFA and several international NGOs and platforms.

Bernardo is a frequent media commentator for different Italian media (e.g., Radio Tre, Il Sole 24 Ore, Repubblica, Avvenire, Quotidiano Nazionale, etc.) and international ones (e.g., BBC Radio, Le Soleil, El Confidencial, etc.).

Periods of study and research led him to Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, Moldova State University, the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), the US Institute for Peace (USIP) and Sussex University. Among his past positions, he was the Director of the Centro Studi Difesa Civile (CSDC) and he also contributed to the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) contributing as a Steering Committee member. Bernardo served as  AP ’s Director for seven years (Oct. 2015 – June 2023).

Bernardo is  AP ’s Co-Founder and Head of Research and Policy.

Peacebuilding in Italy: a sector in need of identity Women, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa Youth, Peace and Security: an Agenda for change Project evaluation: Building peace in Mindanao Project evaluation: good governance in Africa Evaluation Inuka! Evaluation Oxfam’s work Intercultural action in Bologna Analysis of the Peace Process in South Sudan Conflict Assessment in the Bamingui-Bangoran region

Resisting the normalization of violence Tanzania: when statistics becomes the enemy Italy’s contribution to peacebuilding: one step forward, two steps back L ocal participation and migration: the role of countries of origin How to promote healthy state-citizens relations in Africa Are you series? Preventing violence in a “peaceful country”: the case of Tanzania

L’inclusione nei processi di pace: promuovere la partecipazione per assicurare risultati sostenibili Bernardo Venturi discusses the application of the EU-Italy-Tunisia agreement [Quotidiano Nazionale] Reflections from the Bologna Peacebuilding Forum, on the Triple Nexus, Ukraine, and Sudan [Oltremare]   Director for Agency for Peacebuilding says, ‘Europe needs to listen to civil society’ [DIRE]

Italy and the Triple Nexus Report BPF2022 Project assessment: Dumisha Amani Zanzibar Implementing the YPS agenda at the country level Italy and peacebuilding Final evaluation: strengthening young women’s participation in local and national peace processes in South Sudan Evaluation report: Inuka!Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya Final evaluation: “Madame President” project Participation and migrants Evaluation of Oxfam’s work to increasecitizen engagement and influence onagriculture policies and practices in Burkina Faso and Tanzania Assessment summary: Women peace and security in the Horn of Africa

Celina Del Felice

Celina has more than twenty years of experience in peacebuilding specifically focusing on strengthening youth participation, and on peace and global citizenship education. She has experience as a process and dialogue facilitator, trainer, researcher, evaluator and developer of curriculum and educational materials. She has worked for several local governments, universities, intergovernmental and civil society organisations, mostly based in Europe and Latin America. Celina is also a grant proposals reviewer for the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) Foundation and a Member of the Code of Good Practice Panel of Experts of the Irish Development Education Association. Celina has a PhD in International Relations (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands), a MA in Peace and Conflict Studies (European Peace University, Austria), and a BA in Political Science (National University of Rosario, Argentina). She speaks English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese. Celina contributed to AP for 5 years (2018-2023) as an Advisor on Youth, Peace and Security.

Celina is AP´s President.

Unesco’s decision to revise 1974 Recommendation: Signs of hope for peace education Let’s talk about the Football World Cup Time to listen to youth Youth-friendly safe heavens

Mikhail Silvestro Sustersic

Mikhail Silvestro Sustersic, AP’s Director, is a peacebuilding expert with a transdisciplinary background and an holistic approach to the complexities of our world. With expertise in peace and security, conflict management, human rights, gender equality and more, Mikhail is dedicated to fostering inclusivity, equality and meaningful dialogue. He holds a Master’s degree in Modern Philology from the University of Padova, followed by a European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation (E.Ma) from EIUC and Maastricht University and a Master’s degree in Cultural Diplomacy. Strongly committed to championing youth, women, LGBTI+ and minorities participation in peace and security, he is passionated about preventing and countering violent extremism (P\CVE), transitional justice and supranational criminology. Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) expert, trainer, facilitator and researcher, Mikhail has made successful contributions to impactful projects and evaluations for esteemed international organizations such as the United Nations, OSCE and ODIHR, Council of Europe, and civil society organizations including Search for Common Ground, USIP, UNOY, Kofi Annan Foundation, and GCERF. But Mikhail’s vision goes beyond conventional approaches. As a LARP (Live-Action Roleplaying) and experience designer with the association Chaos League, he creates immersive scenarios for personal and social transformation, challenging participants to think differently and inspiring profound change. Related to this, Mikhail is also deeply interested in future thinking and foresight design, seeking innovative solutions to address emerging challenges. Mikhail’s commitment extends to his volunteer work as an emergency rescuer with the Italian Red Cross.

Intercultural action in Bologna Evaluation Inuka!

Can social contact reduce prejudice? Exploring the assumption in Nigeria The European Consultation on Resolution 2250 on Youth Peace and Security

Evaluation Report: “Leading the way to peace” project Implementing the YPS agenda at the country level Evaluation report: Inuka!Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya

ADVISOR COUNCIL

Mariachiara giaccai.

Mariachiara is a master’s degree candidate in International Relation – crime, justice, and security curriculum in the University of Bologna. She is passionate about conflict transformation and peacebuilding issues and the Middle East is her main area of interest. She is keen on organizing and planning and have several years of experiences as project manager in associations.

She first interned for Agency for Peacebuilding and she is now collaborating with AP where she is able to deepen her academic interests for peace and conflict studies and her project development skills.

She is active in volunteer work that includes nonformal education activities with children.

Italy and the Triple Nexus Italy and Peacebuilding REPORT BPF2022

SENIOR ADVISOR

Hashim pondeza.

Hashim Pondeza has over 10 years of working experience in social, economic and political aspects of Tanzania, with a long professional experience in Zanzibar. He is a founder of a youth championing non-profit organization named Center for Youth Dialogue (CYD). Among other assignments, Hashim worked as a Zanzibar Coordinator for a UNDP project and consulted for UNODC’s CVE project in East Africa. Hashim holds a master’s degree in Public Administration obtained from the Bowling Green State University (BGSU) in Ohio, USA.

Project assessment: Dumisha Amani Zanzibar

Ylenia Rocchini

Ylenia has more than 10 years of experience in research, project management and monitoring and evaluation, particularly in the areas of migration, international protection, and global citizenship education. She has worked for academic institutions and international organisations in Europe, North and West Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and Southeast Asia. As a consultant, she has been conducting assignments, mainly in the field of monitoring, evaluation and learning, for several development cooperation actors. She was a postdoctoral research associate at the “Borderlands” project hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. Ylenia holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Law from the Sant’Anna School for Advanced Studies, an MA in International Relations from the University of Florence and BA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Genoa.

Evaluation report Tubiri Tuvurana Ubupfu

Alessandro Totoro

Alessandro is a peacebuilding practitioner with over 10 years of experience. He has worked with the United Nations and with leading peacebuilding agencies such as Search For Common Ground and International Alert, where he managed large and complex projects, mainly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Alessandro’s focuses include research, training and facilitation in conflict analysis, as well as conflict sensitivity and “Do No Harm” methodologies. His areas of interests include conflict dynamics over access to services and resources, with a specific focus on conflicts between refugees and host populations and conflicts between sedentary and nomadic populations in Central and Western Africa. Alessandro holds a University Degree in Political Sciences from the University of Florence, an MA in Human Rights and Conflict Management from the University of Sant’Anna in Pisa, and a Degree in Research Methods from the University of Bradford (UK).

Conflict Assessment in the Bamingui-Bangoran region

A conflict sensitive lens on the upcoming humanitarian aid operations in Burkina Faso The case for conflict sensitivity

Anthony Sarota

Anthony is a social science researcher and practitioner with more than 10 years of experience in the spheres of security, terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization, peacebuilding and governance. Anthony has worked as a consultant on research, monitoring and evaluation in the context of various projects in East and Central Africa, and was previously a law enforcement officer for the Tanzanian government. Anthony has significant experience working at the local, national, and regional levels, designing and conducting complex research assignments. An expert on East Africa’s security and political economies, he holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and a master’s degree and a Post Graduate Certificate in Strategic Security from The George Washington University. He is currently in his final semester for a Post Graduate Certificate in Criminal and Intelligence Analysis at American Military University. Anthony is AP’s Senior Advisor on research, including monitoring and evaluation.

Evaluation report: Inuka!Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya Evaluation of Oxfam’s work to increase citizen engagement and influence onagriculture policies and practices in Burkina Faso and Tanzania Analysis of the Peace Process in South Sudan

Using peacebuilding to counter violent extremism A lesson from Kenya countering violent extremism

Evaluation report: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana Evaluation report: Inuka! Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya

Valentina Bartolucci

Valentina is a researcher affiliated with the Interdisciplinary Centre Science for Peace, in Pisa, a visiting professor at the University of Pisa and an Invited Professor at Dauphine University in Paris. She is the recipient of a research fellowship from the Veronesi Foundation, for 2015-2016, and a Visiting Fellowship at Derby University, in the UK; she also collaborates closely with the Faculty of Social and International Studies at Bradford University, also in the UK. In 2013-2014, Valentina was a Fulbright Research Scholar at Arizona State University. She regularly consults with national and international agencies on issues of terrorism, organized crime, migration and foreign policy. Her interests focus on foreign and security policies, peacebuilding, terrorism and counter-terrorism, and on strategic communication.

On the side of peace Not only brides: the fundamental role of women within the Islamic State After Nice: the urgent need for a new approach to counter-terrorism

Stefano Marinelli

Stefano  has a PhD in international law  at Middlesex University in London. He researches and lectures on the role of international tribunals in conflict resolution and the relation between international justice and peace and security. He has experience in the field of human rights and conflict transformation in the NGO sector, and has worked in the Middle East, South Caucasus, Balkans, North Africa and Sudan. He collaborates with public institutions in the management of European funds, is a lawyer at the bar of Madrid and a consultant for different law firms. Stefano has been living and working in Italy, Switzerland, the UK and Spain. He holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Florence, an LLM from the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, an MPhil from Middlesex University. He co-founded and co-ordinates An International Law Blog, a platform that promote discussions on issues related to international, transnational and European law among lawyers and scholars.

The announced withdrawal of the United States from Syria The military intervention in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria Perspectives for peacebuilding in Syria Military operations against chemical weapons in Syria

Italy and peacebuilding R eport BPF2022

Donata Garrasi

Donata Garrasi is a political scientist with 25 years’ experience leading research, policy, and programmatic initiatives on peace, security, and conflict related issues.

Between 2018-2021 Ms Garrasi served as Director of Political Affairs for the United Nations for which she led sensitive political engagements and peace initiatives in Africa’s Great Lakes sub-region. She previously held senior positions with the World Bank, the OECD, the UK Government, and consulting firms for which she developed and managed successful multi-million US$ engagements in support to peacebuilding, political transitions, and stabilisation operations in West, Central Southern and East Africa, the Middle East, Central and South-East Asia, and globally.

Ms Garrasi has collaborated extensively with financial institutions and multinational companies on issues related to natural resources management and investments in high risk and transitional contexts, contributing to enhancing due diligence processes and multi-stakeholders’ processes, and to preventing and addressing reputational, operational, and financial risks associated with terrorism financing, conflict minerals, and poor governance and security environments.

Ms Garrasi developed methodologies to conduct peace and conflict analysis, recovery and peacebuilding assessments, and conflict sensitive screening which are currently used by leading international and regional organisations. She has developed and delivered trainings on crisis management, political economy analysis in crisis affected situations, conflict prevention, and negotiation for senior-level political and development officials of the European Union, the World Bank, the UK Government, ECOWAS, and private sector partners.

A trained mediator, Ms Garrasi has been directly involved in negotiations in national and sub-national crisis contexts.

Ms Garrasi is an Italian national. She holds a MA in International relations from the University of Florence, Faculty of Political Science, and has completed executive programmes including with Yale School of Management and Harvard Kennedy School. She speaks English, French, and Spanish.

Claudio Pezzi

Claudio Pezzi is a lawyer admitted to the Bologna Bar, managing partner of the law firm Pezzi & Associati based in Bologna, with an extensive experience in international law of commerce and private international law. Over the past years Claudio has developed a robust experience on entertainment Law and IP Rights, most notably in in the field of Copyright Law dealing with international clients in the area of digital copyright infringement and licensing of photographs, movies, music and videos.

In his practice Claudio dealt with international human rights cases and is a member of the International and human rights committee of the Bologna bar.

Claudio has a Master of Laws (LLM) in American Law and International Legal Practice from Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, U.S.A.

He is a member of the International Committee of the Bologna Bar Association and founder and president of ILMA – International Law Meeting Association, a local association promoting the study of International Law.

As a member of Rotary International, over the past 10 years he has promoted, sponsored, introduced and obtained from the Rotary Foundation more than 15 post-graduate scholarships in the field of Peacebuilding.

Debora Guidetti

Senior European Programme Manager, Ariadne – European Funders for Social Change and Human Rights Based in Brussels, Debora identifies trends and opportunities, promotes membership, and liaises with other funders’ networks. Debora has 15 years’ experience of professional and volunteer activities for foundations, NGOs and international organisations. Before joining Ariadne, she worked for a few years as an independent consultant. Previously, she managed the anti-discrimination work of the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE) focusing on Western Europe for five years. From 2008 to 2011, she managed the European Programme for Integration and Migration (EPIM), a grant-making initiative of NEF. Formerly, she worked for UNESCO in Cuba and Mexico and for Handicap International Belgium. She studied international relations, political sciences, culture and development studies, in Italy (Padua), France (Sciences-Po Paris), and Belgium (University of Leuven).

Tom Dewar is now affiliated with Nurture Development as a Senior Associate, as well as being an Emeritus faculty member with the Asset Based Community Development Institute. He was previously Co-Director of the Aspen Institute’s Roundtable on Community Change. He now lives in Bologna, Italy where he taught international and community development through the School for Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University (2001-2007), in Bologna.

From 1998-2001, he was director of Evaluation for the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago – his hometown. He continues to serve as a Senior Advisor to MacArthur in support of their Safety and Justice Initiative, a ten-year commitment to change the way jails are used (and mis-used) in the US. Prior to that he was Senior Project Associate at Rainbow Research in Minneapolis (1991-1997); where he worked with a variety of community-driven initiatives, non-profit organizations and community foundations across the U.S. to improve their effectiveness and impact. Before Rainbow, he was a long=time faculty member of the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota, where he taught and conducted action research (1974-1990).

His teaching, research, writing and public speaking have addressed a variety of topics, including especially the key challenges in community development, role of mutual aid and informal networks in community building, the social and economic organization of neighborhoods, achieving racial equity, and the dangers of an over-reliance on professional service delivery systems. He has led numerous evaluations that have focused on these topics, as well as on efforts to re-integrate formerly institutionalized (and other labeled) people into local communities, reform policy and practice in state level juvenile justice systems, provide employment and income for lower skilled and less experienced workers, improve the integration of school and work, carry out peacemaking and conflict mediation, strengthen sustainable agriculture, and promote strong and effective community organizing..

Lamberto Zannier

Ambassador Lamberto Zannier is a High-Level Expert at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and has occupied this position since September 2020. He served as the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities from July 2017 until July 2020. Previously, he was OSCE Secretary General for two consecutive three-year terms, from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2017. Other senior positions include UN Special Representative for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 2008 to 2011, with rank of UN Under-Secretary-General, Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE (2002-2006), Chairperson of the negotiations on the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1998-1999) and Head of Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperative Security at NATO (1991-1997). Between 2006 and 2008 he served as Coordinator for CFSP and ESDP (now CSDP) in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing inter alia with EU foreign policy issues and with Italy’s participation in EU operations, both civilian and military.

Zannier joined the Italian Foreign Ministry as a career diplomat in 1978 and also served in Abu Dhabi, Vienna and The Hague, mainly specializing in multilateral and security affairs. From 1976 to 1977 he worked at the Legal Office of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome on issues related to international river basins and the shared use of internal waters.

Amb. Zannier is author of several publications on international affairs, conflict prevention and crisis management issues. Visiting Professor, University of Trento; member of Advisory Board, Italian Agency for Peacebuilding; former Director for Euro-Mediterranean Diplomacy and Intercultural Affairs, IFIMES Institute of research studies; former President of the Istituto per la Ricerca sul Negoziato, University of Gorizia.

He holds a Doctorate in Law, an advanced degree in international relations from Societa’ Italiana per le Organizzazioni Internazionali in Rome and an honorary doctorate in International and Diplomatic Sciences (2016) from the University of Trieste, Italy.

Ivan Vejvoda

Ivan Vejvoda is a Permanent Fellow and Director Europe’s Futures project at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, Austria.

From 2010 – 2017 he was Senior Vice President at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS) in Washington D.C. From 2003-2010 he was in Belgrade the Executive Director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a project of GMFUS supporting democratic initiatives and civil society. Vejvoda came to GMF in 2003 from distinguished service in the Serbian government as senior advisor on foreign policy and European integration to Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić. He was executive director of the Belgrade-based Fund for an Open Society from 1998 to 2002. During the mid-1990s, Mr. Vejvoda held various academic posts in the United Kingdom (University of Sussex) the US (Macalester and Smith Colleges). Ivan Vejvoda was involved in the democratic opposition movement in Yugoslavia through the 1980s and 1990s. A political scientist and political theorist he has published extensively on: democracy, totalitarianism, the French Revolution, comparative European politics, Balkans.

He was awarded the French National Order of Merit in the rank of Officer (2006) and the Italian Order of the Star of Italian Solidarity rank of commander (2007).

Huma is an affiliated senior researcher at the Leuven Institute of Criminology (KU Leuven) and an independent research consultant with national and international human rights and development organizations, including the Afghansitan Independent Human Rights Commission, GIZ, ECHO (European Commission), Alert International and other institutions. Her research area is human rights (with focus on women’s rights and Housing, Land and Property rights) and transitional justice with extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan. Previously she has worked with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Kabul as well as human rights and women’s rights organizations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and internationally. She has a PhD in criminology (KU Leuven), MA in human rights (LSE) and BA in Political Science (UMBC). She is the recipient of numerous academic awards, including the Jack Kent Cooke Foundation scholarship, and is a published author in a number of peer reviewed international academic journals.

Caterina Francesca Guidi

Economist and expert in migration and public health: her research interests are mainly concentrated on the impact of mobility and migration on European welfare and health systems. She also works on the organization of reception systems and integration of migrants in Europe. She is currently working as researcher at Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences at University of Siena as a member of the Inequality Lab (Laboratorio delle Diseguaglianze). For seven years she has worked at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) of the European University Institute (EUI) as Research Fellow and Project Coordinator. She has also collected working experience with international organizations, other research centres and NGOs on policy analysis in Belgium, Canada, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Netherlands, Serbia and Spain. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics by the University of Siena (Italy), a M.Sc. degree in Development Economics from the University of Florence (Italy) and a B.Sc. degree in Law and Economics from the University of Bologna (Italy). She is an active contributor and a peer reviewer for several journals and she has been invited as speaker and guest lecturer at different international conferences and universities.

Emiliano Alessandri

Emiliano Alessandri is AP’s Senior Advisor on International Partnerships and Global Outreach. He brings significant conflict-cycle expertise in key regions, from the Middle and North Africa (MENA) to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Emiliano’s entire career has focused on conflict management and conflict resolution, drawing on a 15-year plus track record of working at the cusp of research and policy in the field of international security. He is a non-resident scholar with the Middle East Institute of Washington and a non-resident senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund. He is also the senior officer for the Mediterranean and MENA regions for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

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Si vis pacem, para bellum

A short essay written on the question if the adage 'If you want war prepare for peace' would be supported by different schools of thought in IR and different studies.

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Conatus - Journal of Philosophy, 2023

The dynamics of warfare have undergone significant transformations, necessitating a comprehensive reevaluation of the study of wars. It is no longer sufficient to solely focus on analyzing military operations; instead, a broader perspective is required. Postcolonial research has shed light on the changing forms of warfare that emerged after the era of military colonialism. This shift in the nature of conflicts demands the development and application of new research methods to effectively comprehend and address contemporary warfare. Of particular significance is the emergence of informational and hybrid warfare, which blurs the traditional boundaries between states of war and peace. Consequently, the concept of peace, as the desired state of coexistence, warrants closer examination from multidimensional angles. While peace has historically been considered from moral and religious viewpoints, it is imperative to critically evaluate the applicability of these perspectives and explore alternative approaches. This article seeks to unravel the complex nature of peace by integrating insights from diverse disciplines. By adopting a multidisciplinary approach, encompassing moral, religious, and other disciplinary lenses, a more comprehensive understanding of peace can be achieved. Moreover, this interdisciplinary exploration enables a nuanced analysis of the intricate dynamics between war and peace, facilitating the development of effective strategies for conflict resolution. By critically examining the concept of peace and reevaluating the nature of war from this perspective, this article aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on conflicts and their potential resolutions. By combining theoretical reflections with empirical evidence, it offers a valuable resource for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners interested in comprehending the complexities of contemporary conflicts and working towards the attainment and sustenance of lasting peace.

“Pacem in Terris and the Just War Tradition: A Semicentennial Reconsideration,” with Josh King, Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 2 (Fall, 2013): 142-161.

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