I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. & Ors. (“Amazon-Future case”) has been the subject of immense controversy in recent months. The magnitude of the case derives not only from the enormity of the monetary implications of its outcome, but also from the significant impact the case would have on India’s retail sector. [1] Within the realm of legal practice and scholarship, the Amazon-Future case is most widely known for the Supreme Court’s decision in August 2021, wherein it affirmed the validity of emergency arbitration in India. [2]
The Supreme Court’s decision to recognise Emergency Arbitration in India has been the subject of an extensive body of literature. However, it is important to note that a significant issue in the dispute concerns the applicability of the “Group of Companies” doctrine. According to the Group of Companies doctrine, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement can be subjected to arbitration without its prior consent if all the parties to such arbitration had mutually intended to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, if such non-signatory is part of the same group of companies as one of the signatories. [3] Thus, when the circumstances under which the parties have entered into the transaction reflect an intention to bind both the non-signatory entity and the signatory entity from the same group of companies, such non-signatory entity can be subjected to arbitration. The applicability of the Group of Companies doctrine in the context of the Amazon-Future case merits discussion as it underpins the central question of whether Future Retail can be bound by an arbitration agreement between Amazon and Future Coupons, as will be explained below.
The applicability of the Group of Companies doctrine to the Amazon-Future case has received minimal academic scrutiny. The piece attempts to fill this void. Given the magnitude of the case, this discussion is particularly important in assessing when the Group of Companies doctrine can be invoked, particularly in International Commercial Arbitrations seated in India. To do so, the piece first provides a broad overview of the Amazon-Future case and the relevant legal proceedings. Subsequently, the paper surveys the group of companies doctrine and its application, followed by a critical analysis. The piece ends with concluding remarks. Given the piece’s focus on the invocation of the ‘Group of Companies’ by Indian Courts, the piece does not engage with the SIAC orders — the arbitral institution responsible for the arbitration referred to in the Amazon-Future case — which are, in any case, not publicly available at the date of the paper’s authorship.
II. INDIA AND THE GROUP OF COMPANIES DOCTRINE
Before addressing the applicability of the Group of Companies doctrine to the Amazon-Future case, it is important to understand the analytical framework of how the doctrine operates in India. The Group of Companies doctrine was introduced into India’s arbitral jurisprudence in Chloro Controls India Private Limited v. Severn Trent Water Purification (“Chloro Controls”), in which a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement can be subjected to arbitration without their prior consent, but only in exceptional cases. [4]
In assessing when this exception can be invoked to bind a non-signatory, the Supreme Court propounded a four-factor assessment. The four factors include the common intention of parties to arbitrate, the composite nature of the transaction, the direct commonality of the subject matter and agreement between the parties, and common legal and negotiating teams. [5] However, the judgement in Chloro Controls fails to provide any indicative guidance as to how these factors must be assessed, particularly given the complex nature of commercial transactions wherein multiple factors may weight against each other.
Owing to the absence of any guidance in the use of the factors outlined in Chloro Controls , the Group of Companies Doctrine has often been misapplied by courts in India. For instance, in both Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises and RV Solutions v. Ajay Kumar Dixit , wherein the Group of Companies doctrine was invoked to bind third parties to arbitration, where such third parties were not even members of the same group of companies as the signatories. [6] In the two cases, the parties were subjected to arbitration solely because they were involved in a composite interlinked transaction, which is only one of the factors in the Chloro Controls Test.
The widespread misapplication of the Group of Companies doctrine presents a concerning trend. It is important to understand that the doctrine fundamentally conflicts with the principle of party consent, which is the cornerstone of international arbitration. [7] It is unsurprising, therefore, that most common law countries do not recognise the doctrine. [8] Within this analytical framework, the next section assesses the applicability of the doctrine to the factual matrix of the Amazon-Future case.
III. THE AMAZON V. FUTURE RETAIL CASE AND THE GROUP OF COMPANIES DOCTRINE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
The question of whether Future Retail could be bound by the arbitration agreement between Amazon and Future Coupons poses a controversial issue in the dispute. At the core of the Amazon-Future case lies Amazon’s investment into Future Coupons. As per the Shareholder’s Agreement between Amazon and Future Coupons, Amazon was granted certain “special, material and protective” rights available to Future Coupons in Future Retail. Based on these material protective rights, the retail assets of Future Retail could not be alienated prior to the written consent of Amazon, and could not be alienated to a restricted person. [9] Thus, despite Amazon and Future Retail not having a Shareholders Agreement, The Shareholder’s Agreement between Future Coupons and Amazon transferred of these “special, material and protective” rights, previously held by Future Coupons, to Amazon.The dispute arose when Future Retail approved a transfer of its retail assets to Reliance Group. [10]
Amazon alleged that the transfer was void as per the Shareholder’s Agreement, and sought emergency interim relief based on the arbitration clause in the Shareholders Agreement with Future Coupons to restrain Future Retail from pursuing the transaction. The decisions of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, as well as the Supreme Court all had different approaches to the applicability of the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine.
In its order, the Division Bench concluded that because Future Retail was not a party to the agreement between Future Coupons and Amazon, the Group of Companies doctrine could not be invoked. [11] However, the order is a misapplication of the doctrine itself, and is circular in its reasoning. It must be noted that the very purpose of the doctrine is to bind such non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. Thus, the Division Bench is incorrect in holding that the mere existence of different agreements between the parties precludes the applicability of the doctrine.
On the other hand, the Single Judge upheld the emergency arbitrator’s approach in applying the doctrine based on the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Chloro Controls . [12] The Single Judge noted the presence of factors such as Future Coupons and Future Retail’s common legal and negotiating teams, Future Coupons financial support of Future Retail, the intrinsically intermingled nature of the agreements and similar dispute resolution clauses in the different agreements to conclude that the doctrine can be invoked in the case, and upheld the emergency arbitrator’s award to stay the transaction between Reliance and Future Retail. [13]
From a theoretical perspective, the Group of Companies doctrine’s encroachment on the principle of party autonomy is justified by the application of the doctrine only where there exists a clear intention of the parties to bind the non-signatory to the agreement. [14] When viewing the case from this perspective, it is clear that the Single Judge fails to provide cogent reasons to determine the intention of the parties. Instead, the Single Judge merely emphasises the fulfilment of the indicative test laid down in Chloro Controls to justify the applicability of the doctrine. As shown above, the Court relies on connections such as Future Coupons’ financial support, and the use of the same legal representatives by Future Coupons and Future Retail, to support its invocation of the doctrine. However, the Single Judge’s exclusive reliance on these connections would undermine the commercial realities of business transactions if applied elsewhere, particularly those involving the same group of companies, wherein such connections can be easily found.
While the factors in Chloro Controls are indicative, they cannot be conclusive. Thus, courts must attempt to unravel the true essence of a business arrangement to ascertain the intention of the parties. The Single Judge failed to do so. Further, in a determination of intent, two facts assume importance. Clause No.15.17 of the Shareholder’s Agreement entered into Amazon and Future Coupons provides:
“ For the avoidance of doubt, Parties hereby expressly record their understanding that the Promoters and the Investor have no agreement or understanding whatsoever in relation to the acquisition of shares or voting rights in, or exercising control over, Future Retail and that the Company, the Promoters and the Investor otherwise do not intend to act in concert with each other in any way whatsoever.” [15]
Further, there exists an absence of any amendment to Future Retail’s Articles of Association to reflect the restrictions of the Shareholder’s Agreement entered into Amazon and Future Coupons. These two factors point towards the common intention of the parties not to bind Future Retail to the agreement between Amazon and Future Coupons. More importantly, the Single Judge fails to consider that complex transactions, such as the one in question, are often deliberately structured in this manner in order to limit risk and liability to a specific entity through the principle of separate legal personality. The Single Judge fails to adequately assess these factors and their implications on the applicability of the doctrine. When an invocation of the doctrine is insufficiently reasoned in this manner, it can become a means to bypass and defeat established principles of party consent and separate legal personality.
The Supreme Court did not extensively discuss on the Group of Companies issue. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the emergency arbitrator’s award restraining the transaction was entirely valid and enforceable under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [16] Thus, it deferred to the judgement of the emergency arbitrator, which eliminated the need to consider whether the Group of Companies doctrine could be invoked. The Supreme Court’s lack of engagement, could in significant ways, be perceived as a missed opportunity to clarify India’s tryst with the Group of Companies doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
When considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the dispute, the emergency arbitrator, Single Judge and the Supreme Court were correct to enjoining Future Retail from pursuing the disputed transaction. However, doing so by applying the doctrine without adequate caution may present a dilution of the doctrine in the Indian context. While the Amazon-Future case propels India’s status as a pro-arbitration jurisdiction by recognising emergency arbitration, its overexpansion of the doctrine may yet hold it back.
* Sahaj Mathur is a Third Year Bachelors of Law Student at the National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata. His interests lie in International Arbitration and International Investment Law.
[1] Swaraj Singh Dhanjal, Amazon, Future Group deal to intensify competition in India’s retail Industry , Mint, (Aug. 23, 2019) https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/amazon-future-group-deal-to-intensify-competition-in-india-s-retail-industry-1566536017989.html .
[2] Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Limited & Ors, (2021) SCC Civil Appeal Nos. 4492-4493 (India).
[3] Chloro Controls India Private Limited v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. (2013) 1 SCC 641 (India); Cheran Props. Ltd. v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. & Ors. (2018) 16 SCC 413 (India), ¶ 23.
[4] Chloro Controls India Private Limited v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. (2013) 1 SCC 641 (India), ¶ 68.
[6] Ameet Lalchand Shah and Ors. v. Rishabh Enterprises and Ors., (2018) 15 SCC 678 (India); R.V. Solutions Pvt Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar Dixit & Ors. 2019 SCC Online Del 6531 CS Comm 745/2017 (India).
[7] E. Gaillard & J. Savage, International Commercial Arbitration 498 (1 st ed., 1999); G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 2432 (2nd ed., 2014); C. Partasides & N. Blackaby, Redfern & Hunter On International Arbitration 71 (6th ed., 2015).
[8] B. Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations: Multi-Party, Multi-Contract, Multi-Issue – A Comparative Study 266 (2 nd ed., 2020).
[9] Amazon.com NV, 280 DLT 618 ¶ 8.
[10] Id. ¶ 9.
[11] Future Retail Ltd. v. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC & Ors. (2021) FAO(OS) (COMM) 21/2021(Division Bench of the Delhi High Court), ¶11.
[12] Chloro Controls, 1 SCC 641 ¶ 68.
[13] Amazon.com NV, 280 DLT ¶¶ 118, 168.
[14] Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank & Ors, (2019) Civil Appeal Nos. 6202-6205, ¶ 42.
[15] Future Retail Ltd., FAO(OS) (COMM) 21/2021 ¶ 11.
Home > Cases > Amazon-Future-Reliance Dispute
Amazon.com v Future Retail Ltd
The SC allowed the arbitration proceedings between Amazon and Future Retail Limited before the Singapore International Arbitration Tribunal to continue.
N.V. Ramana CJI
A.S. Bopanna J
Hima Kohli J
Petitioner: Amazon
Lawyers: Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Sr.Adv.; Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Sr.Adv.; Mr. Aspi Chinoy, Sr.Adv.; Mr. Gourab Banerji, Sr.Adv.; Mr. Amit Sibal, Sr.Adv.
Respondent : Future Retail
Lawyers: Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr.Adv.; Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr.Adv.; Mr. Harish Salve, Sr.Adv.; Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, Sr.Adv.
Case Number: SLP(C)1669-1670/2022
Next Hearing: March 15, 2022
Last Updated: August 10, 2022
TAGS: Amazon , CJI Ramana , Future Retail , Shareholder Agreement
Whether Amazon has control over Future Retail through its Shareholder Agreement with Future Coupon.
Whether the sale of FRL to Reliance breached FCPL’s Shareholder Agreement with Amazon.
In August, 2019, Future Coupon Private Ltd (FCPL) entered into a Shareholder Agreement with Future Retail Limited (FRL). FCPL is a subsidiary company of FRL that sells corporate merchandise. FRL is the second largest retail company in India. The Agreement bound FRL to take FCPL’s approval before transferring assets of the company to other parties.
Later that month, Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC (Amazon) and FCPL entered into a Share Subscription Agreement and Shareholders Agreement, which gave Amazon a 49% stake in FCPL. As part of the agreements, Amazon had the right of first refusal for any sale made by Future Coupons. In a broader sense, these agreements bound FCPL to obtain Amazon’s consent before implementing any decision in FRL. Through these agreements, Amazon effectively claimed control over FRL.
Affected by lockdowns in the first wave of COVID-19, FRL was on the verge of bankruptcy. A whopping ₹22,000 crore in debt, FRL decided to sell its retail businesses and assets to Reliance for ₹25,000 crore in August, 2020. This sale will allow Reliance to completely dominate the Indian retail market with over 1,800 retail outlets. This marriage of two retail heavy weights in the Indian market will make it virtually impossible for Amazon to establish a competitive e-commerce business in India.
Amazon claimed that the sale was a violation of its Shareholder Agreement with FCPL. It approached the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) in October of 2020 claiming that the FRL-Reliance deal violated the Amazon-FCPL Agreement. In the meanwhile, FRL filed a case before the Delhi High Court (HC) arguing that Amazon unlawfully interfered with the sale of its assets to Reliance. On October 25th, 2020, SIAC passed an Emergency Arbitral Award halting the FRL-Reliance deal. FRL later appealed the Emergency Award before the SIAC Arbitral Tribunal.
The sale of FRL to Reliance required approval from the Competition Commission of India (CCI), Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). CCI and SEBI approved the FRL-Reliance Agreement in December, 2020. In January 2021, despite ongoing disputes at SIAC and the Delhi HC, FRL approached the NCLT to approve the sale.
In 2021, the case escalated on various levels. Amazon sought the implementation of the SIAC Emergency Award, which the Delhi HC granted. Multiple appeals to the Supreme Court (SC) on various issues were filed by both parties. The Court then halted hearings until the SIAC Arbitral Tribunal made its decision on the validity of the Emergency Award.
Amidst this chaos of multiple complaints, hearings, and fora, on December 17th, 2021, the CCI revoked the original Shareholder Agreement between Amazon and FCPL. The CCI stated that Amazon failed to disclose the interconnected set of agreements that effectively gave it control over FRL, and imposed a penalty of ₹202 crore on Amazon. Amazon then appealed this Order before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).
This revocation changed the very basis of the dispute—now it was a question of whether Amazon had any rights over FRL in the first place at all, as opposed to the initial question of the extent of Amazon’s rights over FRL. In December of 2021, FRL approached the Delhi High Court to stay the arbitration proceedings underway in Singapore. On the 5th of January, 2022, a two-judge Bench of the Delhi HC stayed the arbitration proceedings, on the grounds that the CCI’s revocation of the Agreement rendered a dispute arising from it invalid.
Meanwhile, the appeals on various Orders of the Delhi HC were being heard in the SC. In February, 2022, the SC noted that the Delhi HC had not given sufficient time to FRL and FCPL to establish a defence and file counter arguments. It requested the Delhi High Court begin fresh adjudication, by posting the numerous petitions filed in the case before the same Bench of the Delhi HC
While the Delhi HC is hearing the matters afresh, and the NCLAT is deciding the validity of CCI’s revocation Order, Amazon approached the SC to allow the Singapore Arbitration proceedings to continue.
Based on the joint memo submitted by Amazon and Future Group, On 6th April 2022, the SC passed an Order allowing arbitration at SIAC to continue. They directed SIAC to first hear Future Retail’s plea to terminate the arbitration on the grounds that the Competition Commission of India had revoked Amazon’s permission to invest in Future Coupon.
For SCO’s easy-to-understand timeline of the back and forth between Amazon and Future Retail Limited, click here .
Documents (6)
Order Allowing Parties to Resume Arbitration at Singapore
April 6, 2022
FRL Intimation to NSE, BSE about Shareholder Agreement between FRL and FCPL
August 12, 2019
CCI Notice Approving Shareholder Agreement between Amazon and FRL
August 28, 2019
CCI Press Release Approving Sale of FRL to Reliance
November 20, 2020
Delhi HC Directs Regulators to Complete Proceedings Before HC decides Amazon-Future Case
Delhi HC Upholds SIAC Emergency Award
February 2, 2021
Reports (6)
Amazon-Future Hearing #6: Order Allowing Parties to Resume Arbitration at Singapore
Amazon-Future #5: SC Refuses to Intervene in Reliance-Future Assets Issue, Says Stick to Hearing Scope
April 4, 2022
Amazon-Future Hearing #4: Future Did not Transfer its Assets, was Forced to Surrender Lease
April 1, 2022
Amazon-Future Hearing #3: Interim Relief Vital to Continue Arbitration in Singapore
March 16, 2022
Amazon-Future Hearing #2: Amazon Permitted to Seek Interim Relief
March 15, 2022
Amazon-Future Hearing #1: Parties Agree to Try an Out-of-Court Settlement
March 3, 2022
Contributor.
In the last two years, the idea of urgent ad interim and interim reliefs in dispute resolution process have been catapulted to the forefront. Between the first and second wave of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, "urgency" in cases has been the sole criterion for deciding if a case ought to be heard through e-courts.
Until 4 years ago, litigants in India had to necessarily take recourse to Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (" Act ") for interim reliefs before the Courts prior to constitution of the arbitral Tribunal. However, arbitration institutes such as the Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration and the Indian Council of Arbitration etc. have in line with international arbitration institutions such as the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (" SIAC ") and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre incorporated a mechanism in their arbitration rules for emergency arbitration, thus, giving litigants an option to urge interim reliefs within the institutional framework prior to the constitution of the arbitral Tribunal. The powers of an emergency arbitrator generally correspond to the powers given to an arbitral Tribunal under the applicable law, however, any orders passed are subject to modification by the arbitral Tribunal once it is constituted.
One such award passed in an emergency arbitration conducted as per SIAC Rules assumed significance before the Indian Courts. In March 2021, Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC (" Amazon ") moved the Hon'ble Delhi High Court under Section 17(2) of the Act to enforce an emergency arbitration award dated 25 th October 2020 (" Award ") inter alia against the Future Retail Group. The Award was passed by an emergency arbitrator appointed under Schedule 1 of the SIAC Rules. On 18 th March, 2021, the learned Single Judge passed a detailed judgment giving reasons for an order made under Section 17(2) read with Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) holding that an emergency arbitrator's award is an order under Section 17(1) of the Act. This order was challenged by the Future Retail Group before a division bench of the Delhi High Court by way of a first appeal. The Delhi High Court vide order dated 22 nd March 2021 stayed the order dated 18 th March 2021. Against the order dated 22 nd March 2021, appeals being Civil Appeal 4492-4493 of 2021 (" Appeals ") came to be filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India (" Supreme Court "). These Appeals were heard and finally disposed of vide order dated 6 th August 2021 as per which, the Supreme Court whilst re-emphasising party autonomy recognised under the Act, held that emergency arbitration awards were recognised under section 17 of the Act. The Court further observed that such orders are an important step in aid of decongesting the civil courts and affording expeditious interim relief to the parties.
In this news alert we provide the key observations made by the Supreme Court.
A. facts of the case:.
Amazon had entered into three shareholder agreements with Future Retail Limited (" FRL "), Future Coupons Pvt. Ltd. (" FCPL ") and its promoters/directors (collectively referred to as " Biyani Group ") (Respondents in the Appeals). The Shareholders' Agreement dated 12 th August 2019 was entered into by and between Amazon and the Biyani Group in relation to the Future Retail Limited (" FRL Agreement" ). Under this Shareholders' Agreement, FCPL was accorded negative, protective, special, and material rights with regard to FRL including, in particular, FRL's retail stores. The rights granted to FCPL under this Shareholders' Agreement were to be exercised for Amazon's benefit and thus were mirrored in a Shareholders' Agreement dated 22 nd August, 2019 entered into between Amazon, FCPL and the Biyani Group (" FCPL Agreement "). Amazon agreed to invest a sum of Rs.1431 crore in FCPL based on the rights granted to FCPL under the FRL Agreement and the FCPL Agreement.
The basic understanding between the parties was that Amazon's investment in the retail assets of FRL would continue to vest in FRL as a result of which, FRL could not transfer its retail assets without FCPL's consent which, in turn, could not be granted unless Amazon had provided its consent. Further, FRL was prohibited from encumbering/transferring/selling/divesting/disposing of its retail assets to "restricted persons", being prohibited entities, with whom FRL, FCPL, and the Biyanis could not deal and a list of such persons was set out in the FCPL Agreement. on 29 th August, 2020, Respondents Nos. 1 to 13 entered into a transaction with the Mukesh Dhirubhai Ambani Group which envisages the amalgamation of FRL with the Mukesh Dhirubhai Ambani Group, the consequential cessation of FRL as an entity, and the complete disposal of its retail assets in favour of the said group.
Amazon initiated arbitration proceedings and filed an application on 5 th October, 2020 seeking emergency interim relief from the emergency arbitrator under the SIAC Rules in the form of injunctions against the aforesaid transaction. The emergency arbitrator passed an Award in favour of Amazon. The Biyani Group however went ahead with the impugned transaction, describing the Award as a nullity and the emergency arbitrator as coram non judice, in order to press forward for permissions before statutory authorities/regulatory bodies. FRL, consistent with this stand, did not challenge the emergency arbitrator's award under Section 37 of the Act, but instead chose to file a civil suit before the Delhi High Court being C.S. No. 493 of 2020, in which it sought to interdict the arbitration proceedings and asked for interim relief to restrain Amazon from writing to statutory authorities by relying on the emergency arbitrator's order, calling it a "tortious interference" with its civil rights.
Meanwhile, Amazon went ahead with an application filed under Section 17(2) of the Act which was heard and disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. Since breaches of the aforesaid Agreements were admitted, the only plea raised was that the emergency arbitrator's award was a nullity. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge held that the Award was enforceable as an order under the Act.
A Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice B.R. Gavai considered the following two questions in the Appeals :
Answering this question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court held as follows:
i. A conjoint reading of sections 2(6), 2(8), 19(2) and 21 of the Act reveals that parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by an arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. Section 21, which is expressly subject to the arbitration agreement between the parties, provides that arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.
ii. Placing reliance on a catena of judgments, the Supreme Court emphasised the principle of party autonomy as being one of the pillars of the Act. The Court emphatically held that there is nothing in the Act that prohibits contracting parties from agreeing to a provision for an award by an emergency arbitrator.
iii. There is nothing in Section 17(1), when read with the other provisions of the Act, to interdict the application of rules of arbitral institutions that the parties may have agreed to. The words "arbitral proceedings" are not limited by any definition and thus encompass proceedings in an emergency arbitration including interim awards that are passed by emergency arbitrators.
iv. The introduction of Sections 9(2) and 9(3) was with a view to decongest the court system and for constitution of arbitral tribunals which provide interim reliefs in a timely and efficacious manner. An emergency arbitrator's order would be an order which furthers this objective and gives the parties urgent interim relief in cases which deserve such relief.
v. After participating in an emergency award proceeding, agreeing to institutional rules made in that regard and undertaking to abide by the award, a party cannot be heard to thereafter claim that it will not be bound by an emergency arbitrator's ruling.
vi. In the context of reliance placed on law commission reports, the Supreme Court held that merely because recommendations in a Law Commission Report were not followed by Parliament, would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that what has been omitted does not form part of a statute when properly interpreted.
Declaring that no appeal lies under Section 37 of the Act against an order of enforcement of an emergency arbitrator's order made under Section 17(2) of the Act, the Supreme Court held as follows:
i. The 2015 Amendment Act has provided in Section 17(1) the same powers to an arbitral tribunal as are given to a court. Therefore, it would be anomalous to hold that if an interim order was passed by the tribunal and then enforced by the court with reference to Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, such order would not be referrable to Section 17. Section 17(2) was necessitated because the earlier law on enforcement of an arbitral tribunal's interim orders was found to be too cumbersome. The Court when it acts under Section 17(2), acts in the same manner as it acts to enforce a court order made under Section 9(1).
ii. Section 17(2) creates a legal fiction. This fiction is created only for the purpose of enforceability of interim orders passed by an arbitral tribunal. To extend it to appeals being filed under the Code of Civil Procedure would be a big leap not envisaged by the legislature at all in enacting the said fiction. The legal fiction created under Section 17(2) for enforcement of interim orders is created only for the limited purpose of enforcement as a decree of the court. To extend this fiction to encompass appeals from such orders is to go beyond the clear intent of the legislature.
iii. Section 17(1) is a mirror image of Section 9(1) as to the interim measures that can be made. By adding Section 17(2) as a consequence thereof, significantly, no change was made in Section 37(2) (b) to bring it in line with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r). The opening words of Section 17(2), i.e. "subject to any orders passed in appeal under Section 37..." also demonstrates the legislature's understanding that orders that are passed in an appeal under Section 37 are relatable only to Section 17(1).
iv. An appeal against an order refusing an injunction may be allowed, in which case subsection (2) of Section 17 then kicks in to enforce the order passed in appeal. Also, the legislature made no amendment to the granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9 to bring it in line with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r), under Section 37(1)(b). What is clear from this is that enforcement proceedings are not covered by the appeal provision.
v. The arbitral tribunal cannot itself enforce its orders, which can only be done by a court with reference to the Code of Civil Procedure. But the court, when it acts under Section 17(2), acts in the same manner as it would act to enforce a court order passed under Section 9(1). If this is so, then what is clear that the arbitral tribunal's order gets enforced under Section 17(2) read with the CPC.
vi. Pursuant to the 2019 Amendment Act, it is clear that Section 37 is a complete code so far as appeals from orders and awards made by an arbitral tribunal are concerned.
The judgment of the Supreme Court assumes significance as it has not only re-emphasised 'party autonomy' as a guiding principle of the Act but has also brought to the fore the option of 'Emergency Arbitrations' which, in light of the judgment, are now recognised remedies for interim relief and are enforceable under Indian law. The judgment has been celebrated widely among litigants as well as lawyers given that parties will now be able to avail interim relief expeditiously without having to burden the Courts.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
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Morris Mthombeni and Albert Wocke
Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
Read the professors’ business school-style case study before considering the issues raised in the box at the end.
At the end of last year, Dan Marokane became the 12th chief executive of Eskom in the past decade alone. He returned to the embattled South African state-owned utility monopoly, which he had left in 2015, to tackle the tensions between fixing the company to ensure energy security in South Africa and meeting its “just energy transition” commitments to lower emissions.
At COP26, the UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow, in December 2021, the US, EU, UK, France and Germany pledged $8.5bn to help South Africa shut its coal-fired powered stations. Eskom generates more than 90 per cent of electricity used in South Africa and the Southern African Development Community region, of which 85 per cent is produced from fossil fuels.
Overall, the energy sector contributes 41 per cent of South Africa’s CO₂ emissions, according to the World Bank , earning Eskom the dubious honour of being called “the world’s worst polluting power company” by some environmental groups. Eskom also finds itself at odds with climate activists and academics such as those from University College London and the International Institute for Sustainable Development, who argue that “no more fossil fuel projects are needed as renewable energy sources take up the demand”.
In addition, since 2008, Eskom has struggled with debilitating national blackouts euphemistically known as “load shedding”. These were caused by insufficient generation to meet demand for power as a result of poor management, corruption and bad political decisions. Electricity prices spiked and the lack of power further weakened the South African economy, costing as much as £40mn per day.
Morris Mthombeni and Albert Wocke are professors at the Gordon Institute of Business Science at the University of Pretoria in South Africa; Professor Mthombeni is also dean at Gibs
During the first half of 2024, the situation appeared finally to be stabilising, following the appointment of Mteto Nyati as Eskom chairman. Nyati had a successful track record in the technology and telecommunication sectors. Marokane, as a new chief executive with a supportive board chair, is also able to draw on his prior experience at Eskom, when he was in charge of generation.
Marokane has cautioned that, while there has been no load shedding for several months, “South Africa is not out of the woods yet”. His strategy includes carrying out extensive maintenance at underperforming coal-fired power stations that had been poorly maintained, and dismissing corrupt or incompetent managers. The turnaround is complicated by a new business model and the need for Eskom to move to cleaner energy production as part of the just transition programme.
Eskom was a vertically integrated business since its inception in 1923 but, in 2019, the South African government began a process of unbundling the company into separate subsidiaries for generation, transmission and distribution. The objective was to tackle the problems that led to load shedding and improve efficiency and transparency, reduce rent seeking, and protect capital providers interests.
The first division to be spun off in July this year was transmission, now an Eskom subsidiary known as the National Transmission Company South Africa, which operates with a separate board and management team. This has the potential to be the most profitable of the subsidiaries and will run the transmission system and buy electricity from multiple generators, not only Eskom. It will eventually provide a platform for generators, consumers, retailers and traders to trade with each other, as happens in a number of other countries. But Marokane might want to push back the timing of the spin-off for two related reasons.
First, Eskom ought to protect its less profitable generation division, currently dominated by fossil-fuel energy sources. In July, Eskom spoke out against government plans to issue licences allowing private generators to sell directly to customers, and to permit the import of energy into South Africa. The company was concerned that applicants would be able to cherry-pick customers, leaving existing small users without the present cross-subsidy from larger consumers.
Second, to meet its carbon emission reduction targets, Eskom must find a way to address a continuing reliance on fossil fuels as the main source of energy in its generation division. The company had pledged at COP26 to reduce emissions from 442mn tons a year to between 350mn and 420mn tons by 2030. Retaining transmission capability within Eskom could help support a sustainable restructure, leading to a better funded just transition plan.
Marokane was confident Eskom would reduce about 71mn tons of CO₂ from generation by 2030, as it aggressively built a renewable energy portfolio. Yet it has failed to repurpose its 63-year-old 1,000MW Komati power station, east of Pretoria — it was finally decommissioned in October 2022.
Owing to the social consequences of the loss of hundreds of jobs at the fossil-fuelled Komati, which were replaced by many fewer focusing on social entrepreneurship initiatives, Marokane described it as an “ atomic bomb scenario in terms of social discord”.
Despite partnering with the South African Renewable Energy Technology Centre and the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet to redeploy the hundreds of people who lost jobs after the closure of Komati, Eskom has found that the path to a just energy transition is not a smooth one.
See the FT video above, and:
ft.com/eskom-case1
ft.com/eskon-case2
Considering the current strategy to unbundle Eskom into generation, distribution and transmission subsidiaries, how can the company make its generation business comfortably profitable?
Is the organisational restructure a crucial part of Eskom’s plan to achieve its emission reduction targets? If Eskom believed the restructure was unnecessary for it achieve its 2030 emissions reduction targets, could Marokane and his team consider retaining the current structure for the foreseeable future?
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Pachpande, Priti, and Sham Bachhav, 'Future of the 'Future Group': A Case Study on an E-commerce Retail—The Giant 'Future Group'', Indian Business Case Studies Volume IV (Oxford, 2022; ... This PDF is available to Subscribers Only. View Article Abstract & Purchase Options.
Group in Indian Organized Retail-ing Industry.INTRODUCTION OF FUTURE GROUP:Initially in the year 1987 the company was incorporated under the name of Manz Wear Private L. d. and Pantaloons one of India's first formal trouser brands was launched. Future Group is diversified business group started by Mr. Kishore Biyan from Rajasthan doi.
Future Group Case Study Engage247 Empowering Store - Managers The Client Today, Future Group stands tall as the largest multi-channel retailer with 8000+ stores and 26 Mi SKUs. Engage 247 provided a Digital Catalog through a mobile application prior to the season launch to gather feedback on styles, sizes, colors etc. Analyzed feedback and
Download Citation | Future of the 'Future Group': A Case Study on an E-commerce Retail—The Giant 'Future Group' | Case Volume IV brings industry live into the classroom for management ...
7. 6 Retail Brands With 743 Stores & Digital Channels In 234 Cities Patronized by around 300 mn customer footfalls annually Spread over 13 mn square feet of space Served by 32,012 Employees. Future Retail Limited brings together winning brands and retail chains that speaks, connects and wins the heart of every Indian. 8.
To illustrate this argument, I take as my case study the so-named "retail religion" that leaders within India's retail giant, Future Group, produced in the early 2000s to make buying more ...
Future Group's New Move: Big Bazaar Direct. December 2015. Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies Forthcoming (2) DOI: 10.1108/EEMCS-01-2015-0012. Authors: Vinod Kumar. Mudra Institute of ...
The Big Future Group Sale A Case study.docx - Free download as Word Doc (.doc / .docx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read online for free. 1) Kishore Biyani, founder of Future Group, was facing debts of around Rs 9,000 crore and was negotiating with lenders and suitors to reduce his debt burden. 2) Sameer Sain, founder of Everstone Capital and a former colleague of Biyani's, advised ...
Amazon___Future_Group_Case.docx - Free download as PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read online for free. Amazon entered the Indian market through an online marketplace alliance with Future Group, an established Indian retailer. This allowed Amazon to leverage Future Group's existing infrastructure and customer base while reducing prices through local partnerships.
Future Group: Case Analysis. Go back. Yusra Raouf. Sep 21, 2021. Recently, the Supreme Court of India deliberated on a significant aspect of arbitration law and gave a landmark decision in the case of Amazon v Future Coupons. The case brought up before the apex court dealt with the enforceability of Emergency Arbitration.
In 2014, the chief executives officers of Amazon and Future Group led their companies into an alliance that, while initially successful, encountered some difficulties in regards to discounts on their retail products. With the global retail industry standing at US$25.4 trillion in 2016, and the percentage of which e-commerce made up 7.4 per cent, the partners would have to decide if they should ...
Future Group Case Study: Engage247 - Free download as PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read online for free. Engage247 helped Future Group, a large multi-channel retailer, address challenges in localized assortment mix and product range by developing a digital catalog mobile app. The app gathered feedback from store managers and associates on fashion styles, sizes, and colors before ...
The retailer aimed to increase its sales through such initiatives. Future Group also had ambitious plans. By the end of 2011, it planned to achieve a turnover of Rs. 300 billion from its retail ventures. Issues. The case is structured to achieve the following teaching objectives. Understand the issues and challenges faced by Walmart and Future ...
The Virus Attacks. The COVID-19 pandemic came to India in January 2020. Future Retail was already struggling to stay afloat, and by March 2020 after the lockdown, this struggle became clear to the market, which led to a downfall in the share price from Rs 303.85 on March 2, 2020, to Rs 64.25 on April 8, 2020.
Amazon and Future Group: Rethinking the Alliance Strategy - The Case Centre. Product details. Amazon and Future Group: Rethinking the Alliance Strategy. Case. -. Reference no. 9B16M108. Subject category: Strategy and General Management. Authors: Meeta Dasgupta (Management Development Institute (MDI), Gurgaon) Published by: Ivey Publishing.
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Dissertation on Future Group - Free download as Word Doc (.doc), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read online for free. The document provides an executive summary and table of contents for a research project on the retail strategy of Future Group. It includes an introduction to the Indian retail industry which discusses the size and growth of the industry.
its contribution to society. Operating on a global scale, in 2020 the BMW Group employed a workforce of 120,726 people and consolidated its position as one of the world . s most attractive employers.Sustainability is an integral part of the Group's business model and plays a vital role in ensuring.
In March 2021, Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC ("Amazon") moved the Hon'ble Delhi High Court under Section 17(2) of the Act to enforce an emergency arbitration award dated 25 th October 2020 ("Award") inter alia against the Future Retail Group. The Award was passed by an emergency arbitrator appointed under Schedule 1 of the SIAC Rules.
Read the professors' business school-style case study before considering the issues raised in the box at the end. At the end of last year, Dan Marokane became the 12th chief executive of Eskom ...
(PDF) Learnings from TATA Group - A Case Study
Several studies have emphasized the significance of implementing the land realignment policy and its anticipated benefits. This research paper seeks to propose a methodology for implementing the land realignment policy in developing countries by conducting a comparative study of similar experiences, particularly about the Egyptian case.