case study of 2011 tsunami

Case Study: How does Japan live with earthquakes?

Japan lies within one of the most tectonically active zones in the world. It experiences over 400 earthquakes every day. The majority of these are not felt by humans and are only detected by instruments. Japan has been hit by a number of high-intensity earthquakes in the past. Since 2000 there are have been 16000 fatalities as the result of tectonic activity.

Japan is located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, where the North American, Pacific, Eurasian and Philippine plates come together. Northern Japan is on top of the western tip of the North American plate. Southern Japan sits mostly above the Eurasian plate. This leads to the formation of volcanoes such as Mount Unzen and Mount Fuji. Movements along these plate boundaries also present the risk of tsunamis to the island nation. The Pacific Coastal zone, on the east coast of Japan, is particularly vulnerable as it is very densely populated.

The 2011 Japan Earthquake: Tōhoku

Japan experienced one of its largest seismic events on March 11 2011. A magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred 70km off the coast of the northern island of Honshu where the Pacific and North American plate meet. It is the largest recorded earthquake to hit Japan and is in the top five in the world since records began in 1900. The earthquake lasted for six minutes.

A map to show the location of the 2011 Japan Earthquake

The earthquake had a significant impact on the area. The force of the megathrust earthquake caused the island of Honshu to move east 2.4m. Parts of the Japanese coastline dr[[ed by 60cm. The seabed close to the focus of the earthquake rose by 7m and moved westwards between 40-50m. In addition to this, the earthquake shifted the Earth 10-15cm on its axis.

The earthquake triggered a tsunami which reached heights of 40m when it reached the coast. The tsunami wave reached 10km inland in some places.

What were the social impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

The tsunami in 2011 claimed the lives of 15,853 people and injured 6023. The majority of the victims were over the age of 60 (66%). 90% of the deaths was caused by drowning. The remaining 10% died as the result of being crushed in buildings or being burnt. 3282 people were reported missing, presumed dead.

Disposing of dead bodies proved to be very challenging because of the destruction to crematoriums, morgues and the power infrastructure. As the result of this many bodies were buried in mass graves to reduce the risk of disease spreading.

Many people were displaced as the result of the tsunami. According to Save the Children 100,000 children were separated from their families. The main reason for this was that children were at school when the earthquake struck. In one elementary school, 74 of 108 students and 10 out of 13 staff lost their lives.

More than 333000 people had to live in temporary accommodation. National Police Agency of Japan figures shows almost 300,000 buildings were destroyed and a further one million damaged, either by the quake, tsunami or resulting fires. Almost 4,000 roads, 78 bridges and 29 railways were also affected. Reconstruction is still taking place today. Some communities have had to be relocated from their original settlements.

What were the economic impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

The estimated cost of the earthquake, including reconstruction, is £181 billion. Japanese authorities estimate 25 million tonnes of debris were generated in the three worst-affected prefectures (counties). This is significantly more than the amount of debris created during the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 47,700 buildings were destroyed and 143,300 were damaged. 230,000 vehicles were destroyed or damaged. Four ports were destroyed and a further 11 were affected in the northeast of Japan.

There was a significant impact on power supplies in Japan. 4.4 million households and businesses lost electricity. 11 nuclear reactors were shut down when the earthquake occurred. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was decommissioned because all six of its reactors were severely damaged. Seawater disabled the plant’s cooling systems which caused the reactor cores to meltdown, leading to the release of radioactivity. Radioactive material continues to be released by the plant and vegetation and soil within the 30km evacuation zone is contaminated. Power cuts continued for several weeks after the earthquake and tsunami. Often, these lasted between 3-4 hours at a time. The earthquake also had a negative impact on the oil industry as two refineries were set on fire during the earthquake.

Transport was also negatively affected by the earthquake. Twenty-three train stations were swept away and others experienced damage. Many road bridges were damaged or destroyed.

Agriculture was affected as salt water contaminated soil and made it impossible to grow crops.

The stock market crashed and had a negative impact on companies such as Sony and Toyota as the cost of the earthquake was realised.  Production was reduced due to power cuts and assembly of goods, such as cars overseas, were affected by the disruption in the supply of parts from Japan.

What were the political impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

Government debt was increased when it injects billions of yen into the economy. This was at a time when the government were attempting to reduce the national debt.

Several years before the disaster warnings had been made about the poor defences that existed at nuclear power plants in the event of a tsunami. A number of executives at the Fukushima power plant resigned in the aftermath of the disaster. A movement against nuclear power, which Japan heavily relies on, developed following the tsunami.

The disaster at Fukushima added political weight in European countries were anti-nuclear bodies used the event to reinforce their arguments against nuclear power.

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Japan Earthquake 2011

Japan earthquake 2011 case study.

An earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter Scale struck off Japan’s northeast coast, about 250 miles (400km) from Tokyo at a depth of 20 miles.

The magnitude 9.0 earthquake happened at 2:46 pm (local time) on Friday, March 11, 2011.

The earthquake occurred 250 miles off the North East Coast of Japan’s main island Honshu.

Japan 2011 Earthquake map

Japan is located on the eastern edge of the Eurasian Plate. The Eurasian plate, which is continental, is subducted by the Pacific Plate, an oceanic plate forming a subduction zone to the east of Japan. This type of plate margin is known as a destructive plate margin . The process of subduction is not smooth. Friction causes the Pacific Plate to stick. Pressure builds and is released as an earthquake.

Friction has built up over time, and when released, this caused a massive ‘megathrust’ earthquake.

The amount of energy released in this single earthquake was 600 million times the energy of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb.

Scientists drilled into the subduction zone soon after the earthquake and discovered a thin, slippery clay layer lining the fault. The researchers think this clay layer allowed the two plates to slide an incredible distance, some 164 feet (50 metres), facilitating the enormous earthquake and tsunami .

2011 Japan Earthquake Map

The earthquake occurred at a relatively shallow depth of 20 miles below the surface of the Pacific Ocean. This, combined with the high magnitude, caused a tsunami (find out more about how a tsunami is formed on the BBC website).

Areas affected by the 2011 Japanese earthquake.

What were the primary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Impacts on people

Death and injury – Some 15,894 people died, and 26,152 people were injured. 130,927 people were displaced, and 2,562 remain missing.

Damage – 332,395 buildings, 2,126 roads, 56 bridges and 26 railways were destroyed or damaged. 300 hospitals were damaged, and 11 were destroyed.

Blackouts – Over 4.4 million households were left without electricity in North-East Japan.

Transport – Japan’s transport network suffered huge disruptions.

Impacts on the environment

Landfall – some coastal areas experienced land subsidence as the earthquake dropped the beachfront in some places by more than 50 cm.

Land movement – due to tectonic shift, the quake moved parts of North East Japan 2.4 m closer to North America.

Plate shifts – It has been estimated by geologists that the Pacific plate has slipped westwards by between 20 and 40 m.

Seabed shift – The seabed near the epicentre shifted by 24 m, and the seabed off the coast of the Miyagi province has moved by 3 m.

Earth axis moves – The earthquake moved the earth’s axis between 10 and 25 cm, shortening the day by 1.8 microseconds.

Liquefaction occurred in many of the parts of Tokyo built on reclaimed land. 1,046 buildings were damaged

What were the secondary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Economy – The earthquake was the most expensive natural disaster in history, with an economic cost of US$235 billion.

Tsunami –  Waves up to 40 m in high devastated entire coastal areas and resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. This caused a lot of damage and pollution up to 6 miles inland. The tsunami warnings in coastal areas were only followed by 58% who headed for higher ground. The wave hit 49% of those not following the warning.

Nuclear power – Seven reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power station experienced a meltdown. Levels of radiation were over eight times the normal levels.

Transport –  Rural areas remained isolated for a long time because the tsunami destroyed major roads and local trains and buses. Sections of the Tohoku Expressway were damaged. Railway lines were damaged, and some trains were derailed. 

Aftermath – The ‘Japan move forward committee’ thought that young adults and teenagers could help rebuild parts of Japan devastated by the earthquake.

Coastal changes – The tsunami was able to travel further inland due to a 250-mile stretch of coastline dropping by 0.6 m.

What were the immediate responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• The Japan Meteorological Agency issued tsunami warnings three minutes after the earthquake.
• Scientists had been able to predict where the tsunami would hit after the earthquake using modelling and forecasting technology so that responses could be directed to the appropriate areas.
• Rescue workers and around 100,000 members of the Japan Self-Defence Force were dispatched to help with search and rescue operations within hours of the tsunami hitting the coast.
• Although many search and rescue teams focused on recovering bodies washing up on shore following the tsunami, some people were rescued from under the rubble with the help of sniffer dogs.
• The government declared a 20 km evacuation zone around the Fukushima nuclear power plant to reduce the threat of radiation exposure to local residents.
• Japan received international help from the US military, and search and rescue teams were sent from New Zealand, India, South Korea, China and Australia.
• Access to the affected areas was restricted because many were covered in debris and mud following the tsunami, so it was difficult to provide immediate support in some areas.
• Hundreds of thousands of people who had lost their homes were evacuated to temporary shelters in schools and other public buildings or relocated to other areas.
• Many evacuees came from the exclusion zone surrounding the Fukushima nuclear power plant. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown, those in the area had their radiation levels checked, and their health monitored to ensure they did not receive dangerous exposure to radiation. Many evacuated from the area around the nuclear power plant were given iodine tablets to reduce the risk of radiation poisoning.

What were the long-term responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• In April 2011, one month after the event occurred, the central government established the Reconstruction Policy Council to develop a national recovery and reconstruction outlook for tsunami-resilient communities. The Japanese government has approved a budget of 23 trillion yen (approximately £190 billion) to be spent over ten years. Central to the New Growth Strategy is creating a ‘Special Zones for Reconstruction’ system. These aim to provide incentives to attract investment, both in terms of business and reconstruction, into the Tohoku region.
• Also, the central government decided on a coastal protection policy, such as seawalls and breakwaters which would be designed to ensure their performance to a potential tsunami level of up to the approximately 150-year recurrence interval.
• In December 2011, the central government enacted the ‘Act on the Development of Tsunami-resilient Communities’. According to the principle that ‘Human life is most important, this law promotes the development of tsunami-resistant communities based on the concept of multiple defences, which combines infrastructure development and other measures targeting the largest class tsunami.
• Japan’s economic growth after the Second World War was the world’s envy. However, over the last 20 years, the economy has stagnated and been in and out of recession. The 11 March earthquake wiped 5–10% off the value of Japanese stock markets, and there has been global concern over Japan’s ability to recover from the disaster. The priority for Japan’s long-term response is to rebuild the infrastructure in the affected regions and restore and improve the economy’s health as a whole.
• By the 24th of March 2011, 375 km of the Tohoku Expressway (which links the region to Tokyo) was repaired and reopened.
• The runway at Sendai Airport had been badly damaged. However, it was restored and reusable by the 29th of March due to a joint effort by the Japanese Defence Force and the US Army.
• Other important areas of reconstruction include the energy, water supply and telecommunications infrastructure. As of November 2011, 96% of the electricity supply had been restored, 98% of the water supply and 99% of the landline network.

Why do people live in high-risk areas in Japan?

There are several reasons why people live in areas of Japan at risk of tectonic hazards:

• They have lived there all their lives, are close to family and friends and have an attachment to the area.
• The northeast has fertile farmland and rich fishing waters.
• There are good services, schools and hospitals.
• 75% of Japan is mountainous and flat land is mainly found in coastal areas, which puts pressure on living space.
• They are confident about their safety due to the protective measures that have been taken, such as the construction of tsunami walls.

Japan’s worst previous earthquake was of 8.3 magnitude and killed 143,000 people in Kanto in 1923. A magnitude 7.2 quake in Kobe killed 6,400 people in 1995 .

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Publications, japan’s 3.11 triple disaster and its impact 10 years later, spring 2021.

Within minutes, the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown on March 11, 2011, brought an unprecedented wave of death, displacement, and destruction to Japan. Richard Samuels revisits its impact one decade later.

Ten years ago, on March 11, 2011, Japan was struck by the most powerful earthquake in its recorded history. Of 9.1 magnitude by many accounts, the earthquake occurred off the Pacific coast of Tohoku and triggered a tsunami and meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Nearly 20,000 Japanese—and most of their worldly possessions—were washed away in a matter of minutes. 340,000 survivors were displaced, and only a fraction ever returned to their homes. For some survivors, this decade passed with the speed of light, while for many others—most, perhaps—time has lumbered along, encumbered by reminders of loss.

Richard Samuels , the Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and director of the Center for International Studies, offered the first broad assessment on Japan’s response to the horrific triple disaster in his book 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (2013, Cornell University Press). His work explored the impact of 3.11 on policy preferences of Japan’s leaders across three key sectors: national security, energy policy, and local governance.

For some reformers, 3.11 was a warning for Japan to overhaul its priorities and political processes. It was a chance to push the nation forward in a new, and better direction. For others, 3.11 was a “black swan”—a once-in-a-millennium event that required no tinkering and certainly no new dramatic changes to business as usual. Still others declared that the catastrophe demonstrated the need to return to an idealized (and more simple) past; Japan needed to recover what had been lost to modernity and globalization.

On March 11, he led a conversation with other scholars, including Miho Mazereeuw, associate professor of architecture and urbanism at MIT and director of MIT’s Urban Risk Lab, at a virtual event, 3.11 Ten Years Later: Disaster and Resilience in Japan. Here, Samuels reflects on whether 3.11 was a force of change, or a return to status quo, in Japan’s politics and public policy.

Q: Ten years later, what are some examples that 3.11 impacted Japan's government and society, for good or bad?

A: In the days and months after the tsunami and the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the nation and the world closed ranks to support the survivors under the banner “ Gambare Nippon !” (“Hang Tough, Japan!”). This was a moment of great promise—or at least one of great promises. Politicians vowed that Japan would be reborn, revitalized, rebuilt, and renovated.  Many of their promises became hopes. And, sadly, many of these hopes remain unrealized a decade later.

Indeed, a shroud of disappointment covers many communities in northeastern Japan—and across the rest of the archipelago as well. In a survey by the Asahi Shimbun in January, nearly two-thirds of the Japanese do not trust the government to ensure the safety of nuclear power generation. And an even greater number disapprove of how the government has handled the Fukushima Daiichi plant in particular. In a Kyodo survey taken in November, only 30 percent of Fukushima Prefecture residents say reconstruction has been sufficient. “There is nothing left for me to return home to” has become a common, elegiac refrain.

Q: You warn in your book to look for continuity, and not change, following major catastrophe. How has this played out in Japan?

A: The facts that support this conclusion have surprised many observers: For example, the same majority of the Japanese public that, when polled, declared its opposition to nuclear power also voted to return the pro-nuclear Liberal Democrats to power in 2012. The same Japanese public that emphatically embraced the alliance with the United States after the US military supplied 20,000 troops and nuclear expertise to come to their rescue continues to oppose plans to reconfigure the footprint of US bases on the Japanese home islands. 

Social science teaches that great and unexpected shocks can stimulate great and unexpected social and political change. Catastrophes on a 3.11 scale should “punctuate equilibria,” making it impossible for the status quo to be reconstructed and for change to happen. Events such as this, we think, free up paths for new sets of institutions, practices, preferences, and ideas to shape the future. 3.11 was, I thought, a great case to test this long-held idea. But what I found was that even an event as cataclysmic as 3.11 did not change the policy preferences of Japan’s leaders. 

Perhaps the most striking development in the weeks and months after the devastation was how political entrepreneurs from across the political spectrum used the catastrophe to frame the event to justify, to legitimate, to fortify, and to sell their pre-existing preferences. Those who were anti-nuclear before 3.11 said that Fukushima proved they were right. Those who supported nuclear power insisted that since this destruction was beyond anyone’s imagination (souteigai) they were not responsible and, besides, they would learn from the accident, making future ones even less likely. Those who were opposed to the rearmament before 3.11 lauded the hard work of the Japanese military in its rescue work, but said that this service was only possible because Japanese soldiers carried shovels, not guns. Those who sought a strong military and who supported the alliance with the United States declared that 3.11 proved the value—and the need to strengthen—both.   

That said, there were important changes. In 2012, the Japanese government stood up a new regulatory body that has had surprisingly sharp teeth. By 2013, the agency issued safety standards requiring new plants to prove they would be able to withstand earthquakes, floods, and terrorist attacks. The Japanese military was allowed for the first time to work with local officials and the utilities to develop emergency plans in the event of another Fukushima-like accident. And, while nine nuclear reactors have been approved for restart, only four—a tiny fraction of the 54 that had been producing power before 3.11—are in operation today. The government—a pro-nuclear power government—now aims to have renewables account for 22 to 24 percent of the country's electricity generation, more than the share projected for Japan’s nuclear power.

And, in what is the most heartening measure of “non-change,” the Japanese press reports that the Tohoku region, which accounted for nearly 16 percent of Japan’s total agricultural output in 2008, achieved a 15 percent share by 2017.    

Q: You wrote your book on 3.11 in record speed following the catastrophe. How were you able to pivot so quickly to this pressing yet unexpected topic and produce, within two years, such compelling work?

A: For about four years before 3.11, I had been working on a project on how political captivity—kidnappings, POWs, etc—have been used in democratic states by political entrepreneurs to capture foreign policy. For centuries—and without regard for location —political abductions have figured in the construction of national identities and in justifications both for aggression and conciliation. Many ambitious politicians and their support groups have capitalized on captivity to frame and highlight national weakness and the fecklessness of opponents. Others have spun out accounts of heroism to demonstrate national strength and visionary leadership. Either way, the manipulation of the captivity passion for political ends often has been used to mobilize public sympathy to reorient national policies. This work will be the subject of my next book.

In short, work on how politics can be kidnapped intrigued me—and I found myself pivoting to study this in the painful context of 3.11. It was immediately clear that a competition was emerging for control of a national narrative that could be manipulated to shape minds and generate political support. As I saw it, 3.11 would provide a different, but parallel laboratory for investigating how the identification of heroes and villains—and the assignment of credit and blame—matter for democratic politics.

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Relief and rebuilding efforts

Related articles: affected areas.

• What effects did the Japan earthquake and tsunami of 2011 have?
• How did the Fukushima accident happen?
• What happened after the Fukushima accident?
• Did anyone die as a result of the Fukushima accident?
• What is a tsunami?

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

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• Table Of Contents

In the first hours after the earthquake , Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto moved to set up an emergency command centre in Tokyo , and a large number of rescue workers and some 100,000 members of the Japanese Self-Defense Force were rapidly mobilized to deal with the crisis. In addition, the Japanese government requested that U.S. military personnel stationed in the country be available to help in relief efforts, and a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier was dispatched to the area. Several countries, including Australia , China, India, New Zealand , South Korea , and the United States , sent search-and-rescue teams, and dozens of other countries and major international relief organizations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent pledged financial and material support to Japan . In addition, a large number of private and nongovernmental organizations within Japan and worldwide soon established relief funds to aid victims and assist with rescue and recovery efforts.

The rescue work itself was hampered initially by the difficulty in getting personnel and supplies to the devastation zone; compounding the difficulty were periods of inclement weather that curtailed air operations. Workers in the disaster zones then faced widespread seas of destruction: vast areas, even whole towns and cities, had been washed away or covered by great piles of mud and debris. Although some people were rescued from the rubble in the first several days following the main shock and tsunami , most of the relief work involved the recovery of bodies, including hundreds that began washing ashore in several areas after having been swept out to sea.

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, several hundred thousand people were in shelters, often with limited or negligible supplies of food or water, and tens of thousands more remained stranded and isolated in the worst-hit areas as rescuers worked to reach them. Within days the number of displaced people in the Fukushima area grew as the situation with the nuclear reactors on the coast deteriorated and people left the quarantined area. Gradually many people were able to find other places to stay in the Tōhoku area, or they relocated to other parts of the country. Some quarter million people were still in hundreds of shelters in the region two weeks after the quake, but in the ensuing months that number gradually was reduced. Two years after the disaster, a small number of people still remained in emergency centres. However, more than 300,000 displaced residents were living in tens of thousands of prefabricated temporary housing units that had been set up in Sendai and other tsunami-damaged locations or were in some other type of domicile, such as hotels, public housing units, or private homes. Four years after the disaster, some 230,000 people were still displaced, a large number of them because of the continuation of the evacuation zone around the Fukushima plant.

In the weeks following the disaster, much of northern Honshu’s transportation and services infrastructure was at least partially restored, and repairs continued until train lines and major highways were again fully operational. However, the region’s power supply continued to be affected by the ongoing situation at the Fukushima plant, resulting in temporary power outages and rolling blackouts. The loss of businesses and factories from earthquake and tsunami damage, as well as the uncertainties surrounding the power supply, severely reduced the region’s manufacturing output in the months following the disaster. Industries most affected included those producing semiconductors and other high-technology items and automobiles. By late summer, however, the economy was again growing briskly, as many of the affected businesses were able to resume at least limited production. In the first months of 2012, industrial output essentially reached the level it had been at before the disaster.

In 2011 first the Kan and then the Noda administration proposed and pushed through the legislature three disaster-related supplemental budgets. The third and largest of these, approved in November, provided some $155 billion, the bulk of the funds earmarked for reconstruction in devastated areas. In addition, in February 2012 the government established a cabinet-level Reconstruction Agency to coordinate rebuilding efforts in the Tōhoku area. The agency was scheduled to be in operation for 10 years, the length of time it was projected to completely restore the region. In early 2015 the agency reported that nearly all the disaster debris had been removed. In addition, it noted that work had started on about three-fourths of the planned coastal infrastructure (e.g., seawall) construction in the affected areas and was at least under way on nearly all the higher-ground sites designated for rebuilding away from low-lying coastal areas.

For coverage of some of the places affected by the earthquake and tsunami, see the following Britannica articles:

• Fukushima prefecture
• Ibaraki prefecture
• Iwate prefecture
• Miyagi prefecture
• Hitachinaka
• Kitaibaraki

NYU GPH Journal of Public Health Disasters

A student-led journal driven by the latest research in public health disaster preparedness and management.

Sara Merken’s Case Study on 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

On March 11, 2011, Japan was hit with a record-breaking 9.1 magnitude earthquake, leading to tsunami waves up to 40 meters tall. This event caused mass destruction, killing thousands and displacing more than 450,000. While Japan deployed a quick response, gaps in disaster management plans led to a worldwide impact. 

Merken reviews the global impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake, analyzing the role played by Japan’s disaster response protocol in this case study. In some aspects, the Japanese government had a timely and effective response to the event. However, Merken emphasizes the shortfalls in the nation’s emergency management that led to widespread adverse consequences. 

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• Iran J Public Health
• v.41(6); 2012

Crisis Management of Tohoku; Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, 11 March 2011

M zaré.

1 International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology (IIEES), Tehran, Iran

S Ghaychi Afrouz

2 Mining Engineering, School of Mining Engineering, University College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

The huge earthquake in 11 March 2012 which followed by a destructive tsunami in Japan was largest recorded earthquake in the history. Japan is pioneer in disaster management, especially earthquakes. How this developed country faced this disaster, which had significant worldwide effects? The humanitarian behavior of the Japanese people amazingly wondered the word’s media, meanwhile the management of government and authorities showed some deficiencies. The impact of the disaster is followed up after the event and the different impacts are tried to be analyzed in different sectors. The situation one year after Japan 2011 earthquake and Tsunami is overviewed. The reason of Japanese plans failure was the scale of tsunami, having higher waves than what was assumed, especially in the design of the Nuclear Power Plant. Japanese authorities considered economic benefits more than safety and moral factors exacerbate the situation. Major lessons to be learnt are 1) the effectiveness of disaster management should be restudied in all hazardous countries; 2) the importance of the high-Tech early-warning systems in reducing risk; 3) Reconsidering of extreme values expected/possible hazard and risk levels is necessary; 4) Morality and might be taken as an important factor in disaster management; 5) Sustainable development should be taken as the basis for reconstruction after disaster.

Introduction

The magnitude 9.0 Japan’s Tohoku Earthquake occurred at 14:46 local time on Friday, 11 March 2011, 125 km east coast of Honshu and 380 km far from Tokyo and rattled the large parts of Japan and some part of east China and Russia with 30 km depth of the hypocenter ( 1 ). This earthquake that lasted approximately 3 minutes (170 seconds) caused a 130 km long by 159 km wide rupture zone on the pacific plate subduction zone and followed by a huge tsunami with more than 40 meter waves. The destructive aftermaths of this incident made an irreparable disaster not only for the Japan, but also for the whole world because except for the enormous death toll and debris, the damages of nuclear power plants were a hazardous unexpected tragedy.

Casualties and damages

According to the report of the Japanese National Police Agency, 15854 dead, 3167 missing and 26992 injured across twenty prefectures are the result of this devastating earthquake and tsunami which ruined more than 125000 buildings. Moreover, it caused long blackouts for more than 4.4 million buildings and left 1.5 million buildings out of water for days ( 2 ), also large fires were triggered one after another even for weeks after the main quake. Explosion and demolition of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima Daiichi), which generated radioactive contamination near the plant’s area with irreversible damages to the environment, was one the most significant issues of this catastrophe and ranked 7 (the most sever level for nuclear power plant) based on the International Nuclear Event Scale, similar to the Chernobyl disaster on 26 April 1986 ( 3 ). Therefore, it is not strange to consider to this earthquake as the most important destructive seismic event of the beginning of the twenty first century in the advanced industrial world.

Losses intensified by hit of the tsunami as the statistics shows it was more fatal ( Fig. 1 ) and also more buildings destroyed by its strike; However, the quake was the main cause of the partial damage of buildings ( 4 ). Figure 2 manifests the building losses distribution through affected areas and Fig. 3 reveals the relative impact of the earthquake vs. tsunami in each prefecture of Japan ( 4 ).

Division of total 19100 death and missed people by the reason as of 10th March 2012 (CATDAT)

Building damage distribution (CATDAT)

The relative impact of the earthquake vs. the tsunami in each location

Seismology and Seismic History

This mega thrust earthquake is categorized as a great earthquake with the magnitude more than 8 in scientific seismological classification ( 5 ). Over 1000 aftershocks, some of which were larger than the recent catastrophic earthquakes in Iran such as Bam, Iran 2003, hit the area since the main shock. Regardless of the consequent tsunami, the Tohoku Sendai Earthquake (2011) is the largest recorded earthquake in the history of Japan in terms of magnitude while the territory of Japan is known by numerous and critical earthquakes. There are two momentous calamitous earthquakes in history of Japan: The great Kanto earthquake with magnitude of 7.9 on 1 September 1923 which destroyed Tokyo and Yokohama rigorously by the severe quake and subsequent fires and caused more than 143000 deaths ( 6 , 7 ); and the Kobe earthquake (also known as Hanshin- Awaji earthquake) with magnitude of 6.9 on 17 January 1995 that left more than 6400 demises ( 6 , 8 ). The Kanto incident is still the deadliest earthquake in Japanese history and the Kobe earthquake was the most costly natural disaster of the world since Tohoku Earthquake 2011 ( 9 ).

Methodology

Japan crisis management system.

Japan has an overall population of 127 million and is one of the most densely populated countries in the world (340 persons per Km), where the population highly concentrated around Tokyo ( 6 ). This earthquake-prone country as a pioneer in crisis management has a comprehensive plan for preparing against disasters, consists of the Central Council for Accident Prevention, chaired by Prime Minister, set of cohesive rules for immediate response to all of the unexpected incidents, the advanced research system and the extensive public education about disasters. As the result of this plan, in the case of an accident, people, government officials and rescue departments know exactly what to do while the alarm is sounded, without chaos.

It was after the disastrous Kobe earthquake of 17 January 1995 (M6.9) that crisis management of Japan greatly promoted since the government set up a GIS system and a general computer network. This system contains different subsystems to operate all disaster related functions from prevention before the disaster to damage evaluation after it ( 10 ). Additionally, the most advanced earthquake and tsunami early warning system of the whole world is installed in Japan during 2003 to 2007, which is one of the main parts of this crisis management system. This warning system had a considerable role in Tohoku 2011 earthquake to reduce losses and save lives. Several Japanese media such NHK channel and also mobile phone networks have the most responsibility of broadcasting the news of early warning system.

In management of the 11 March 2011 crisis, one of the most facilitative factors for emergency managers was proper behavior of people who follow the commands cautiously. In other words, the “ social capital” in this country had a significant role in recovery after the incident as people’s high respect to roles and moral values and their solidarity prevent them from influx for aid and looting and motivate them to consider the public benefits instead of self-interests.

Response to the disaster

Immediately after the event, The Government of Japan (GOJ) held National Committee for Emergency Management, headed by Prime Minister. The government declared an emergency in effected area and dispatched the Japan Self Defense Forces for rescue operations ( 11 ). All ministries and departments such as Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Health were involved in this response, also local offices of disaster response in all prefectures begins their operations as their duty was already clear. The Ministry of Health was in charge of preparing suitable vehicles for supplying water and assigning hospitals for remedy of casualties and people who have been exposed to radiation. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries with Ministry of Finance were responsible for providing food, portable toilet, blanket, radio, gasoil, torch, dry ice and other essential things. By the command of the government, all of the main highways in north of the country were completely occupied for emergency response activities. Besides, the transport systems includes subway, shipping and the Shinkansen bullet train ceased their activity in Sendai and Tokyo instantly after the quake.

Moreover, at the day of event the Government of Japan declared “the state of nuclear emergency” due to the threat posed by reactors in two Fukushima nuclear power plants (I and II) and 140,000 residents within 20 km of the plant evacuated. At 15:36 JST (Japan Standard Time) on 12 March, there was an explosion in the reactor building at Unit 1 in Fukushima Daiichi (I) power plant. At 11:15 JST on 14 March, the explosion of the building surrounding Reactor 3 occurred. An explosion at 06:14 JST on 15 March in Unit 2, damaged the pressure-suppression system. When the disaster began on 11 March 2011, reactor unit 4 was shut down for periodic inspection and all fuel rods had been transferred to the spent fuel pool on an upper floor of the reactor building. On 15 March, an explosion damaged the fourth floor rooftop area of the unit 4 reactor.

Japanese Red Crescent Society (JRC), which had a substantial role in initial relief operations and temporary housing, deployed its teams promptly. JRC performed properly for accommodation of refugees and evacuees in schools, public buildings, and shelters. This society adapted its operations to all other rescue organizations and NGOs, which deployed to the area later.

Construction of temporary housing in quakestricken prefectures was begun 8 days after the event and the first set of buildings was expected to be ready within a month ( 12 ). In addition to medical aids, therapists and social workers were dispatched to the affected zone by Health ministry and then in coming days the concentration of treatments was shifting to psychotherapy from physical sicknesses. In addition, this Ministry performed required actions in order to control and inhibit infectious diseases and encouraged people to use masks ( 2 ).

Fire was reported in eight prefectures after the quake. Fire suppression of gas pipeline took a few days and fires in Cosmo Oil Installations and some other refineries lasted 3 days. Generally, the number of fires increased from 44 to 325 in a week, but its growth rate declined. All the fires, which were triggered after the earthquake, were under control of Japanese Police and it can be said that they could prosperously cease and extinguish them ( 13 ). On the other hand, these fires and breakdown of six out of nine oil factories faced the affected areas with fuel shortage. The gas pipeline repairing operation had a slow progress, too. Therefore, about one million liter gasoline per day had been carried to the damaged areas by tankers and then by cargo train in order to compensate lack of fuel. Low displacement capacity of oil and coal shipments caused delays in delivering fuel loads, which were importing from countries such as South Korea and Russia, to consumers ( 13 ).

Due to the shutting down of the power plants which were cracked by the quake and tsunami, authorities begun imposing sporadic power cuts nationwide to make up for production losses. Correspondingly, large factories like Toyota and Sony halted their production activities and many citizens in Kanto reduced their power consumption in order to abridge the time of blackouts ( 14 ).

Nuclear crisis

There are 54 reactors in Japan, but since the tsunami on March 2011 that destroyed Fukushima plant ( Fig. 4 ) and triggered the world’s worst nuclear crisis in 25 years, the government did not allow to restart any reactor that have undergone maintenance due to public safety ( 15 ). The first nuclear power plant of Japan was initiated with collaboration of English corporations in 1973, but these kinds of power plants then developed by American technology. All the 11 reactors in Fukushima 1, Fukushima 2, Onagawa and Tokai nuclear power plants automatically safe shut down after the quake; however, arrival of tsunami debris with high waves damaged reactor’s cooling systems and eventually, resulted hazardous explosions. This could have been prevented if the designers had estimated the probable maximum altitude of the tides more prudently. The explosion occurred in 4 of the 6 reactors of Fukushima 1 power plant one after another, while the unit 3 reactor was more damaged and more intensively contaminated the surrounding area. A few hours before each of these explosions, authorities warned about the cooling system breakdown, ordered to evacuate neighboring people and tried to drop the pressure of vapors, but in all of them the hydrogen explosion finally happened.

Fukushima 1 NPP explosion, 14 March 2011 (DigitalGlobe)

The owner of the Fukushima Plant, The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), is accused of mismanagement and hiding the truth about the real damage caused by the disaster at the expense of saving the company ( 16 ). Moreover, according to reports, it was expected that TEPCO safely shutdown reactors of Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant approximately a month before the 11 March earthquake, but apparently the company avoided this action because of economic issues.

Over 140 thousand residents were evacuated from 20 Km around the Fukushima plant. Radiation penetrated in foods and drinking water in 30 kilometer far from the evacuated area, and authorities inhibited distribution of these polluted foodstuffs ( 13 ). U.S. Department of Energy announced a wide area beyond 80-kilometer radius around the Fukushima plant is affected by radiation ( 17 ).

The explosion of Fukushima power plant and its aftermaths aroused public concerns about nuclear energy in Japan and other earthquake prone countries. Consequently, other power plants, which were not resistant to the probable future quakes with magnitude more than 8, ceased they activity gradually sequentially by the command of The Prime Minister. TEPCO shut its last operating nuclear reactor in 26 March 2012 for regular maintenance, leaving just one running reactor supplying Japan’s creaking power sector ( 15 ). Then again, on 10 April 2012 (less than a month later), as the summer arrives, while Japan is going to struggle with electricity shortage, the government planned to restart one of the atomic plants in Kansai after approval its safety ( 18 ) and faced with people’s disagreement.

Furthermore, the nuclear crisis has led to growing opposition against atomic power plants in other countries, particularly in Germany, where thousands of citizens participated in an anti-nuclear demonstration. This disapproval also affected the regional election results unbelievably. In the state of Baden-Wurttemburg, which traditionally had gone with Christian Democratic Union party for 58 years, most of people voted for the Green Party who was against with 17 nuclear reactors in this country ( 19 ).

Results: Crisis consequences

The 11 March 2011 earthquake had many deleterious environmental impacts that take a long time to recover. Apart from radioactive materials dispersed due to nuclear plant explosions and discharging polluted radioactive water of cooling systems to the sea, the subsequent tsunami induced huge amount of debris contains building materials, broken boats, cars, trees and etc. that cause environmental harmful issues.

Radioactive pollutions and radiations as the most harmful repercussions of the earthquake induced fear and concern among resident. Most evacuees did not return to their home even after the safety of the regions was assured. However, the government tried hard to convince people to return to their homes by checking and promulgation the radiation doses constantly, but just the population of old people gradually increased. Therefore, satisfying young people to come back will be a demanding challenge for the government.

• A year after the event, anecdotal evidence suggests that fear of radiation, rather than contamination itself, is triggering stress-related problems among nuclear evacuees ( 20 ), despite the experts emphasized that the doses are too low to develop cancer. Even in more distant areas, where completely secure, parents do not allow their children to play outside. Although there have been no recorded deaths from radiation in Fukushima, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, psychological trauma associated with evacuation, pneumonia and heart disease were much more fatal based on statistics. Therefore, in months after the event, Japanese Red Cross concentrated on mental health issues.
• Also, the tsunami had adverse effects on agriculture and requires long-term reconstruction at least for 2 or 3 years. In addition, the fishing industry faced to critical continuing problems. Most reports acknowledged that Japan’s food exports could be limited by Japan’s current Production and supply shortages, along with boosting food safety concerns and possible long-term radiation threats to its food production, in contrast possibly its need for food imports will increase in future ( 21 ).
• Moreover, since Japan is a country covered by jungles, wooden houses are very prevalent in this country and despite the dropping rate of wood imports in recent decade, due to boom reduction of this kind of homes; the Tohoku earthquake caused a 70% rise in wood import rate by enhancement of the wood demand. This made a competition for wood exporters from different countries such as Australia, America, and China.
• One of the important impacts of the Fukushima power plant explosion is its psychological consequences. Regardless of common diseases such as infectious ones that break out after earthquakes, the radioactive contamination permeated to the residential areas where people was living, working and planting brought a ten times fatal disease, which is hopelessness and untruthfulness. People know they should leave anything they had include home and agriculture plant and this lead them to an ambiguous future which is unstable and they should build everything from beginning. The increase in number of suicides in power plant’s surrounding areas even far from them and farmers concern about safety of their productions and land even 100 kilometers far from the affected zone prove the strength and influence of this issues.
• Japan should also challenge with the problem of enhancing of unemployment. Large number of refugee and evacuees left their home and moved to other cities. Also, workers of car and electronic factories are now jobless by factory closure so they are forced to immigrate ( 22 ). Japanese government created around 20 thousands of jobs in the emergency measures to combat the effects of the disaster in a month, but the number of the unemployed ones was much more than created jobs ( 23 ). Additionally, women especially in rural areas, who used to were involved in tough works such as agriculture and fishing, after the disaster have to work in other posts and try different occupations in order to help to family economic. Many of these women take apart in protests against Fukushima power plant issues in Tokyo in October and November 2011. It seems that this earthquake has modified the women life style in affected prefectures as now they have more important roles in family issues and it is big change in an almost traditional male-dominated Japan.
• Following the shutting, the Fukushima power plant, on February 2012, the House Foreign Relations Committee off Japan approved to export its nuclear equipment to Vietnam and Jordan. Also Japanese companies signed agreements with India, Bangladesh, and Turkey about construction, operation, and management of nuclear power plants in these countries, despite environment activist’s oppositions in recent months against these transactions and their high costs and permanent detriments for humans and earth. Actually, the nuclear power in spite its approximate low costs, have many hazardous disadvantages that the Japan 2011 accident and the Chernobyl 1986 are good samples for this fact. Unfortunately, developing countries do not consider these consequences and endanger the environment and people’s lives while Japanese authorities are just accenting their own country’s benefits.

In Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011 despite the unprecedented scale of the quake itself, infrastructures and buildings mostly remained standing and proved the resilience of Japan is planning laws especially in constructions and earthquake technology. Hence, if the earthquake had been the sole problem, then Japan could have claimed for itself a momentous prosperous in planning for the impact of a major earthquake. The reason of Japanese plans failure was the large-scale tsunami, which had higher waves than what was assumed in designing. In addition, the fact that Japanese authorities considered economic benefits more than safety and moral factors exacerbate the situation. Even after the disaster, this country just cared about economic benefits and sought to export its technology to other countries.

However, this disaster was a motivation for people and governments worldwide to replace clean energy with the hazardous one and it was a reminder to decommissioning the old and unsafe operating power plants. Thus, the Metsamor nuclear power plant in Armenia, Iran’s neighboring country, is a critical threat in the region with high seismic risk. Governments had to plan long-term and costly solutions to replace the nuclear energy with clean and renewable forms of it with respect to criteria and moral values, not only the benefits.

Although energy issues and management of power plant’s crisis was a blind spot in Tohoku disaster management, Japanese social ethics and their manner in dealing with the problem were the most advantageous points. Discipline, maintaining calm, public confidence in managers and scientific management based on the plans helped to improve the situation more quickly ( Figure-5 ). Long queues of Japanese People for food and facilities instead of chaos, which we mainly consider in developing countries, could be a good proof for other countries that enterprising on educating people about how to act in crisis is very operative and effective in enhancement of disaster management.

These two photos taken over a six-month period showing aftermath of the March 11, 2011, tsunami and its cleanup progress in Wakabayashi-ward in Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture, in northeastern Japan. ( pacificcitizen.org )

The 11 march 2011 earthquake was an alarm for seismologist all over the world, particularly in Tehran as a capital city, to revise their methods and evaluation of estimating the plausible time and magnitude of earthquake. It could be an alarm for us to be more meticulous and cautious about the earthquake hazard as prepared and industrialized Japan with the most modernized technology confronted many extensive troubles, which were out of their predictions. Now we should ask this question “how much we are prepared in an earthquake prone country with a capital located exactly on active faults?”

Ethical considerations

Ethical issues (Including plagiarism, Informed Consent, misconduct, data fabrication and/or falsification, double publication and/or submission, redundancy, etc) have been completely observed by the authors.

Acknowledgments

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests. The authors appreciate the assistance of IIEES and Tehran university colleagues for finalizing this study, specially H.R. Jalilian, M.H Pishahang and Z. Hejazi.

For the Instructor

• Case Study 2: 2011 Japanese Earthquake

Just a few years after the 2004 event, another large-scale tsunami hit one of the most prepared and most technologically advanced countries in the world. The event occurred in March of 2011 when a large 9.0 magnitude earthquake off the eastern coast of Japan produced a tsunami wave that came ashore on the Japanese coastline less than an hour after the earthquake. In this case, the tsunami wave was detected about 25 minutes after the earthquake by a DART buoy. The geologic context was nearly identical to the 2004 event in Sumatra. An eastward directed mega-thrust earthquake disturbed the seafloor, this time in a much more restricted region but with similar energy release, and generated a substantial tsunami that raced across the Pacific Ocean. This model produced by NOAA's Tsunami Research Center (NCTR) in Seattle, Washington shows the predicted path of the March 11, 2011 Honshu tsunami as it propagated around the Pacific.

Check out more information about NCTR. Also on the site is a maximum wave amplitude model produced by the MOST tsunami model and a new narrated animation of the tsunami propagation and maximum amplitude model. Even more exciting is the fact that NCTR now has a Google Earth interface that provides users with access to datasets (tide data, DART buoy data, etc.) that record water levels in shallow water regions as well as out at sea in deep water where they present water column height (in meters above the seafloor), more on this later.

In any regard, as the length of the fault rupture was relatively small compared to the 2004 Sumatran event, wave propagation was more spherical, and although tsunami beaming occurred, seamounts and other submerged obstructions in the direction of the most prominent beaming direction (i.e., toward the southeast) helped to bend and refract the direct wave so that it lost some of its amplitude as it traveled toward Hawaii and South America. Data measured by tsunami buoys showed that the initial wave close to the fault observed a nearly 2m amplitude wave. As the wave moved toward the southeast, the amplitude subsided to less than a meter, likely as a result of interference as mentioned here. However, the beaming that focused toward the northwest meant that the full-force of the direct wave was squarely onto the island of Honshu.Given the orientation of the shoreline with numerous river valleys opening to the east and southeast (see below), the tsunami waves were funneled full force into shallow waters and up the progressively narrower valleys located up and down the coast of Honshu.

So, although much had been learned from the 2004 event, and although the tsunami warning system is more advanced and sophisticated and although it had helped to detect and measure the tsunami wave, unfortunately the tsunami produced an incredible trail of destruction across northern Japan. Not only did the earthquake result in uplift and subsidence of portions of the sea floor and the islands of northern Japan, in fact, Honshu, Japan's main island was detected to move eastward by over two meters while some of the shoreline on the same island subsided by about a half meter. In addition to these tectonic movements, the event produced 10 meter waves that led to wave run-up heights of almost 40 meters (over 120 feet) in some areas, and traveled inland through low lying river systems at least 10 kilometers and caused over 500 square kilometers to be flooded. For a zoomable map showing some of the specific numbers for wave heights and run-up, check out this map at Extreme Planet .

Most coastal defenses were insufficient in preventing the destruction as tsunami seawalls were overtopped or destroyed in many communities. Perhaps the tsunami warning system didn't function as intended and notice didn't reach the population. Perhaps the wave was generated so close to shore there was so little time. Perhaps a false sense of security was afforded by the coastal infrastructure built to protect the shoreline. Nevertheless, as a result of the 2011 tsunami, more than 15,000 people died when entire communities were wiped from their seaside locations. The vast majority died as a result of drowning. When you search the Internet, you will easily find tens of videos showing people desperately trying to move to high ground as the wall of water surges inland behind them. There are even videos of residents on the tops of taller buildings who thought they were safe, but who were also washed away. In addition to these frightening occurrences, the tsunami triggered a series of events that led to the failure of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. When the plant failed, the nuclear meltdown led to the release of radioactive materials that ended up in the atmosphere and the Pacific Ocean. In addition to radioactive materials, the Japanese government suggested that more than five million tons of debris was washed out to sea as the surge waters retreated back to the sea. As a result of these and other damages, estimates for damage topped $300 billion dollars in Japan alone, but real costs were far greater and continue to mount as a result of clean-up efforts and as a result of the environmental impact on fisheries and agricultural areas that supply food to the population. The Extreme Planet website has some absolutely mesmerizing photos from the event that are incredible to look at and fundamentally demonstrate how destructive these events can be.

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Displacement and older people: The case of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of 2011

• Japanese Red Cross

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The earthquake that occurred off the Sanriku coast of northern Japan on 11 March 2011 caused one of the most destructive tsunamis ever recorded. Aside from the devastating loss of human life and damage to physical infrastructure, 470,000 survivors were evacuated to shelters and as of December 2013, about 117,000 remain displaced in temporary accommodation.

This disaster took place in a country with the world’s highest proportion of older people: over 23% of the population is 65 years and older. The immense impact of the disaster on this generation is signified by the fact that 56% of those who lost their lives were aged 65 and over. Understanding the experiences of older people who survived is crucial for addressing the needs and capacities of older people in future emergencies – in Japan and elsewhere.

The Japanese Red Cross College of Nursing and HelpAge International therefore conducted this study of the impact of the disaster and the access to assistance for older people in two of the most severely affected prefectures of Iwate and Miyagi.

The majority of older people in the survey (69%) were at home when the earthquake struck, and their evacuation time was slowed down as a consequence of power failures, lack of reliable information, physical frailties and being alone. Although half the respondents fled with family members, many, especially those with reduced mobility and those over 75 years old, faced difficulties reaching the evacuation sites and reported a range of barriers along designated evacuation routes. About 20% of older people did not know where the nearest evacuation sites were, or how to get there.

Life in the evacuation shelters, without usual support networks, proved highly challenging for older people. Distributions of basic items were often inappropriate or difficult to access, and respondents were challenged with unfamiliar food, ill-fitting clothes and water supplies too heavy to carry. Forty per cent of respondents reported that toilets and bathing facilities were difficult to use and often lacked appropriate privacy. Access to medical care and treatment – severely compromised by the damage to hospitals as well as being overwhelmed by the emergency needs – was a major concern, particularly for those with chronic health conditions. Many older people with physical and cognitive impairments were obliged to live with reduced levels of support in ill-equipped evacuation shelters. While basic needs were increasingly met, their concerns about healthcare endured after their transition to temporary housing units.

The more positive experiences focused on their social interaction – developing new friendships, re-establishing connections with those in their communities and affirming their self-worth through sharing their knowledge with younger people in the shelters. Many expressed a heightened appreciation of the value of relationships in coming to terms with painful memories and losses.

Extensive infrastructural damage and shortage of suitable land for building prolonged people’s stay in evacuation shelters, in some cases for up to five months. Having moved to temporary accommodation, many older respondents realised that they could remain displaced for longer periods than initially expected. On average, older people already comprise about half of all residents in temporary accommodation and they face greater challenges in moving on, partly due to their limited income and ability to access reconstruction loans. Given the high proportion of older residents and their extended stay in temporary housing, it is imperative that both housing design and delivery of support are appropriate for this age group.

Prolonged displacement is likely to have serious consequences for the long-term health status of older people, with 10% of survey respondents in temporary housing reporting concerns for their health. Care and management of high risk health conditions such as cardiovascular diseases, stroke, diabetes and dementia continued to be severely compromised by disruption to health facilities and reduced ability to access available services. Volunteer health teams mobilised to address the gaps in the immediate aftermath of the disaster had ceased at the time of this study, yet the survey findings suggest that extending this service could considerably improve the wellbeing of displaced older people.

The experience of displacement implies a radical change in status: the loss of well defined roles and increased dependency may be harder for older people to overcome.

The findings indicated that changes in environment and social activity often reduced the opportunities for human interaction, with important implications for psychological wellbeing and recovery. The transfer from evacuation sites to temporary accommodation separated many older people from neighbours and new friends they had made, disrupting support networks they had relied upon.

With displacement, many missed tending their vegetable plots or complained of lack of space to entertain family. While the majority of respondents interacted with others two to three times a week, 14% of older women and men felt that being unable to see old friends was one of the greatest challenges they faced.

Unsurprisingly, symptoms of stress relating to the disaster and displacement were evident among respondents two years later, and were manifested in disruptive sleeping patterns, signs of depression and fear of proximity to the disaster area. Over a third of respondents reported that their main method of coping was talking with friends and family, and slightly fewer managed their symptoms mainly through physical exercise.

Looking toward their future recovery, the large majority, 65%, of older people understandably expressed the desire to secure somewhere to live in a safe area. Some expressed concerns that, unless they could rebuild their own homes, they would be obliged to move into multi-storey apartment blocks, raising fears that their familiar socialisation activities, such as meeting to chat in informal spaces and gardens, would be once again disrupted. The experiences of older people indicate that inclusion of appropriate spaces for social interaction, as well as consideration of accessible transport to health and care services in the design of permanent accommodation blocks, could enhance the psychological wellbeing and recovery of older survivors of this disaster.

Opportunities for developing age inclusive disaster response and recovery activities are outlined in more detailed recommendations at the end of this report.

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Case Study – Tsunami in Japan

On Friday afternoon the 11th of March 2011, a devastating earthquake occurred outside the eastern coast of Japan.

It was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded to have hit Japan , and the fourth most powerful earthquake in the world since modern record-keeping began in 1900. The 9.0 magnitude earthquake triggered powerful tsunami waves that reached heights of up to 40.5 meters in Miyako in Tohoku’s Iwate prefecture, and in the Sendai area the wave traveled up to 10 km inland.

The earthquake moved Honshu (the main island of Japan) 2.4 m east, and generated sound waves detected by the low-orbiting GOCE satellite. SAFEY Emergency System, at this time had a beta version of the SAFEY system and provided alerts to three travelers in Tokyo metropolitan area. They received the red alert of the tsunami warning at 14:49 JST, 47 minutes before the wave hit hit the shoreline. 

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Wednesday, August 21, 2024 88° Today's Paper

Hilo Bay water quality will continue to decline, UH study finds

By Michael Brestovansky Hawaii Tribune-Herald

Aug. 15, 2024

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The water quality of Hilo Bay will only get worse as climate change intensifies, according to a recent study by University of Hawaii researchers.

The study, published earlier this year in the journal Water Environment Research, found that sources of freshwater discharge into Hilo Bay coincide with high levels of harmful bacteria, and that those levels are likely to increase as sea levels rise and extreme weather events become more common.

According to the study, certain parts of Hilo Bay contain pathogens such as Staphylococcus aureus (commonly called staph) at concentrations ranging from six to 78 times greater than baseline. Those high concentrations were associated with lower tidal heights, greater freshwater discharge, and the density of nearby sewage disposal systems — cesspools, in other words.

“There’s a lot of factors,” said study co-author and UH-Hilo professor Tracy Wiegner. “There’s the huge concentration of cesspools in the area, all on lava rock, which is very porous and permeable.”

Wiegner said sewage from a Keaukaha cesspool can trickle out into the bay within hours to days.

Steven Colbert, an associate professor of marine science at UH-Hilo, said there are similar conditions throughout the Big Island’s east and southern coastlines.

“So much of the island is just too young for there to be the soil for septic systems to work,” Colbert said. “Instead, we have all these cracks and fissures and lava tubes beneath us that wastewater just flows through.”

As sea levels rise, wastewater will reach the sea even more quickly, and more and more cesspools will be flooded, Colbert said. At the same time, as the ocean gets warmer, Hilo Bay will become a better habitat for bacteria to thrive.

While the bay’s water quality has been a long-known health hazard, Colbert said the study at least has helped confirm where the pathogens are coming from.

“(Fixing the problem) will need a very expensive bullet,” Wiegner said. “That’s why the cesspool conversion process has taken so long.

“Ideally, we’d want to connect homes in Keaukaha to a sewerline and then get the Hilo Wastewater Treatment Plant back up to its maximum capacity … or even higher,” Wiegner went on.

However, the question of who will bear the cost of such a conversion remains an open one. Wiegner said it’s clear that Keaukaha already has borne the brunt of the bay’s wastewater contamination, and most residents can’t afford to convert their cesspools on their own.

A study commissioned by Hawaii County could find some solutions, albeit not for at least two years. In 2023, the county Department of Research and Development applied for federal grant funding for a comprehensive study of the Hilo watershed.

In March, the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation awarded $2 million to the county for that study, and the agreement between the county and NFWF was formally executed Tuesday.

Beth Dykstra, economic development specialist for R&D, acknowledged the project has been slow to progress because of the bureaucratic hurdles inherent with federal funding, but said the two-year study should bear fruit by the end of 2026.

That study, Dykstra said, would build substantially on the UH study and other research, but would be carried out on a larger scale across the entire watershed.

The study also will include potential solutions and, crucially, possible funding sources.

“That’s what the study is really about,” Dykstra said. “So we can go for funding.”

Dykstra said that although the Hilo watershed is the largest in the state, neither the county nor the state Department of Health has sufficient resources to manage its ecology, and the decrepit Hilo Wastewater Treatment Plant is on its last legs and will cost about $300 million to rehabilitate.

Despite its issues, however, Colbert said the watershed’s conditions aren’t too dire yet.

“It doesn’t stop me from going swimming,” Colbert said. “I just have to be careful. I take a shower afterward, and if I have an open wound, I probably won’t go in. If the water’s brown after a storm, you probably shouldn’t go in.”

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